concurring in the result.
I agree that we should reverse and remand. I am not able, however, to agree that we should reach this result based on the abuse of discretion analysis contained in the lead opinion. I would premise the decision on the analysis contained in footnote 3.
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187, 1198 (1986) requires that we uphold the trial court’s grant or denial of new trial motions “unless the court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it.” (Emphasis in original.) Our usual abuse of discretion analysis does not consider “manifest abuse” of discretion. I cannot agree that the abuse of discretion identified in the lead opinion was manifest, that is, “unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, and self-evident.” Black’s Law Dictionary 962 (6th ed. 1990).
The trial court concluded that “a different result may occur” in a retrial rather than concluding that a different result “would follow a retrial” as required by Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967) (emphasis added). In my view, this necessitates reversal.