dissenting:
I dissent. The majority appropriately analyzes the reasonableness of the search by weighing (1) the extent to which the procedure used may threaten the safety or health of the individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and (3) the community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1617-18, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). Application of these factors supports the court of appeals’ conclusion that the officer’s search may have been reasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 563-64 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (remanding for factual findings on whether Hodson’s air or blood supply was cut off).
The officer’s use of his gun and the throat-hold admittedly involved a threat to Hodson’s safety and health. However, no express threat accompanied the brief display of the gun, and Hodson’s own actions in attempting to swallow several containers of illegal drugs in questionable packaging equally threatened his own safety and health. Moreover, a defendant should not be allowed to object to the fact that more force was used when it was his active resistance that caused the conflict to escalate. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 5.2(i), at 474 (1987) [hereinafter LaFave].
The officer’s use of his gun and the throat-hold also intruded upon Hodson’s dignity interests. However, suspects in serious crimes often are arrested at gunpoint, sometimes to prevent them from destroying the physical evidence of their crime. Also, “it makes little sense to say that the minimal pressure necessary to prevent swallowing is excessive, particularly when it is considered that if the drugs are swallowed the defendant ... may have to submit to an even more disagreeable procedure ... for retrieval of the evidence.” LaFave § 5.2(i), at 473. Although admitting that “drug dealers commonly seek to secrete drugs by means of swallowing,” the majority fails to provide any guidance to officers facing similar scenarios in the future other than to say that the evidence is “readily (if inconveniently) accessible through nonviolent means.” These “nonviolent means” are also sure to intrude upon a defendant’s dignity interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183, 190 (1952) (search involving pumping of defendant’s stomach to obtain drugs he swallowed *1161upon Ms arrest “shocks the conscience” and violates due process); People v. Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, 330 N.W.2d 405, 411 (1982) (“[Defendant’s objections would certainly have been more forceful had the officers permitted him to swallow the contraband and then hauled him off to a hospital to have his stomach pumped.”), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 917, 103 S.Ct. 1900, 77 L.Ed.2d 288 (1983).
The community has a strong countervailing interest in obtaining the evidence to fairly and accurately determine guilt. Despite the majority’s confidence that the drugs will be “susceptible to identification and recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest settings,” there is no evidence in the record on wMch to base that assertion. The trial court correctly found that the officers “could have kept the defendant in isolation but the evidence of the drug ingestion could have been destroyed [and] the amounts could have been altered by his stomach acids.”
As noted by the majority, other jurisdictions predominantly hold as reasonable some degree of force to obtain evidence from a suspect’s mouth. See LaFave § 5.2(i), at 472. The court of appeals held that “ ‘it is constitutionally reasonable for the police to “place” their hands on a suspect’s throat to prevent the swallowing of evidence, as long as they do not “choke” him [or her], i.e., prevent him [or her] from breathing or obstruct the blood supply to [the] head.’” Hodson, 866 P.2d at 563 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Williams, 16 Wash.App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Ct.App.1977)). Many other jurisdictions support this standard. See, e.g., People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal.3d 394, 124 Cal.Rptr. 528, 536 n. 6, 540 P.2d 624, 632 n. 6 (1975) (“Inasmuch as the mouth is not a sacred orifice and there is no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, attempts to swallow evidence can be prevented as long as excessive force is not employed.”); People v. Fulkman, 235 Cal.App.3d 555, 286 Cal.Rptr. 728, 730, 734 (Ct.App.1992) (reasonable force where police applied pressure to defendant’s chin and throat, placing fingers on either side of defendant’s neck but did not “choke” him); People v. Johnson, 231 Cal.App.3d 1, 282 Cal.Rptr. 114, 116, 121 (Ct.App.1991) (no excessive force where officer placed his right arm around defendant’s neck but did not “choke” him); People v. Cappellia, 208 Cal.App.3d 1331, 256 Cal.Rptr. 695, 699-700 (Ct.App. 1989) (no excessive force where police “neither impaired defendant’s breathing nor caused him to gasp, choke, or cry out in pain”); State v. Winfrey, 359 So.2d 73, 77 (La.1978) (reasonable measures used where officer put his fingers in defendant’s mouth while using other hand to prevent him from swallowing); State v. Desmond, 593 So.2d 965, 967, 971 (La.Ct.App.) (reasonable force where police “grabbed defendant by the throat to prevent him from swallowing” and yelled “give it up”), cert. denied, 600 So.2d 637 (La.1992); Holloway, 330 N.W.2d at 410 (reasonable search where officer placed his fingers inside defendant’s mouth and retrieved evidence while defendant remained standing, search was brief, and “defendant’s blood supply and air passages were not restricted or cut off’); State v. Victor, 76 Ohio App.3d 372, 601 N.E.2d 648, 653 (1991) (reasonable search where defendant remained standing, search was accomplished quickly with defendant opening his mouth as soon as pressure was applied to his throat, and defendant did not appear to be injured), appeal denied, 63 Ohio St.3d 1455, 590 N.E.2d 750, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 902, 113 S.Ct. 292, 121 L.Ed.2d 217 (1992); Williams, 560 P.2d at 1163 (establishing test adopted by Utah Court of Appeals).
Some jurisdictions allow even more force to obtain evidence from a suspect’s mouth than the court of appeals’ standard. See, e.g., Espinoza v. United States, 278 F.2d 802, 803-04 (5th Cir.) (necessary force used where officers obtained evidence from defendant’s mouth “by grabbing the defendant about the throat, choking him[,] and attempting to pry open his mouth by placing pressure against his jaw and nose”), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827, 81 S.Ct. 65, 5 L.Ed.2d 55 (1960); State v. Harris, 244 Neb. 289, 505 N.W.2d 724, 728, 732 (1993) (reasonable force where “lateral vascular neck restraint” combined with “Heimlich-type maneuver” used on defendant); Hernandez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (reasonable measures taken where two officers rushed defendant and “wrestled” him to the ground, and *1162while one officer then held his arms, the other “choked” him until he spit out four balloons).
The court of appeals properly determined that assuming Hodson’s air and blood supply were not cut off, the community’s interest in obtaining the evidence and in protecting Hodson from the effects of the drugs he was about to swallow outweighed his individual interests. The degree of pressure to the throat permitted by the court of appeals’ standard is reasonable and workable and is well supported by the majority of cases in other jurisdictions. Also, the temporary use of the gun in the crisis situation did not render the search unreasonable.
I would affirm the court of appeals’ decision.
RUSSON, J., concurs in Justice HOWE’s dissenting opinion.