dissenting:
This is an original proceeding brought by Stanley Jurgevich, a prisoner of the State of Colorado. On July 24, 1995, Jurgevich submitted a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to direct the District Court of Routt County to grant him the use of a transcript from his earlier trial in order to prepare a Crim.P. 35(e) motion for postconviction relief.
Upon consideration of the petition, we issued a rule directing the Routt County District Court to show cause why the relief requested by Jurgevich should not be granted.
The majority discharges the rule based on its conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jurgevich’s motion for a free transcript “because Jurge-vieh failed to show that he may be entitled to relief under Crim.P. 35(c) and that the record might contain specific facts that would substantiate any alleged errors.” Maj. op. at 566. I respectfully dissent.
In 1989, Jurgevich was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for forty years. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In June of 1995, Jurgevich filed a pro se motion for loan of the trial record and existing transcript for thirty days so that he might conduct a supervised inspection of the material for the purpose of preparing a Crim.P. 35(c) motion. In his motion for loan of the record, Jurgevich stated that the transcript and trial record were necessary for identifying any errors made, although no specific errors were delineated. He alleged, however, that he “was not competent during the proceedings due to the heavy medication he was taking and his mental instability, thus him [sic] memory, especially at this late date, is distorted and can only offer conclusory allegations which would be insufficient.” The district court denied Jurgevich’s motion for lack of good cause, noting that he failed to list the errors he sought to discover or support by review of the record and transcript and that the material had previously been loaned to Jurgevich’s counsel of record, who had not moved for postconviction relief.
Jurgevich filed a motion to reconsider. In this motion, he specifically stated that he wished to claim (1) ineffective assistance of counsel on trial and appeal, (2) failure of counsel to present mitigating evidence, and (3) failure of counsel to raise the issue of incompetency to proceed. He again alleged that at trial he “was heavily medicated and was mentally unstable, thus could not comprehend the proceedings and was, therefore, not competent to proceed.” In response to the court’s earlier observation about the loan of the material to counsel, Jurgevich alleged that he never was able to speak to counsel after she had obtained the record and has not heard from her since. The district court denied the motion to reconsider by written order without further assignment of reasons.
In its opinion, the majority correctly states that a defendant must demonstrate that he may be entitled to relief under Crim.P. 35(e) before he can obtain a free transcript. Romero v. District Court, 178 Colo. 200, 202, 496 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1972). In addition, the determination of whether a person is entitled to a free transcript for purposes of an appeal rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. People v. Nord, 767 P.2d 750, 751 (Colo.App.1988); see Nikander v. District Court, 711 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Colo.1986). An abuse of discretion is established when, upon review, an appellate court can say with fair assurance that the decision made was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302, 1308 (Colo.App.1992). Although I agree with the majority’s explication of the law, I disagree with its application of the law to the facts of this ease.
*570In the present case, Jurgevich wishes to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the fact that he was mentally impaired at the time of trial and that counsel failed to assert his incompetency. This mental impairment, he asserts, was caused by the ingestion of several prescribed medications he was taking at the time of trial which impaired his thought process and affected his ability to understand the proceedings and to participate and assist in his defense. Given Jurgevieh’s alleged mental condition at the time of the trial, it is reasonable to conclude that it would be difficult for him to remember completely or reliably all that transpired seven years ago without the assistance of the trial record and transcript.1 Thus, Jurgevich adequately demonstrated that the trial record and transcript are necessary for preparation of a motion for postconviction relief.
In addition to the above, Jurgevich is only asking the court to loan him an existing transcript. He is not requesting that the court expend funds to prepare a new transcript; rather, he seeks only to have the existing transcript mailed to the correctional facility for his review under supervision for a limited period of thirty days. The minimal cost associated with Jurgevich’s request should not override his need to obtain the trial record and transcript.
Since Jurgevich adequately demonstrated a need for the trial record and transcript, and these documents are in existence, I would hold the decision to deny the loan of these items to be manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair, and to constitute an abuse of discretion by the district court. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would make the rule to show cause absolute.
. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, the present case is similar to Sherbondy v. District Court, 170 Colo. 114, 459 P.2d 133 (1969), in that Jurge-vich's alleged impaired mental condition at the time of trial supports his claim that his memory is distorted and capable of producing only con-clusory, not specific, recollections of the trial proceedings so that he cannot adequately formulate a Crim.P. 35(c) motion without the aid of the record.