ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
HUNTLEY, Justice.The petition for rehearing by the board asserts one issue we wish to address, that being that “there was no relationship between Oppenheimer, Bolen Cattle Co., and the brand board giving rise to any duty on the part of the brand inspector toward Oppenheimer.” This assertion ignores the basis upon which liability exists in this case, namely IDAPA 11.02.3, which reads:
IDAPA 11.02.3. Fresh brands on cattle, horses, mules and asses bearing older brands shall not be accepted as proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or bill of sale covering older brands, (a) The state brand inspector may inquire into the ownership of all livestock bearing two or more brands.
We take this opportunity to clarify that liability in this case is solely premised upon IDAPA 11.02.3. Our opinion states that “[wjhile a state brand inspector may exer*430cise discretion in deciding whether to inquire into the ownership of livestock bearing two or more brands, the appearance of a “fresh” brand mandates that the same inspector shall not accept such a brand as proof of ownership____” At 425, 732 P.2d at 663. We do not imply that the brand inspector, by virtue of the “discretion” granted him by IDAPA 11.02.3 is, in some way, a “planner.” A brand inspector has, and presumably always will, act “operationally” in accordance with a policy or plan. Here, the “plan” (IDAPA 11.02.3) allowed for “discretion” in certain instances (where there are two'or more brands) and none in others (where fresh brands are present). Although semantically confusing, the “discretion” allowed brand inspectors as to whether to inquire into ownership of cattle with two brands is not at all analogous to the “discretion” excepted from liability under I.C. § 6-904(1) of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, otherwise known as the “discretionary function” exemption.
We also use this opportunity to clarify an argument put forth in part II of Justice Bakes’ dissent. Justice Bakes contends that the brand inspector’s actions were not the proximate cause of Oppenheimer’s injuries, as the injuries stemmed from Bolen’s conversion of the cattle. This argument misses the point — specifically, that Oppenheimer complains of the brand inspector’s negligent inspection of the cattle as leading to the subsequent conversion.
The argument also fails to account for the most obvious and controlling authority on situations such as the instant one, where a third party is involved in the injury to the plaintiff—Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). In Durtschi, Justice Bakes argued that the essence of the plaintiffs’ claims was premised on Durtschi’s sexual assault and battery on the children, just as he now argues that “[t]he essence of Oppenheimers’ claim for damages is premised upon the tort of conversion.” Justice Bakes then states that the brand inspector had not “committed any of the traditional acts of conversion which our prior cases have recognized.” Thus, the brand inspector’s actions were not the proximate cause of Oppenheimer’s loss.
The response to this argument in Durtschi is equally appropriate in this case and deserves quotation in its entirety:
Under the plaintiffs’ allegations, the children’s injuries arose out of the basic negligence of the school district. The injuries were the foreseeable consequence of the school district’s negligence in retaining Durtschi despite full knowledge of his proclivities.
The fact that the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a third party does not absolve the school district from liability for its negligence. The concept of supervening causation is inapplicable, under the allegations of the present case. Durtschi’s actions were the foreseeable result of the school district’s alleged failure to exercise due care to protect its students. The very risk which constituted the district’s negligence was the probability that such actions might occur.
It is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his conduct negligent, has brought about the expected harm. Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir.1972). To do so would fly in the face of basic principles of tort law, as recounted in the Restatement:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal, does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 449. See Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 428, 354 P.2d 172, 176 (1960).
The fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; the school district had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students *431from such a danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence. Under the allegations of the present case, Durtschi’s actions would not constitute as supervening cause, and the school district’s tortious conduct would not arise out of the assault and battery. Rather, the root of the assault and battery would be in the district’s own negligence. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 471-72, 716 P.2d at 1243-44.
Oppenheimer’s allegations, like those in Durtschi, arose out of the negligence of the brand inspector during the inspection of the cattle, not out of any alleged conversion.
The action of Bolen in this case, like the action of Durtschi, was “the foreseeable result of the [brand inspector’s] alleged failure to exercise due care____ The very risk which constituted the [brand inspector’s] negligence was the probability that such actions might occur.” Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 472, 716 P.2d at 1244. On the solid authority of supporting case law the Court concluded that when the third party’s actions were the foreseeable result of the tortfeasor’s own negligence, those actions do not constitute supervening causation. Id. In this case, the foreseeable result of the brand inspector’s allegedly lax performance was that fraudulently rebranded cattle would be transferred. The roots of the conversion of Oppenheimer’s cattle were in the brand inspector’s alleged negligence.
The further argument, that IDAPA 11.-02.3 fails to define those to whom the brand inspector’s duty is owed is addressed in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986).
While the statute does not purport to identify by name or class those to whom that assigned duty is owed, in the instant circumstances, obvious to the utmost, the motorists foreseeably endangered by the negligent supervision of Bloom are within the class protected. Id., 723 P.2d at 768. (Footnote and citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Here, cattle ranchers, like Oppenheimer, who rely on the brand inspectors to do their jobs, are within the class protected.
Obviously, the brand inspector did not supervise Bolen in the same fashion that the state supervised Durtschi and Bloom. However, at the time of inspection, the brand inspector had the authority and duty to insure that Bolen had not fraudulently rebranded someone else’s cattle. This he allegedly failed to do, despite the regulatory directive that such brands “shall not be accepted as proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or a bill of sale covering older brands.” The reasoning of Durtschi applies here. One whose negligence brings about harm at the hands of a third party is liable for that harm.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for rehearing is denied.
DONALDSON and BISTLINE, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, Chief Justice, and BAKES, Justice,