(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I agree with the majority that Holman's fees were excessive and that he should be removed as cotrustee of the Stuart trusts. *720I also agree that Holman should pay the attorney fees incurred by the plaintiffs and beneficiaries because of his breach of fiduciary duty to the trust. I believe that the majority errs, however, in granting the cotrustee, Seattle-First National Bank, its attorney fees on appeal. Majority, at 717-18.
Seattle-First was originally a defendant in this case, but settled with the beneficiaries prior to trial and at trial testified on their behalf. A judgment against Holman was entered in favor of the trust (in the name of the cotrustees) and Holman was removed as a cotrustee. Holman appealed both the judgment and his removal, and Seattle-First argues that it should not have been named as a respondent. Moreover, Seattle-First argues that the sole purpose of its being named a party to this appeal was to delay execution of the judgment, and pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 it should receive its attorney fees for the costs of answering this appeal. The majority grants those fees, which I believe is error.
RCW 4.84.185 sets forth the only grounds on which Seattle-First relies for this award:
In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon final judgment and written findings by the trial judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense. This determination shall be made upon post-trial motion, and the trial judge shall consider the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense as a whole.
This statute does not authorize the granting of fees for appellate court decisions, and cannot be a justification for this court to award Seattle-First the costs of this appeal. Thus, the majority awards attorney fees to Seattle-First without authority.
Furthermore, Seattle-First argues that the only purpose *721in its being named a party on appeal was to prevent it from executing its judgment (as cotrustee) against Holman. This is incorrect. RAP 8.1 states that a party may delay execution of judgment by filing of a supersedeas bond. Failure to file such a bond allows a successful party to execute on its judgment in all but a few cases not relevant here. Holman has not filed such a bond. Seattle-First was free at all times to execute on the original judgment.
Therefore, I would not allow the bank to recover over $4,000 in attorney fees for the cost of this appeal. Seattle-First has not advanced any theory which would justify such an award, and has not presented any argument as to why Holman is using this appeal solely as a vehicle for delay. I would deny Seattle-First attorney fees for this appeal.
Hamilton, J. Pro Tern., concurs with Dore, J.Reconsideration denied May 19, 1987.