concurring in part and concurring in the result:
I concur in parts I and III of Justice Durham’s opinion. I join in the conclusion of part II and agree that plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to support an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, I do not join in part II’s wide-ranging dictum to the effect that mental illness, in the absence of physical manifestation, is sufficient to support a claim. There is no need to attempt to decide this question for the purposes of this appeal, since under any theory plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient. Moreover, Justice Durham’s dictum conflicts not only implicitly with the approach of a ma*983jority of this court in Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 784 (Utah 1988) (opinion of Zimmerman, J., joined by Hall, C.J., Howe, Assoc. C.J., and Stewart, J.), but explicitly with what I think are the better-reasoned authorities she cites but does not follow.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART, J., concur in the concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.