concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant, Family First Mortgage Corporation, was entitled to summary judgment, I respectfully dissent. I concur with the conclusion of the majority that all other named defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1 declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2001). “Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.” Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). “ ‘To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practice a plaintiff must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.’ ” Mitchell v. Linville, 148 N.C. App. 71, 73-74, 557 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001) (quoting Spartan Leasing v. Pollard, 101 N.C. App. 450, 460-61, 400 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1991)). Section 75-1.1 provides two distinct grounds for relief. Id. “If a practice has the capacity or tendency to deceive, it is deceptive for the purposes of the statute. Id. “Unfairness” is a broader concept than and includes the concept of “deception.” See id. “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy, as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” See id.
In the instant case, plaintiff asserts numerous allegations to establish that Family First engaged in unfair and deceptive practices. I conclude that there exist genuine issues of material fact in at least three of plaintiff’s assertions. First, plaintiff argues that Family First failed to conduct an in-person interview with plaintiff. Plaintiff further contends that the majority of the contact made was with her granddaughter. As noted in the majority opinion, plaintiff fails to provide, and we fail to find any cases in which a court has held that such an interview is necessary or proper. As stated supra, when considering whether a practice is unfair or deceptive, it is proper to consider the facts of the individual case. Therefore, it is proper for a jury to consider (1) whether, under the facts of this case, the failure of *139Family First to conduct an in-person interview with plaintiff affected commerce; (2) the impact of such a practice on the marketplace; and (3) whether the practice caused injury to plaintiff.
Second, plaintiff argues that her name was either forged by Family First or that Family First accepted forged documents. The majority asserts that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of forgery; the record, however, reflects that plaintiff provided evidence that the signature on the document differed from her own signature. A jury could conclude that accepting forged documents offends public policy, is unethical and can substantially injure consumers. In determining what is unfair and deceptive, the “intent or good faith belief of the actor is irrelevant,” and the “effect of the actor’s conduct on the consuming public is relevant.” Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.1 agree with plaintiffs contention that it is for a jury to decide whether the documents were forged and whether such a forgery should have caused Family First to question the circumstances of the loan.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the loan application documents were backdated. Whether backdating documents in a business transaction could have the tendency to deceive and be unfair to the consumer is an issue for the trier of fact. As noted earlier, unfairness is a concept that includes deception.
In light of the fact that plaintiff provided evidence presenting genuine issues of material fact regarding potential violations of section 75-1.1, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Family First.