dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement into evidence, I respectfully dissent.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that, in order to be admissible, a defendant’s confession must be voluntary and “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.’ ” State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)). In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the court considers such factors as
whether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declar-ant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.
Id. The trial court’s findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. See State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 78-79, 150 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911, 17 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1967). The determination, however, of what facts amount to such threats or promises as to make a confession involuntary and inadmissible in evidence is a question of law, and is fully reviewable by the appellate court. See State v. Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 226-27, 152 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1967). “ ‘So, whether there be any evidence tending to show that confessions were not made voluntarily, is a question *247of law.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205, 206 (1867) (Phil. Law)). This Court must therefore decide as a matter of law whether the circumstances of the instant case rendered the confession inadmissible.
In considering whether a confession is free and voluntary, our Supreme Court in the landmark case of State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259 (1827) (1 Dev.), stated that
Confessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called voluntary when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are attributable to that love of truth which predominates in the breast of every man, not operated upon by other motives more powerful with him, and which, it is said, in the perfectly good man cannot be countervailed. These confessions are the highest evidences of truth, even in cases affecting life. But it is said, and said with truth, that confessions induced by hope or extorted by fear are, of all kinds of evidence, the least to be relied on, and are therefore entirely to be rejected.
Id. at 261-62. These principles enunciated by the Roberts Court “long before the insertion of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution of the United States” have been consistently recognized and followed by our courts. Gray, 268 N.C. at 77, 150 S.E.2d at 7-8; Fuqua, 269 N.C. at 227, 152 S.E.2d at 71 (noting that “ ‘a confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected’ ” (quoting Roberts, 12 N.C. at 260)). Accordingly, our Supreme Court has found inadmissible a statement induced by an officer’s promise to testify that the defendant was cooperative in confessing, see Fuqua, 269 N.C. at 228, 152 S.E.2d at 72, a statement induced by assistance on pending charges and promises of assistance on potential charges arising out of the confession, see State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C. 333, 338, 130 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1963), a statement influenced by a suggestion that the defendant might be charged with accessory to murder rather than murder if he confessed, see State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 293, 163 S.E.2d 492, 503 (1968), and a statement given after the defendant was told that any confession he made could not be used against him since he was in custody, and that if he confessed “it would be more to his credit hereafter.” Roberts, 12 N.C. at 259. See also Gray, 268 N.C. at 77, 150 S.E.2d at 7 (noting that a confession may not be admitted where induced by the police through the slightest emotions of hope or fear); State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 810, 164 S.E. 337, 337 (1932) (stating that “a confession wrung from *248the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in such questionable shape as to merit no consideration); State v. Campbell, 133 N.C. App. 531, 537, 515 S.E.2d 732, 737 (1999) (noting that “[i]ncriminating statements obtained by the influence of hope or fear are involuntary and thus inadmissible”), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 111, 540 S.E.2d 370 (1999).
In the instant case, the trial court found that law enforcement officers neither threatened nor made any promises to defendant in obtaining his confession, except for those promises “regarding his cooperating in helping the police to apprehend the person from whom he had obtained the cocaine.” These findings and conclusions contradict, however, the evidence presented at trial. As recognized in the majority opinion, Officer Holland acknowledged that he informed defendant that his girlfriend could be charged with a crime and her car seized if defendant did not cooperate. Officer Holland stated that the possibility of the arrest of defendant’s girlfriend was “the topic of discussion through the whole process” of obtaining defendant’s statement. Officers also used the threat against defendant’s girlfriend in inducing his promise to assist the officers in their investigation of “Flash.”
Like the Fuqua Court, I conclude that the evidence presented at the instant trial tends to show that “[t]he total circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession impels the conclusion that there was aroused in him an ‘emotion of hope [or fear]’ so as to render the confession involuntary.” Fuqua, 269 N.C. at 228, 152 S.E.2d at 72. Because the confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible, I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence.
“Error committed at trial infringing upon one’s constitutional rights is presumed to be prejudicial and entitles him to a new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Russell, 92 N.C. App. 639, 644, 376 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2001). The burden of showing harmless error is on the State. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b). Such error is only harmless where it can be shown that the improper admission of the evidence had no reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict of the jury. See State v. Easterling, 119 N.C. App. 22, 38, 457 S.E.2d 913, 922, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 762 (1995). In his statement to law enforcement officers, defendant confessed to meeting a known drug dealer and receiving substantial amounts of cocaine from him. Because I conclude that there is a reasonable possibility *249that defendant’s statement influenced the jury verdict against him, I would hold that the trial court’s improper admission of this evidence entitles defendant to a new trial.