DISSENTING OPINION OE
CIRCUIT JUDGE CROCKETT.Where a question of statutory construction arises this court has uniformly held that words of a statute should be taken in their usual sense unless there is sufficient to indicate that they were intended to be taken in some other sense. In Hawaii Cons. Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 269, this court reviewed the several decisions and summarized them at p. 272 as follows:
“It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning. As said previously by this court, its ‘plain and obvious meaning,’ Kauai v. McGonagle, 33 Haw. 915; in its ‘usual sense,’ Yoshizawa v. Hewitt, 31 Haw. 625; ‘in its known and ordinary significance,’ Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 686; in its ‘commonly accepted *196meaning,' Estate of Castle, 25 Haw. 108, 118; in its ‘usual sense,' Ottmann v. Young, 12 Haw. 303, 306; Thomas v. Norton, supra.” (Emphasis added.)
Also in Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 686, it was said: “Unless, therefore, there is something in the context showing that Congress intended a different meaning we must hold that it intended the words used to be accepted in their known and ordinary significance. By the context is meant not only, the sentence or section in which the words occur but the whole body of the act.” (Emphasis added.)
I am unable to concur with the conclusion reached by the majority for the reason that I can find nothing in the context of the statute in question to indicate that the words of the statute should be taken in some other than their usual sense.
The statute in question is a general tax statute, not applicable to a particular trade or business and there is nothing in the statute or, as set out in the majority opinion, nothing in the committee reports to indicate that the legislature was aware of the fact that the words in question had a “trade-meaning” distinct from their ordinary and usual meaning. The fact that there is such a distinction has only been developed when experts in a particular trade or industry have been called to testify. To now give these words their “trade-meaning” is in my opinion judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation. It is not an ascertainment of the legislative intent.
■ Since this is primarily a question which depends upon a determination of legislative intent, I am in further disagreement with the majority in applying to these words their “trade-meaning” for the reason that the “trade-meaning” in itself is arbitrary and incomplete. It includes as “canning” only those products which are canned by being “sterilized by heat” and “hermetically sealed.” It has been *197pointed out by eminent authorities that there are at least five or more other processes of sterilization which to some extent accomplish the same purpose; that these products are likewise hermetically sealed in cans or similar containers and distributed to be consumed. It is also a matter of common knowledge that many products are sold and distributed in sealed cans or containers which apparently are not or do not require sterilization by heat or any sterilization process. A few examples are beers, soda-water, fruit juices, coffee, tea, peanuts, macadamia nuts and candies. Under the construction of the statute adopted by the majority these articles which now appear on the shelves of our supermarkets in cans are not “canned.”
This is a general tax law, not confined to any one particular trade or industry, I therefore do not agree that the rule that a trade-definition should be adopted in preference to the common or dictionary meaning of the words in question.