Edwards v. State of Georgia

McMurray, Chief Judge.

This is a workers’ compensation case. The claimant, Queenie Edwards, has been employed since September 1980 as a secretary with the State Department of Labor, Employment Security Agency. On *88March 18, 1982, claimant slipped and fell at a nearby fast-food restaurant while she was getting lunch for her office manager. The claimant was unable to work for several weeks (although she received her full salary as sick pay during her convalescence), and she eventually applied for workers’ compensation. The administrative law judge and the full Board (with one dissent) awarded the claimant benefits, but the superior court reversed on the basis that the claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employer’s business.

It was undisputed that the claimant regularly obtained lunch for the office manager, and the claimant testified she had considered that task as one of her normal job duties. She contends the task was covered in her formal job description under the catch-all, “other duties as assigned by supervisors and managers.” The claimant further maintained that the time period when she usually obtained her manager’s lunch did not coincide with her own lunch break. While the office manager acknowledged that the claimant regularly procured his lunch for him so that he could remain working at his desk, he considered this service a personal favor and not one of claimant’s assigned job duties; he also believed that the claimant usually obtained his lunch during her own lunch break.

It is, of course, axiomatic that only injuries which arise out of and in the course of employment are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). Ordinarily, whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact and the Board’s award, if supported by any evidence, may not be disturbed. Davidson v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 139 Ga. App. 621 (229 SE2d 97) (1976); Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Carlan, 104 Ga. App. 170 (121 SE2d 316) (1961). We find the case sub judice to fall within the general rule.

The Board determined that the manager could direct the employees to do various other jobs which would facilitate the proper performance of his job duties and it was his decision to remain in the office, continue to work and send the secretary to get lunch. Even though the office manager considered this to be a personal favor to him, the evidence was ample for the Board to determine that at the time she slipped and fell the claimant was not doing anything of a personal nature; and that the claimant was benefiting the employer by obtaining the office manager’s lunch and allowing him to continue to work at his desk.

When an employee is injured while in the performance of a task which is of benefit to the employer, he is covered by the Act. Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 711, 712 (3) (236 SE2d 915); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Merck, 117 Ga. App. 163 (159 SE2d 300); Crowe v. Home Indem. Co., 145 Ga. App. 873 (245 SE2d 75); 1A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 27.00, 27.40. Having determined that *89the claimant was injured while performing a task from which her employer derived benefit, the Board properly awarded benefits to the claimant.

Decided November 28, 1984 Rehearing denied December 17, 1984 Robert A. Eisner, Christopher G. Knighton, for appellant. A. Cullen Hammond, for appellee.

The employer’s reliance upon U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 829 (5 SE2d 9) and American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Lemming, 187 Ga. 378 (200 SE 141) is misplaced. In these cases, the claimant was not in the scope of his employment and the task which he undertook was of no benefit to the employer.

The award of the full Board was supported by evidence under the “any evidence” rule. Accordingly, the superior court erred in reversing the award of the Board.

Judgment reversed.

Banke, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Sognier, and Benham, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., Pope and Beasley, JJ., dissent.