concurring in part/dissenting in part.
Based on the facts revealed by the record in this case, I must concur in the results reached by the Court. However, I must dissent to the Court’s determination that in substance, an attorney can be dilatory, wait *517until just before the Court is to instruct the jury, orally request an instruction by number from the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal instruction book, and comply with his or her responsibility as an officer of the court.
This Court should never let itself be so removed from the realities of the rigors of the everyday management of trial practice that it loses sight of the pressing demands constantly placed on trial judges. We must be ever mindful that until the State of Oklahoma provides the District Courts with the automated word processing and computer equipment it needs to perform its duties, trial judges are relegated to the archaic requirement of individually typing each instruction. When a request for an instruction is not made until the last minute, it creates a burden upon the trial court that this Court should not condone. The basic threshold of professional responsibility for a trial attorney is that he or she has prepared and knows his or her case, which includes the instructions required to be submitted to the trial judge for use at the conclusion of the trial.
I agree the trial judge in this case should have allowed the defense attorney an additional thirty minutes to prepare the requested instructions in writing. However, I cannot agree to the carte blanche ruling in this case that all a trial attorney must do is wait until the end of trial, when the Court has already prepared a set of instructions, and request additional instructions by OUJI-Cr. number. What if the trial attorney requests eight or ten different instructions instead of just one? Why should the trial judge be required to be the secretary for the trial attorney? What about the jurors who have to cool their heels waiting for instructions to be prepared which should have already been prepared? The naivete of the Court in regard to the management requirements of a jury trial has precluded consideration of these and many other issues. In addition, it can hardly be said that the request for the instruction was “timely made” under the facts of this case.
Very little effort is required for a trial attorney to prepare his or her requested instructions in the course of trial preparation. Indeed, it is a responsibility which was abdicated in this case. This Court should not establish a rule which rewards lack of preparation or laziness on the part of a trial attorney. Therefore, I must dissent to the Court’s decision which erodes the professional responsibility of trial attorneys. Based on the Court’s decision in this case, it appears the trial judges must shoulder the responsibility of requiring timely preparation and submission of instructions by trial attorneys. One method of accomplishing this requirement is for the trial judge to enter a scheduling order in the case that requires trial counsel to submit requested instructions to the Court in writing by a day certain, either prior to the day of trial or during the course of the trial. This order will place the parties on notice with sufficient time to prepare and present requested instructions to the Court.
I must also disagree with the general statements the Court utilizes in discussing instructions on a defendant’s theory of defense. The general paraphrasing of previous decisions of this Court skew the actual rulings in those cases. In addition, the Court cites to Lester v. State, 408 P.2d 563 (Okl.Cr.1965), without recognizing that Lester was modified in Kinsey v. State, 798 P.2d 630, 633 (Okl.Cr.1990). The Court in Kinsey provided the trial court must first determine if the evidence is sufficient to support an instruction on a defendant’s theory of defense. The theory of defense must be tenable as a matter of law and be supported by the evidence before there is any requirement to provide an instruction to the jury. Therefore, the right to a jury instruction regarding a defendant’s theory of defense is not as broad as stated by the Court. In addition, Lester does not state that “regardless of the lack of written request” an instruction on the theory of defense must be given. Further, a reading of Cherbonnier v. State, 751 P.2d 1098 (Okl.Cr.1988), and Broaddrick v. State, 706 P.2d 534 (Okl.Cr.1985), fails to reveal where the Court predicated its ruling on “whether or not he (defendant) requests *518instructions on that ground at trial” as related by the Court in this case. I also fail to find the holding in Grayson v. State, 687 P.2d 747 (Okl.Cr.1984), supports the Court’s statement that “[a]ny evidence, without consideration of its veracity in light of the weight of the evidence, requires that instruction be given so that the jury may make the ultimate decision whether to accept or reject the offered defense”. In fact, the Court in Grayson determined that appellant in that case had not “even reached the minimal requirement of producing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt”. Therefore, it does not appear the authority cited supports the holding the Court seeks to make in this opinion.