This is an action by a minor, by next friend, against the City of Decatur, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her, at the age of six years, in her near drowning in the Glenn Lake swimming pool, which was owned and operated by the defendant municipality. The complaint was based on the theories of negligence and nuisance. The plaintiff appeals from the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
1. OCGA § 36-33-1 provides: “Municipal corporations shall not be liable for failure to perform or for errors in performing their legislative or judicial powers. For neglect to perform or improper or unskillful performance of their ministerial duties, they shall be liable.” It has been held uniformly in this state that the operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit rather than for revenue producing, is a governmental function, so that the city is shielded from negligence claims by the doctrine of governmental immunity. Scott v. City of Millen, 153 Ga. App. 231 (2) (265 SE2d 30) (1980) and cits. The appellant contends that this Code section is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, in that it violates the appellant’s federal and state rights to equal protection of the law and due process of law, and enables a city to escape liability by merely passing an ordinance authorizing the operation of a swimming pool and declaring that it is for the benefit of the public at large, hence is a governmental function. However, it has been held that the statutory bar of sovereign immunity to suit in tort is not a deprivation of property without just compensation, nor a denial of either equal protection or due process under the federal or state constitutions. City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3 (310 SE2d 892) (1984); Williams v. Ga. Power Co., 233 Ga. 517 (212 SE2d 348) (1975); Azizi v. Bd. of Regents, 132 Ga. App. 384 (208 SE2d 153) (1974); City of Atlanta v. Mapel, 121 Ga. App. 567 (174 SE2d 599) (1970).
2. The evidence here was that the operation of the swimming pool was primarily for public benefit, thus making it a governmental function, so that the city is shielded from negligence claims by the doctrine of governmental immunity. The grant of summary judgment was correct with respect to the negligence claim.
3. The grant of summary judgment was correct as to the nuisance claim, because the factors set out in City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809, 811 (2) (256 SE2d 782) (1979), did not exist here. The doc*780trine of attractive nuisance, discussed in Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 (289 SE2d 232) (1982), is not applicable, because that provides a standard of care of negligence, which does not apply in this sovereign immunity situation.
Decided February 13, 1985. Teddy R. Price, for appellant. Theodore Freeman, G. Randall Moody, for appellee.4. The purchase of general liability insurance by the municipality does not waive sovereign immunity. Winston v. City of Austell, 123 Ga. App. 183 (179 SE2d 665) (1971).
The grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant municipality was not error.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hill, C. J., Smith and Weltner, JJ., who dissent. Clarke, J., concurs specially.