Although this proceeding, filed in reference to Initiative Petition No. 349 (petition/abortion petition), initially presented multiple issues, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) has rendered a single issue dispositive — whether Initiative Petition No. 349 is constitutional. We find: 1) that the issue of the constitutionality of the initiative petition is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Casey; and that we are bound to follow the mandate of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal con-, stitutional law; and 2) that when the unconstitutionality of the initiative petition is manifest, a pre-election judicial determina*3tion of the issue is both appropriate and necessary to avoid a costly and useless election.
The Casey court held that: 1) a woman’s right to obtain an abortion is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;2 2) viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non-therapeutic abortions; and 3) before viability, a woman may choose to have an abortion without undue interference by the State. Because Oklahoma women who do not fall within four narrowly defined categories would be absolutely prohibited from exercising the pre-viability liberty interest expressly recognized by Casey, we are required to find the initiative petition unconstitutional. We also find that an examination of the constitutionality of the initiative petition is necessary, both to avoid misleading citizens about the legal effect of the proposition upon which they may vote, and to avoid a costly election which would ultimately be an exercise in futility. [Nevertheless, this ruling does not prohibit the circulation of a proper initiative petition or of legislation which passes constitutional muster.]
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The proponents, Oklahoma Coalition to Restrict Abortion, Inc., and Fred W. Sellers, Jr. (collectively, proponents/Seilers) filed petition pamphlets with the Secretary of State on June 29, 1990. On December 31, 1990, the protestants, Nancy Feldman and Kim Little (collectively, Feldman) filed a protest to the legal sufficiency of the petition. On January 8, 1991, the Secretary of State filed the proposed ballot title prepared by the Attorney General. The proponents filed a timely appeal to the ballot title on January 17, 1991. Although Feldman also appealed the ballot title, the challenge was dismissed by order of this Court on April 13, 1992, as being untimely. However, a valid ballot title challenge is before us — the one filed by the proponents. The initial briefing period concerning the legal sufficiency of Initiative Petition No. 349 was commenced when this Court ordered a briefing schedule on March 3,1992. The final filings of the parties were submitted to the Court on June 4, 1992.
The issue of the constitutionality of the initiative petition was fairly raised within certain of the other issues raised by Feld-man in the challenge to the legal sufficiency of the petition.3 On July 14,1992, in the interest of fairness, we ordered the parties and the Attorney General to submit simultaneous briefs addressing Casey and its impact on the constitutionality of the proposed ballot title and the substance of Initiative Petition No. 349.4 Those briefs were filed on July 24, 1992.
*4In response to this Court’s order of July-14, 1992, the proponents, Sellers, and the protestants, Nancy Feldman, Kim Little, Janet M. Taliaferro, Andrew Tevington, and Pam Fleischaker (collectively, protestants) and the Attorney General filed briefs specifically addressing the constitutionality of the initiative petition in relation to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). We also granted the amici’s motion to brief the issue. The protestants, the amici curiae, and the Attorney General assert that Initiative Petition No. 349 is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Casey. As we read the proponents submission, they concede that the initiative petition was unconstitutional when it was drafted, that it was unconstitutional when it was circulated, and that it is unconstitutional now. However, the proponents insist that we should allow the petition to go forward as an exercise in political advocacy. We find that the initiative petition is unconstitutional based on controlling federal precedent enunciated by the United States Supreme Court as recently as June 29, 1992.
I.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INITIATIVE PETITION IS GOVERNED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S PRONOUNCEMENT IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY. BECAUSE WOMEN WHO DO NOT FALL WITHIN FOUR NARROWLY DEFINED CATEGORIES MAY NOT EXERCISE THE PRE-VIABILITY LIBERTY INTEREST RECOGNIZED BY CASEY, WE ARE REQUIRED TO FIND THE INITIATIVE PETITION UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
When the initiative petition was filed, it appeared that a major re-examination of the law in relation to a woman’s right to obtain a nontherapeutic abortion was in progress. Legal commentators anticipated either the overruling or the substantial undercutting of the principles of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64, 93 S.Ct. 705, 731-32, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 182-83 (1973).5 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 518, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3052, 106 L.Ed.2d 410, 435-36 (1989), the United States Supreme Court rejected the strict trimester approach of Roe v. Wade. The Webster Court also found that a State’s interest in protecting human life did not come into play only at viability as previously expressed in Roe.6 Additional evidence of the *5uncertainty surrounding Roe’s continuance as a rule of law can be seen by the vote in Webster. Five Justices — Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White and Scalia, who have consistently voted to overrule Roe, as well as Justices O’Conner and Kennedy— joined in part IID of the majority opinion criticizing Roe.7
After June 29, 1992, when the United States Supreme Court promulgated its opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), co-authored by Justices O’Conner, Kennedy, and Souter,8 which reiterates, and perhaps strengthens, the central premise of Roe — that women, may for some time period, make independent decisions to obtain nontherapeutic abortions — the submission could not go forward. Casey reaffirmed the central premise of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 177 (1973), reh’g denied, 410 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1409, 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973), that the right of privacy founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty includes a woman’s right to have an abortion. Five members of the Casey Court’s precedential inquiry joined in part IIIA of the opinion which found that “Roe’s underpinnings were unweakened in any way affecting its central principle” and that Roe was not “unworkable.”9
The issue of the constitutionality of the initiative petition is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Casey. In this instance, the only course available to this Court is to follow what the United States Supreme Court, the final arbiter of the United States Constitution, has decreed.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2806, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the United States Supreme Court framed the constitutional question as:
“... whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest....”
After considering the constitutional questions, the principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, the majority answered the question by concluding *6that the essential holding of Roe should be both retained and reaffirmed. The Casey Court, after balancing the woman’s liberty interest against the State’s interest in fetal life, held that the line should be drawn at viability; that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy; and that, before viability, no state may deprive a pregnant woman of that right.10 Five members of the Court agreed that:
“... It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman’s life or health. And third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.... Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that a State shall not ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The controlling word in the case before us is ‘liberty.’ ...”11
Initiative Petition No. 349 criminalizes and absolutely prohibits abortions except in four narrow circumstances: 1) grave impairment of the female’s physical or mental health; 2) rape as defined in 21 O.S.1991 § 1111; 3) incest as defined in 21 O.S.1991 § 885; and 4) grave physical or mental defect of the fetus.12 If the abortion does not fall within one of the exceptions, any person who performs or aids or abets in the performance of an abortion upon another person is punishable by up to four-years imprisonment.13 Initiative Petition No. 349 does not allow a woman to make a private decision to obtain an abortion at any time during the pregnancy— either before or after viability. It does not protect a woman’s liberty interest as defined by Casey.
*7Because the United States Supreme Court has spoken, this Court is not free to impose its own view of the law as it pertains to the competing interests involved. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Const, art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, the Oklahoma Constitution requires compliance with federal constitutional law on issues of federal law.14 Art. 1, § 1 of the Okla. Const, provides that:
“The State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.”
We are doubly bound to uphold the law of the land. Our limited role, like the role of all state courts in such cases, is to apply federal constitutional law, not to make it nor to guess what it may become.15 By virtue of our constitutional oath of office,16 we have solemnly sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Roe and Casey may be overruled. The Freedom of Choice Act of 1992, now pending before Congress, which would codify Roe, may be enacted. Or, the proponents may present a proper petition for submission to a vote of the people. Speculation as to which of many paths the law in a given area will take in the future is a transparent veil behind which people act out their own policy preferences. “Guesses” about the future development of any rule of law have never been an acceptable rule of decision in Anglo American jurisprudence.
We will uphold the law of the land whatever it may be. Today, the law of the land is that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to make an independent choice to continue or to terminate a pregnancy before viability. Because viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions, and because women who do not fall within four narrowly defined categories may not exercise the pre-viability liberty interest recognized by Casey, we are compelled to find the initiative petition unconstitutional. Not quite two years ago, we defined our duty in In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 797 P.2d 326, 330 (Okla.1990) holding that:
“... This Court is the Protector of our Constitution. While the electorate has a constitutional right to amend the Oklahoma Constitution, it is this Court’s responsibility to see the petitions for change actually reflect the voters intent and comply with the requirements set out in both the Constitution and the statutes. In this case, the requirements are simply not met.”
The unconstitutional abortion ban is the cornerstone of Initiative Petition No. 349.17 Without the inclusion of the petition’s restrictions, the remainder of the proposed legislation is meaningless. Therefore, the existence of a severability provision is of no avail in the instant cause.18 Neither can the Court rewrite the provision to ensure that it meets the constitutional requirements of Casey.19 We are required to pre*8serve a woman’s right to make a decision to obtain an abortion before viability to maintain harmony with the law. This position is diametrically opposed to the proposal presented.
II.
A PRE-SUBMISSION DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INITIATIVE PETITION IS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY WHERE THE PROPOSAL IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND IS JUSTIFIED WHEN A COSTLY AND FUTILE ELECTION MAY BE AVOIDED.
Although the proponents continue to press for an election on the initiative petition, they apparently admit that the petition was unconstitutional under Roe when it was drafted and circulated, and that, if it were adopted by a vote of the people, it would be unconstitutional under Roe and Casey. The proponents claim that notwithstanding the facial unconstitutionality of Initiative Petition No. 349, the people should be permitted to vote because In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla.1975) was wrongly decided, and additionally that the people have an absolute right to vote on any measure. The proponents urge us to allow a vote on the petition in order to present a “test case” urging the United States Supreme Court to overrule or to redetermine Roe and Casey.
The protestants, the Attorney General, and the amici charge not only that the measure is unconstitutional under Casey, but that to allow the question to appear on the November ballot would be to sanction a costly, divisive, and unnecessary election. The Attorney General, who may under certain circumstances have the duty of defending the measure if it were adopted by a vote of the people and subsequently ehal-lenged, asserts that such a measure cannot be defended because no principled argument can be made in its defense.
In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla.1975), was decided seventeen years ago. Since then, this Court, in an unbroken chain of decisional law, has held that a determination on a constitutional question as to the legality of a measure proposed to be enacted into law by the people will be reached by this Court when raised by a party if, in the Court’s opinion, reaching the issue may prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election. That finding has been reaffirmed by this Court on at least four subsequent occasions. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, 780 (Okla.1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 347, 813 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Okla.1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, 796 P.2d 267, 269 (Okla.1990); and In re Initiative Petition No. 315, 649 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Okla.1982) all solidly stand for the premise that if a properly preserved constitutional challenge is leveled at a proposed law and a ruling on the issue would prevent a useless election resulting in the enactment of an unconstitutional statute, this Court has the authority, as well as the responsibility, to decide the matter.
We cannot undervalue the importance of the constitutional right, under the Oklahoma Constitution, to initiative and referendum. Nor may we ignore our constitutional duty. In Ralls v. Wyland, 40 Okla. 323, 138 P. 158, 160 (1914), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that:
“The powers of the initiative and the referendum reserved to the people occupy a prominent place in the Constitution and laws of this state, and their act, when invoking such powers, should be guarded by the courts, to the end that whatever is their due is kept inviolate. In the exercise of such powers, it is necessary that the provisions of the *9Constitution should be adhered to.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The very first article of the Oklahoma Constitution and its very first section acknowledge that the “State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.” The very first section of the Bill of Rights of the Okla.Const. art. 2, § 1 limits the right of the initiative. It provides:
“All political power is inherent in the people; and government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it; Provided, such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The proponents eleventh hour revelation that they apparently knew that Initiative Petition No. 349 was unconstitutional when it was drafted, circulated, and submitted only serves to raise additional questions about its legitimacy. Were prospective signers of the proposition informed of its unconstitutionality, and of its strategic role in a long-range strategy of political advocacy i.e., its “test case” status? Or conversely, were the signers led to believe that they were supporting a proposition that would enjoy legal validity if adopted by the voters?
There is nothing in the ballot title or anywhere else in the record before us from which we can discern that the ballot title was “in harmony with the law,” or that it is “legally correct.” The argument that the proposition should be placed before the voters, notwithstanding that it violates the law of the land as expressed in Casey, raises the additional issue of the treatment of those citizens who may support state-imposed limitations on abortions, but who are not inclined to vote for an unconstitutional measure. The Okla.Const. art. 5, § 6 provides:
“Any measure rejected by the people, through the powers of the initiative and referendum, cannot be again proposed by the initiative within three years thereafter by less than twenty-five per centum of the legal voters.”20
Although initiative voters always must face the dilemma posed by the three-year rule, this dilemma is unnecessarily sharpened by the proponent’s insistence on the submission of a patently unconstitutional measure where defeat will impair the initiative rights of those supporters who also support constitutional government. While this Court cannot monitor every aspect of every initiative campaign, it can express its concern about a post-circulation concession of unconstitutionality and its impact on this vital component of our political democracy.21
The proponents appear to assert that this “absolute right” to vote is derived from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. At the same time, they concede that the right of initiative does not arise from the United States Constitution. Indeed, only twenty-three of our sister states provide this constitutional right. It seems self-evident that the exercise of a non-federal right can be conditioned by the same state constitution that creates and confers it. In this instance, art. 2, § 1 of the Okla. Const, bars statutory enactments which violate the law of the land.
Assuming arguendo, the relevance of proponents’ “core speech” argument in this context, it is obvious that these rights are not absolute. Judicial intervention to interdict a hypothetical state constitutional amendment prohibiting the free exercise of religion would “limit” the proponents “core speech” activities; however, no one would question the legitimacy of such a limitation.
We understand the proponent’s characterization of their petition as “core political speech” as additional emphasis for the im*10portance of the initiative process and for placing the proposition on the November ballot — and not as an attempt to raise a First Amendment claim. It is, in effect, an argument that their “free speech” rights to advocate an unconstitutional law outweigh constitutional rights of all other Oklaho-mans that the Oklahoma Constitution should not be repugnant to the Constitution which we all share as Americans. The Oklahoma drafters were careful to frame a constitution which was in harmony with the constitution written by the founding fathers. Our reverence for the initiative rights guaranteed by the Oklahoma Constitution cannot be overstated. It is our profound belief that our rejection of the Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 109 P. 558, 562 (1910) rule which held that the constitutionality of an initiative petition is not subject to review prior to its enactment by the voters, and our reaffirmation of constitutional lawmaking principles enhances those rights rather than diminishes them.
Not surprisingly, the proponents have not cited us to a single provision of federal or Oklahoma law which trammels their First Amendment rights under the federal constitution, and our own review discloses none. The proponents rely upon Myer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1891, 100 L.Ed.2d 425, 434-35 (1988)22 for the proposition that a pre-submission judicial review of the constitutionality of Inita-tive Petition No. 349 violates “core political speech” protected by the First Amendment. The reliance on Myer is misplaced. In Myer, the United States Supreme Court held that Colorado could not prohibit payment of persons hired to circulate initiative petitions. Here, the procedural issue of paying circulators is not presented. The manner in which the petition was circulated is not at issue. Nothing in this opinion should be read to limit the content of any petition circulated. However, if an unconstitutional measure garners enough signatures to be presented to the people and is challenged on constitutional grounds, pre-submission judicial review is appropriate.23
This Court’s action is not based on the content of the proponents’ “speech”; rather, it responds to the lawfulness of that speech in the context of our fundamental law on initiative and referendum. Nothing in this Court's action precludes the proponents of legal limitations on abortion from bringing forward a proposal on that exact subject matter so long as the proposal conforms to the applicable legal requirements for initiative proposals. In this context, the most basic requirement of the Oklahoma Constitution is that the change in law petitioned for be compatible with the United States Constitution as construed by the United States Supreme Court. It should also be noted that the proponents of change in federal constitutional law are entirely free to exercise their First Amendment rights in the arenas where federal law is shaped.
We noted in In re Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441, 434 P.2d 941, 946 (Okla.1967) that the real purpose of an initiative petition is to secure a vote of the people upon a proposed law or constitutional amendment. We also expressed the view that the repeal of any conflicting provisions of the law in effect at the time the proposed law is to become effective as being merely incidental to the purpose of the petition. This is not what is before us here. The proponents apparently take the position that they are not attempting to amend Oklahoma law. The goal clearly implicit in their “test case” strategy is a change in federal constitutional law. The *11initiative process guaranteed to our citizens by the Oklahoma Constitution was never intended to be a vehicle for amending the United States Constitution — nor can it serve that function in our system of government.24
The proponents also complain that because bills pending before the Legislature are not subject to pre-enactment judicial scrutiny for constitutional flaws, we should similarly defer consideration of this proposition until such time as the people have acted. This argument quite simply mixes apples and oranges, and it ignores the many longstanding and well-recognized differences between these two modes of lawmaking. Few, if any, of the pre-enactment requirements governing the initiative and referendum process are applicable to the legislative process, such as, for example: 25 circulating petitions, signature verifications, eighth-grade reading level of the ballot title, mandatory challenge periods, and submission to the Attorney General of the ballot title for review for “legal correctness.” Likewise, many of the hurdles built into our legislative structure do not apply to initiatives and referenda: namely, passage by both houses, legislative committee consideration, and the availability of a gubernatorial veto. These are two very different processes and the proponents’ efforts to confuse them are misplaced.
The proponents also claim that the proposal here is different from the Casey restrictions. Yes, it is. It is different, most significantly, in that Initiative Petition No. 349 is so much more restrictive that it could not be enforced in a manner consistent with the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Subject to some procedural restrictions, the Pennsylvania statute 26 reviewed in Casey did not ban first trimester abortions.)
Even though the proponents continue to cling to Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 109 P. 558, 562 (1910), this Court implicitly recognized in 1975, that the Threadgill doctrine was frequently nothing more than a rationalization for deferring obvious issues of constitutionality. The effect of this doctrine, especially when it involves transparently unconstitutional proposals, is subject to the perception by the citizens of our state that their votes, so eagerly solicited, are ultimately meaningless acts in an elaborate charade. The danger of Threadgill is that, in effect, citizens may be led to believe that their votes on matters of intense public concern count, when this Court is already fully aware that the proposed measure is subject to being struck down as unconstitutional within months should the voters approve it. Conversely, the vote on an indisputably unconstitutional measure will almost certainly be distorted by widespread citizen awareness of the invalidity of the measure. In any event, a truly meaningful vote on the initiative becomes impossible.
The underlying sense of our cases dating back to 1975 is that Threadgill trumpets a triumph of form over substance which calls into question the very legitimacy of the initiative process itself by merely postponing the inevitable. For seventeen years, the majority of this Court has understood that the Threadgill doctrine has been modi*12fied to the extent that it no longer operates as a bar to the pre-submission review of constitutional defects in initiative proposals.
Here, the initiative petition makes no allowance for a woman’s pre-viability decision on whether to obtain an abortion. If enacted, it could not withstand a Casey-based challenge; and, at best, it would serve as an expensive, non-binding public opinion poll. Were we to allow the initiative to be submitted to the people, a costly, fruitless, and useless election would take place. The pragmatic approach to the consideration of constitutional issues begun in Norman strengthens rather than impairs the initiative process because voters are assured that their vote on a state question is meaningful. The utilization of pre-sub-mission constitutional scrutiny guarantees that Oklahomans are neither “cut off at the pass” nor engaged in a game of “Kings-X” after they have exercised their most precious right — the right to vote.
CONCLUSION
The right of the initiative is precious and it is one which we are zealous to preserve to the fullest measure of the spirit and the letter of the law. All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions is resolved in favor of the initiative.27 However, the right of the initiative is not absolute. There are constitutional and statutory limits on the process.28 After Casey, it became incontrovertibly clear that the petition could not withstand a constitutional challenge. Although state law may afford greater rights than those guaranteed by federal law, it may not curtail rights guaranteed by federal law or the United States Constitution.29
If the people of Oklahoma want to vote on a valid enactment concerning abortion, they have the constitutional right to circulate another petition. However, it would be a disservice to the proponents, to the protestants, and to the citizens of this state to hold an election which could not withstand the immediate Casey challenge which would be bound to follow. At that time, this Court would be forced to declare the enacted proposition unconstitutional. The legal resources of the parties, the people of Oklahoma, and the judiciary would be better spent in considering a petition which is not void on its face.
INITIATIVE PETITION INVALID; ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE BALLOT.
LAVENDER, SIMMS and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. WATT, J., concurs in part I, concurs by reason of stare decisis in part II. HODGES, V.C.J., and HARGRAVE, J., concur in part and dissent in part. OPALA, C.J., and ALMA WILSON, J., dissent.. The United States Const, amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Fourteenth Amendment is enforceable against the states. When the United States Supreme Court speaks on matters of federal constitutional law, state courts are bound under the Fourteenth Amendment to follow its mandate. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961).
. Initially, Feldman raised a myriad of constitutional challenges. However, when Feldman filed the brief in support of the protest to the petition, all constitutional challenges except those relating to federal constitutional law were waived. The federal constitutional issues were raised to demonstrate that even if the Initiative Petition were approved by the people, it could not survive a constitutional challenge and would be ineffective to regulate first and second trimester abortions. Sellers responded to the constitutional challenges.
.We are bound under the United States Const, art. VI, cl. 2 and the Okla. Const, art. 1, § 1 to follow the United States Constitution as the supreme law of the land. We are required under 12 O.S.1991 § 2201(A) to take judicial notice of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. Even if this were not so, in matters of publici juris, the Court may on its own raise and determine the issue. As Chief Justice Opala wrote for the majority of the Court in Matter of McNeely, 734 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla.1987):
*4"... The dispositive issue here — one of public law — was neither raised nor briefed by the parties. When public-law issues are present this court may, on review, resolve them by application of legal theories that were not tendered below....”
See also, Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Okla.1985) (Overruled on other grounds.), also authored by Chief Justice Opala for the majority of the Court.
Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2201 provides in pertinent part:
"A. Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States....”
. See, S. Hewett, “Hodgson v. Minnesota: Chipping Away at Roe v. Wade in the Aftermath of Webster," 18 Pepperdine L.Rev. 955, 995 (1991); C. Forsythe, "A Legal Strategy to Overturn Roe v. Wade After Webster: Some Lessons from Lincoln," 1991 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 519, 520-21 (1991); E. Brueschke & J. Brueschke, "Constitutional Law: The Future of the Abortion Controversy & the Role of the Supreme Court After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," 43 Okla.L.R. 481, 513 (1990); W. Dellinger & G. Sperling, "Colloquy — Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Abortion & the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade," 138 U.Pa.L.Rev. 83, 89 (1989); P. Prieto, “City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.: Stare Decisis Prevails, but for How Long?,” 38 U. Miami L.Rev. 921, 938 (1984).
. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Ohio v. Akron Center, 497 U.S. 502, -, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 2979, 111 L.Ed.2d 405, 418 (1990) and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1768, 114 L.Ed.2d 233, 250 (1991). The Supreme Court upheld a parent notification provision containing a by-pass provision in Akron Center. In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld íegulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting grantees under Title X from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy. These cases along with Webster's, apparent foreshadowing that the holding in Roe was subject to reexamination, left the constitutional issues presented by the initiative petition questionable.
. The Court wrote in part IID of Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 518, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3052, 106 L.Ed.2d 410, 435-36 (1989):
"... We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.... We have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of the Constitution that has proved 'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice’_ (T)he rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the Roe framework — trimesters and viability — are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle. Since the bounds of the inquiry are essentially indeterminate, the result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine_”
. Our discussion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2815, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), is predicated on what a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded in parts I and II of the opinion. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined the authors in these portions of Casey and in parts III, V-A, V-C, and VI. When an opinion is delivered by a divided United States Supreme Court, the rule for determining the holding of the Court is laid down in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260, 265-66 (1977) in which the Court said:
"... When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds....”
In a judgment upholding a statute, the narrowest grounds are those which uphold the fewest statutes as constitutional. Conversely, when the rule is applied to striking down a statute, the narrowest grounds are those invalidating the fewest statutes as unconstitutional.
. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, see note 8, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2810-13, supra.
. The United States Supreme Court upheld some restrictions on the right to obtain an abortion — an informed consent provision, a one-parent consent with a judicial by-pass procedure for minors, and a 24-hour waiting period— while preserving the basic right to obtain an abortion.
. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, see note 8, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2802-06, supra.
. Section 5 of the petition provides:
“Abortion shall not be a crime under the following circumstances:
(A)(1) The abortion was necessary to save the life of the female or to avoid a grave impairment of the female's physical or mental health;
(2) For the purpose of determining grave impairment of a female’s mental health in Section 5(A)(1), impairments or stresses produced by an unwanted birth, social stigma or embarrassment, interruption of life plans, or lack of financial resources, which have not resulted in psychosis or major depressive illness, shall not constitute grave mental impairment;
(B) The pregnancy resulted from rape as defined by Title 21, Section 1111 of the Oklahoma Statutes;
(C) The pregnancy resulted from incest as defined by Title 21, Section 885 of the Oklahoma Statutes; or
(D) The unborn child would be born with a grave physical or mental defect."
.Section 4 of the petition provides in pertinent part:
"(A) Except as provided in Section 5, a person commits the crime of abortion if:
(1) Such person performs an abortion upon another person; or ...
(2) Such person intentionally or knowingly aids or abets the performing of an abortion upon another person....
(B) Every natural person guilty of the crime of abortion is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than four (4) years.
(C) Any person, other than a natural person, guilty of the crime of abortion is punishable by a fine not less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) but not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00).”
. The Okla.Const. art. 1, § 1.
. See, State of Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 420, 53 S.Ct. 667, 670-71, 77 L.Ed. 1292, 1296 (1933); McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Okla.1990); State v. Board of Control, 83 So.2d 20, 23 (Fla.1955).
. The Okla.Const. art. 15, § 1.
. Section 5 of the petition, see note 12, supra.
. See, In re Initiative Petition No. 347, 813 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Okla.1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, 649 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla.1982); Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Board of County Comm’ns, 468 P.2d 501, 507 (Okla.1970); Battles v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Comm’n for Crippled Children, 206 Okla. 444, 244 P.2d 320, 323-34 (1952); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 P. 486, 491-92 (1926).
.Title 34 O.S.1991 § 10 provides in pertinent part:
"A. Any person who is dissatisfied with the wording of a ballot title may, within ten (10) days after the same is filed by the Attorney *8General with the Secretary of State as provided for in Section 9 of this title, appeal to the Supreme Court by petition in which shall be offered a substitute ballot title for the one from which the appeal is taken. Upon the hearing of such appeal, the court may correct or amend the ballot title before the court, or accept the substitute suggested, or may draft a new one which will conform to the provisions of Section 9 of this title....”
. Initially, pursuant to the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 2, only 8% of the legal voters are required to propose legislative measures, and 15% to propose constitutional amendments.
. The Okla.Const. art. 5, § 8 states that:
"Laws shall be provided to prevent corruption in making, procuring, and submitting initiative and referendum petitions.”
. The only other material presented by the proponents in support of the "core political speech" argument are Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, see note 8, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2885, supra; and a concurring opinion authored by Chief Justice Opala in In re Initiative Petition No. 347, see note 18, 813 P.2d at 1040, supra. Neither of the positions expressed in these special writings could garner a majority vote of either of the respective courts.
. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, 780 (Okla.1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 347, see note 18, supra; In re Initiative Petition No. 315, see note 18, supra; In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla.1975).
.The idea that proponents of change in the federal constitution can select their own means of doing so is not a new one. Although it dealt with a procedural issue, it is important to recognize that the United States Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledge that the federal constitution cannot be amended other than as provided in the federal constitution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in State v. Morris, 79 Okla. 89, 191 P. 364, 365 (1926) cited with approval Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 40 S.Ct. 495, 64 L.Ed. 871 (1920) when it refused to submit the 19th amendment (the prohibition amendment), which had been ratified by the Oklahoma Legislature, to a vote of the people. The Morris Court held that:
“Referendum provisions of state Constitutions and statutes cannot be applied in the ratification or rejection of amendments to the federal Constitution without violating the requirement of article 5 of such Constitution, that such ratification shall be by the Legislatures of the several states, or by conventions therein, as Congress shall decide.”
. See, 34 O.S.1991 § 9.
. Title 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3203 (Purdon 1982); 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3211 (Purdon 1988).
. Oliver v. City of Tulsa, 654 P.2d 607, 613 (Okla.1982).
. The United States Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Okla. Const., art. 1, § 1, art. 2, § 1 and art. 5, § 6; In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 797 P.2d 326, 330 (Okla.1990). See, Community Gas & Serv. Co. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Okla.1965).
. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1214 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741, 751-52 (1980). The following jurisdictions which have considered the issue of abortion have afforded greater individual rights to their citizens under state constitutions than those recognized under the federal constitution. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 1992 LEXIS 1, 5 (Ohio Com.Pl.,1992); Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn.Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134, 152 (1986); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387, 400 (1981); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (1981); Doe v. Director of Dept. of Social Serv., 187 Mich.App. 493, 468 N.W.2d 862, 870 (1991); Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc.2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 979 (1991). We are not called upon here to do so, nor will we speculate concerning the scope of individual liberty under the Okla.Const. art. 2, § 2 or under the Okla.Const. due process clause, art. 2, § 7.