dissenting.
Although I concur with what is said in Division 1 of the majority opinion and with the affirmance of Donohoe’s conviction (Case No. 68592), I cannot agree with the holdings in Division 2 of the majority opinion or with the affirmance of Brownlee’s conviction. For that reason I must respectfully dissent in Case No. 68385.
My disagreement is not with the law cited by the majority but with the application of the facts to that law and the holding that this is one of those “ ‘rare instances’ in which the conduct of an investigating officer needs to be explained.” In my view, the fact that the warden’s conduct in calling in an outside agency is different from the conduct involved in Gaskins v. State, 250 Ga. 386 (4) (297 SE2d 729) (1982), and Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865 (294 SE2d 482) (1982), is not determinative of the issue. Each case will have different facts and those facts need to be applied to the rule set out in Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534 (314 SE2d 910) (1984). The majority does not explain why the conduct of the warden was a matter concerning which the truth must be found by the jury, and I do not believe an adequate explanation exists. The warden could have explained his conduct by testifying to the fact that he arranged for surveillance by an outside agency because of a tip from an informant. The recitation of the content of the tip was gratuitous. For that reason, I believe the warden’s testimony was inadmissible under the rule in Teague, supra, and its admission was error.
I must also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the admission of the testimony was harmless. The statement in regard to the smuggling of drugs by a person posing as a law enforcement officer goes directly to the issue on trial and the identification of Brownlee as a perpetrator. The prejudicial effect was exacerbated by the emphasis placed upon the hearsay statements in the State’s clos*142ing argument (see Goodman v. State, 167 Ga. App. 378 (1) (306 SE2d 417) (1983)), and by the circumstantial nature of the evidence, which was sufficient only when taken as a whole, as is recognized by the majority in the first division of its opinion.
Accordingly, although I concur in the affirmance in Case No. 68592, I must respectfully dissent from the affirmance in Case No. 68385.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Carley join in this dissent.