Ryan v. Gonzales

FROST, Justice

(dissenting).

I must dissent from the majority’s narrow interpretation of the constitutional mandate that a bond be issued for “some specified work or object,” and the resulting separation on the ballot of provisions in the comprehensive 1992 Capital Projects General Obligation Bond Act. In its analysis, the majority pays deference to the important separation of powers policies followed in State ex rel. Chavez v. Vigil-Giron, 108 N.M. 45, 766 P.2d 305 (1988), but in the end it turns its back on Chavez to revive the technical and unworkable “double proposition” rule first enunciated in Lanigan v. Town of Gallup, 17 N.M. 627, 131 P. 997 (1913).

In Chavez, we found that the purpose of a similar section in the Constitution, requiring that constitutional amendments be submitted separately, was to allow voters the opportunity to vote for each amendment separately and thereby prevent “logrolling,” the evil proscribed by the constitutional mandate now under the Court’s scrutiny. Chavez, 108 N.M. at 47, 766 P.2d at 307. We were careful to acknowledge in that case, however, that the legislature must be deemed to be cognizant of the constitutional purpose of preventing logrolling, and “that strong deference should be shown to the legislature” to uphold the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 48, 766 P.2d at 308.

For that reason, we upheld the scrutinized amendment in Chavez that provided for (1) a method for election and retention of justices and judges, (2) an increase in the age and legal experience requirements for justices and judges, (3) the selection of the chief justice and chief judges by their peers, (4) the increase of court of appeals judges from three to seven, and (5) the legislative authority to annually redraw judicial district boundaries, increase the number of judicial districts, and provide for additional judges in those districts. Id. at 46-47, 766 P.2d at 306-07. In upholding these varied provisions of the amendment as a single amendment, we held that “although perhaps testing the limits of joinder, the provisions in this amendment are not devoid of a reasonable or rational basis of commonality.” Id. at 49, 766 P.2d at 309. In Section 2 of the 1992 Bond Act the legislature specifically found:

[F]or the betterment of the welfare of the people of New Mexico, there is a need to issue general obligation bonds in order to fund public capital improvements and acquisitions, including the construction and improvement of public buildings and the acquisition of equipment, furnishings and other necessities for the state, its political subdivisions and institutions. The legislature further finds that the acquisition of certain water rights is also necessary for the betterment of the welfare of the people of New Mexico [and] that the capital projects and acquisitions authorized by the 1992 Capital Projects General Obligation Bond Act are necessarily related to each other to accomplish the foregoing purposes and that the authorized projects are interrelated.

I do not see how the majority in this case determines that the provisions in the 1992 Bond Act are any more “devoid of a reasonable or rational basis of commonality” than the varied provisions upheld in Chavez, especially when the legislature determined in this matter that the provisions were interrelated.

The “object” of the 1992 Bond Act is to fund public capital improvements and acquisitions for the betterment of the welfare of the people of New Mexico. Related to that object are the various proposed capital improvement expenditures. Given the legislative finding of “relatedness” between these provisions, the 1992 Capital Projects General Obligation Bond Act should be submitted to the voters in a unified ballot question.

I believe the majority failed in its constitutional separation of powers duty to indulge every presumption in favor of the validity and regularity of legislative enactments. See City of Raton v. Sproule, 78 N.M. 138, 142, 429 P.2d 336, 340 (1967). The high courts of other states have confronted the basic issue presented in this matter and have taken the position urged in this dissent. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, while recognizing that their constitutional “single object” requirement was implemented to prevent logrolling, upheld a bond act for the construction and improvement of penal institutions, institutions for the mentally retarded, and institutions for the blind and handicapped. New Jersey Ass’n on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 403 A.2d 437, 442-43 (1979). The New Jersey Court noted that the legislature had always been given deference in determining the relatedness of projects and that that deference should be given an important precedential position in determining the constitutionality of a statute. Id. at 445.

The Supreme Court of Washington upheld legislation authorizing capital projects ranging from fisheries to educational facilities. It reasoned that “this constitutional requirement [mandating a single subject] is to be liberally construed so as not to impose awkward and hampering restrictions upon the legislature.” State Fin. Comm. v. O’Brien, 105 Wash.2d 78, 711 P.2d 993, 994 (1986) (quoting Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wash.2d 392, 418 P.2d 443 (1966)); see also Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So.2d 849 (1946) (appropriations bill for the payment of outstanding debts of state and its agencies, without specifying the kind of debt or its purposes, had but one “subject”); Short v. State, 600 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1979) (bond act for construction and improvement of correctional and public safety facilities met “one-subject” requirement); Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1974) (single bond proposition approved by the voters to make capital improvements for flood control and small boat harbor projects met “one-subject” requirement); Walton v. Carter, 337 S.W.2d 674 (Ky.1960) (bond act to fund development and improvement of state parks, and construction and improvement of highways, bridges and tunnels constituted but one “subject”). The precedent of Chavez, giving great weight to the legislature’s determination of relatedness of provisions to constitute but one object, should have been followed in this case.

In addition, the majority mistakenly relies upon cases involving general obligation bonds proposed to be issued by municipalities, counties, or school districts. The issuance of such bonds are governed by Article IX, Sections 10, 11, and 12 of the New Mexico Constitution. The governing constitutional provision in this matter is Art. IX, Section 8. The majority erroneously proceeds on the basis that the requirement of the relevant constitutional provisions is identical. The majority utilizes cases that were decided in the context of local government funding, and would extend the rulings in those cases to this question involving a bond act that provides for funding state-wide capital improvements projects. Those cases do not involve a law in which the legislature determined the “object” of the bond act and the “relatedness” of the proposed expenditure. In those cases, this Court did not have the benefit of recent decisions such as Chavez, which accorded deference to the legislature’s determination of “object” in analyzing “double proposition” issues. In the context of state-wide funding, those cases would impose an erroneous hypertechnical application of the “double proposition” rule.

If the position adopted by the majority is followed to its logical conclusion, each individual expenditure provided in a general obligation bond act will have to be listed and voted upon as a separate question. This would result in unduly cumbersome and excessively lengthy ballots. A greater vice is that the success or failure of each expenditure would depend upon the percentage of population residing in the area affected by the expenditure. The result that would follow would be that a statewide property tax could be imposed to finance projects located only in the more populated areas of the state. The majority opinion will make it exceedingly difficult for future legislatures to enact equitable legislation providing for state-wide capital improvements projects.

Giving the appropriate respect to the constitutional separation of powers, and for numerous practical reasons, we should not disturb the legislature’s determination that the 1992 Bond Act met the single object test. This Court said it best in Chavez:

When, as here, competing interpretations or applications of the Constitution’s * * * process do not present one singularly clear and plain mandate, it is to the people and their elected representatives that the Court must turn for the dynamic meaning which most comports with the purpose and intent of a Constitution in which the framers recognize that all political power is vested in and derived from a people who have the sole and exclusive right to. govern themselves.

108 N.M. at 50, 766 P.2d at 310. I need say no more.