The question dispositive of this appeal is whether the strike benefits Mr. Stone received were gifts under N.C.G.S. 105-141 (b)(3). This statute provides in part:
(b) The words “gross income” do not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation under this Division, but shall be reported in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Revenue:
(3) The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent ....
We find no definition of “gift” in either the income taxation Article or the gift taxation statute, N.C.G.S. 105-188. The only reported case citing N.C.G.S. 105-141(b)(3) to date is Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 261 N.C. 504, 135 S.E. 2d 205 (1964). This case concerned whether the forgiveness of debt owed by a corporation to an officer/stockholder constituted income to the corporation or a contribution to its capital. In discussing the transfer of property from a stockholder to a corporation, this Court stated:
The value of property acquired by gift is excluded from both State and Federal income tax. G.S. 105-141(b)(3); Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 102. A gift is usually defined as a voluntary transfer of property by one to another without any consideration therefor. Theoretically, a contribution by a stockholder increases the resources of the corporation and the value of all the stock, including his own, proportionately. This business aspect removes such a transaction from the concept of a pure gift. However, such a gift to a corporation necessarily constitutes a gift to the other stockholders.
In American Dental Co. [318 U.S. 322, 87 L.Ed. 785], the Supreme Court held that the gratuitous release by creditors of accrued rent and interest on merchandise purchased constituted a gift to the corporation which was not subject to income tax. The court said: “The. fact that the motives leading to the cancellation were those of business or even selfish, if it be true, is not significant. The forgiveness was gratuitous, a *742release of something to the debtor for nothing, and sufficient to make the cancellation here gifts within the statute.” (Section 22(b)(3) of the Revenue Code of 1939). The creditor-donors in American Dental Co. were not stockholders. When a creditor who is a stranger to the corporation forgives its debt to him, the forgiveness is exempt from income tax under the exclusion of gifts. When a stockholder gratuitously cancels the debt the corporation owes him, the transaction is denominated a contribution to capital. See George Hall Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T. Ct. 146; Pacific Magnesium, Inc. v. Westover, 86 F. Supp. 644, 649 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Subject to Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1017, the tax result is the same. However, neither constitutes income under state or federal law.
We hold that the forgiveness of the debt in question constituted a contribution to the capital of the plaintiff corporation and was therefore not taxable income.
Id. at 507, 135 S.E. 2d at 208.
The definition of “gift” stated in Manufacturing Co. is broader than the definition used for federal income taxation purposes which was first enunciated in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1218 (1960). Under Duberstein, if a transfer “proceeds primarily from ‘the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,’ or from ‘the incentive of anticipated benefit’ of an economic nature . . ., it is not a gift. ... A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested generosity’ . . . ‘out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.’ ” Id. at 285, 4 L.Ed. 2d at 1225 (citations omitted). By quoting and relying on Helvering v. Amer. Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 87 L.Ed. 785 (1943), and its similarly broad characterization of gift for income tax purposes, in Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 261 N.C. 504, 135 S.E. 2d 205, this Court tacitly rejected the Duberstein definition of gift. Manufacturing Co. is strong precedent to apply the common law definition of gift for income taxation purposes. An analysis of the facts in the instant case compels the holding that the strike benefits paid to Mr. Stone were gifts under our income taxation law.
*743As stated in Manufacturing Co., a gift is a “voluntary transfer of property by one to another without any consideration therefor.” Thus, there must be a transfer, the transfer must be voluntary, and the transfer must be without consideration. There is no question in this case that there were transfers. Money passed from the Defense Fund to Mr. Stone on numerous occasions. The money was not loaned but was transferred to Mr. Stone permanently and absolutely. There is no evidence that the union was in any way coerced into making the payments, nor does anything in the record lead to any conclusion other than that the union made the payments voluntarily. The remaining question, therefore, is whether the union’s payment of strike benefits to Mr. Stone was without consideration.
The record is clear that the union did not demand or require that Mr. Stone perform any services for it in order to be eligible to receive strike benefits. He did not perform any services for the union prior to the inception of the strike. Not all strikers received benefits. Assuming that the trial court’s findings of fact that “Union assistance was based [merely] on moral obligation” and “plaintiff was morally obligated to perform strike duties” are adequately supported by evidence of record, the trial court’s conclusion that the benefits are taxable is erroneous. As the Court of Appeals aptly stated:
It is firmly settled . . . that except in cases of consanguinity or similar relationship, or when there is some antecedent debt or legal obligation, a moral obligation alone does not constitute consideration. See Carolina Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 139 S.E. 2d 362 (1964); Cruthis v. Steele, 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E. 2d 344 (1963); Exum v. Lynch, 188 N.C. 392, 125 S.E. 15 (1924); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 71-73 (1981); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 90 (1963); 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 7 (1943); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 130-133 (1964); 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gifts §§ 1-2 (1968).
68 N.C. App. at 446, 315 S.E. 2d at 354. We further agree with the Court of Appeals that the record in the instant case reveals no special relationship between the union and Mr. Stone, nor is there any evidence that Mr. Stone was party to any antecedent obligation or agreement with the union which would cause the moral *744obligation to constitute legal consideration. Because the voluntary transfers of strike benefits from the union to Mr. Stone were made without consideration, they were gifts and therefore ex-cludable from plaintiffs’ taxable income pursuant to N.C.G.S. 105141(b)(3).
Although our holding rests on state law, we find it in accord with the federal law as expressed in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1233 (1960). The strike benefits in the present case would also be considered gifts under the Kaiser decision. Kaiser was concerned with the question whether strike benefits were gifts under 26 U.S.C. § 102(a). In Kaiser a plurality of the Court held that whether strike benefits constituted a gift under the definition set forth in Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1218 (heard with Kaiser), was a question of fact for the fact finder. The Court held that in Mr. Kaiser’s case the jury appropriately found that strike benefits had been a gift:
[The jury] had the power to conclude, on the record, taking into account such factors as the form and amount of the assistance and the conditions of personal need, of lack of other sources of income, compensation, or public assistance, and of dependency status, which surrounded the program under which it was rendered, that while the assistance was furnished only to strikers, it was not a recompense for striking. They could have concluded that the very general language of the Union’s constitution, when considered with the nature of the Union as an entity and with the factors to which we have just referred, did not indicate that basically the assistance proceeded from any constraint of moral or legal obligation, of a nature that would preclude it from being a gift. And on all these circumstances, the jury could have concluded that assistance, rendered as it was to a class of persons in the community in economic need, proceeded primarily from generosity or charity, rather than from the incentive of anticipated economic benefit. We can hardly say that, as a matter of law, the fact that these transfers were made to one having a sympathetic interest with the giver prevents them from being a gift. This is present in many cases of the most unquestionable charity.
*745363 U.S. at 304, 4 L.Ed. 2d at 1236. Such factors were also present in the instant case, and thus under Kaiser the benefits Mr. Stone received would also be considered gifts.
Because the strike benefits in the instant case are gifts under our interpretation of both state and federal law, we do not reach the question of whether principles of federal taxation law must or must not be followed when a state taxation statute is identical or substantially similar to a federal taxation statute. We note, however, that generally it is preferable that state taxation statutes be interpreted consistently with their federal counterparts. See, e.g., Ward v. Clayton, Comr. of Revenue, 276 N.C. 411, 172 S.E. 2d 531 (1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105141(b)(9), (10), (17), (19), (23), -144(b), -145(e), -147(8), (16), (20) (Supp. 1983). This is especially important when the statute involved is one of technical taxation law or procedure not involving a common law issue, such as presented in this appeal.
Plaintiffs also seek to raise the issues of whether taxation of strike benefits by the State of North Carolina violates the supremacy clause of the Constitution of the United States and whether such taxation is preempted by federal labor legislation. As these issues were neither raised nor decided by the trial court, they are not properly before this Court for review. E.g., Wilcox v. Highway Comm., 279 N.C. 185, 181 S.E. 2d 435 (1971).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice VAUGHN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.