dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the magistrate. The majority’s reading of AS 28.35.-225 is problematical. The obvious purpose of the statute seems to be to confer upon local law enforcement officers the authority to arrest for and otherwise enforce against state traffic violations that occur within the territorial limits of their local governmental subdivisions. In my view, the meaning of this statute is reasonably clear on its face and does not require interpretation. See Anchorage v. Lloyd, 679 P.2d 486 (Alaska App.1984).
The interpretation of AS 28.35.225 adopted by the majority of the court departs from the established traditions of the common law and from the sound authority of decisional law. See, e.g., People v. Marino, 80 Ill.App.3d 657, 36 Ill.Dec. 71, 400 N.E.2d 491 (1980); Schachter v. State, 338 So.2d 269 (Fla.App.1976); State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D.1977); Molan v. State, 614 P.2d 79 (Okla.Crim.App.1980). Absent a clear and unequivocal statutory grant of authority permitting local law enforcement officers to patrol and arrest ex-traterritorially, I do not believe expansion of the common law rule to be justified. I therefore dissent.