dissenting.
I dissent. The opinion of the Chief Justice and Justice Zimmerman are at variance with the principles set down in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Utah, 709 P.2d 265 (1985). While I dissented in that case, I recognize that it constitutes the controlling law on charitable exemptions in this state. There, the two hospitals failed to qualify for a charitable exemption because they did not demonstrate that they made a substantial gift of services to their patients. The daily operating expenses of the hospitals were covered by its patients’ payments. Said this Court:
[The] current operating expenses for both hospitals are covered almost entirely by revenue from patient charges. Although a substantial donation to capital was identified in the case of Utah Valley Hospital, there was no demonstration of the impact of that donation on the current support, maintenance, and operation of that hospital in the tax year in question in this lawsuit.
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The record also shows that neither of the hospitals in this case demonstrated any substantial imbalance between the value of the services it provides and the payments it receives apart from any gifts, donations, or endowments. The record shows that the vast majority of the services provided by these two hospitals are paid for by government programs, private insurance companies, or the individuals receiving care. Collection of such remuneration does not constitute giving, but is a mere reciprocal exchange of services for money.
Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, each tenant pays a portion of the rent and the balance is made up by a government program, viz., federal subsidy. The amount of the rent is fixed at the prevailing rate in the market. The rent covers the full operating expenses of St. Marks Towers, including mortgage payments. No deficit remains which must be covered by a gift from Episcopal Management or other sources. I am unable to see how this arrangement varies from that in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, where the hospital rendered services to patients who received medicare payments from the federal government to assist them. Indeed, the medicare payment seldom covered the hospitals’ cost of services and the hospitals absorbed the deficit. In the instant case, the payment from the federal government plus the amount paid by the tenant fully covers the tenant’s costs. Episcopal Management contributes nothing toward the daily operating expenses. The opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Zimmerman seek to distinguish medicare payments from federal housing subsidy on the ground that medicare is given on the basis of personal entitlement, whereas federal housing subsidy is given to the project. This attempted distinction is fallacious. The subsidy is given to the project only because eligible persons reside therein. Medicare payments, too, are paid directly to the hospital but only for eligible patients therein.
The opinion of the Chief Justice also seeks to justify the exemption in this case on the ground that a government burden is lessened. That basis, too, is faulty. In actuality, what happens here is simply shifting the burden for providing housing for the elderly and handicapped from local and state government to the federal government. The taxpayers of Salt Lake County and of the State of Utah are also taxpayers of the federal government. Shifting the financial burden from local and state government to the federal *666government does not relieve the taxpayers of Salt Lake County from any burden. The principle that a charitable exemption should be given to property which is used in a manner so as to relieve the government from a burden is simply not satisfied under these facts. When non-tax revenues are used, such as contributions and gifts from private sources, to finance activities which otherwise would have to be borne by the taxpayers, a charitable exemption is justified. When property such as St. Marks Tower is taken off the tax rolls, the remaining taxpayers must make up the loss of revenue which occurs because of the exemption. This additional burden on the taxpayers has been justified on the ground that they are given corresponding relief from maintaining the services, activities, and programs which are conducted on the exempt property which otherwise would be funded from tax dollars. That quid pro quo is not realized in this case where the taxpayers are not relieved of any burden because the burden is simply shifted from one government entity to another.
The opinion of the Chief Justice places reliance upon the fact that Episcopal Management Corporation is a non-profit corporation; that it is exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; that its board of trustees serves without compensation; that hundreds of hours of volunteer time were donated to negotiate the financing with HUD; and that $1,500 for travel expenses were also expended. These same things were true with Inter-mountain Health Care and the two hospitals involved in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra. Indeed, in the case of the Utah Valley Hospital more than $4,000,000 had been donated by members of the community to add an addition. We held that effort was not relevant to the granting of a charitable exemption because “there was no demonstration of the impact of that donation on the current support, maintenance, and operation of that hospital in the tax year in question.” The same problem exists in the instant case. It does not appear that the donation of volunteer time and $1,500 of travel expenses has in any way reduced the amount of rent paid by the tenant or the federal government. The tenant’s total rent remains at the prevailing market rate. This was fatal to the claim for exemption in Utah Valley v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, where we said:
The evidence was that both hospitals charge rates for their services comparable to rates being charged by other similar entities, and no showing was made that the donations identified resulted in charges to patients below prevailing market rates.
Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
I agree with the Chief Justice that St. Marks Tower serves an important social need in its community and to the individuals residing therein. This need was conceded in Utah Valley v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, but we held that much more had to be shown to qualify for a charitable exemption. The opinion of the Chief Justice states that “[Tjhe test of charitable purpose is public benefit or contribution to the common good or the public welfare,” and that a charitable purpose is not “limited to the mere relief of the destitute or the giving of alms.” These broad principles were held not to be controlling in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, where specific tests for a charitable institution were enuniciated. Those tests were clearly not met here and the charitable exemption should be denied.
The opinion of the Chief Justice relies heavily on out-of-state cases, particularly from Missouri, viz., Bader Realty and Investment Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747, 217 S.W.2d 489 (1949), and Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, Mo., 566 S.W.2d 213 (1978). Yet in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, a majority of this Court rejected the Missouri line of authority on charitable exemptions because it was held to be inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court in that it “contains no mention of the element of gift that this Court has held crucial to the meaning of charity.” Further, the majority said *667that the exemption granted to a hospital in the Missouri case of Community Memorial Hospital v. City of Moberly, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 290 (1967), was granted “largely on the basis of its non-profit structure.”
In conclusion, in Utah County v. Inter-mountain Health Care, Inc., supra, precise and exact requirements were laid down for a charitable exemption. Now in the next case to follow, the requirements are clearly not met but a charitable exemption is granted upon the authority of out-of-state cases and the pre-Utah County case of Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272 (1971). Our tax assessors and taxing authorities are left to ponder and apply inconsistent rulings of this Court, both made in the past six months.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HOWE, J.