concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
We all agree that plaintiff violated multiple nonjurisdictional requirements of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008) (hereinafter referred to as Dogwood T). The majority’s opinion erroneously disregards prior precedents that impose sanctions for similar violations to those at bar and concludes plaintiff’s violations do not rise to the level of “gross” or “substantial” warranting any type of sanction. See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 192 N.C. App. 114, 119, 665 S.E.2d 493, 499 (2008) (hereinafter referred to as Dogwood II); Odom v. Clark, 192 N.C. App. 190, 193, - S.E.2d -, - (2008). Nevertheless, as addressed later in this opinion, the majority dismisses one of plain*220tiff’s assignments of error and declines to invoke Appellate Rule 2, despite finding no other sanctions are warranted for plaintiff’s multiple rule violations. This holding shows the inherent inequity and danger in non-uniform application of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for all appellate litigants.
Plaintiff’s assignments of error numbered 1 through 5 fail to state any legal basis upon which error is assigned in violation of Rule 10(c)(1) and subjects plaintiff’s broadside and ineffective assignments of error to dismissal. Consistent with our Supreme Court’s mandate in this case and Dogwood I, in order to achieve the appropriate disposition of this appeal, this Court should invoke Appellate Rule 2 and proceed to the merits of plaintiff’s appeal. 362 N.C. at 196, 657 S.E.2d at 364.
On the merits, the majority’s opinion: (1) reverses the lower court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTP”) claims and (2) remands this case to the trial court for (a) entry of judgment in the amount of $31,815.00 on plaintiff’s fraud claim; (b) entry of an award of treble damages; and (c) in the trial court’s discretion, entry of an award for attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 (2005).
I agree that the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim and failed to reach plaintiff’s UDTP claim on that basis. The trial court correctly addressed plaintiff’s UDTP claim based upon defendant’s act of conversion. Here, plaintiff’s trial was bifurcated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30 (2005). The trial court deprived plaintiff and defendant of the opportunity to submit their evidence to the jury regarding punitive damages and defendant was also denied the opportunity to show it was exempt from the UDTP statute or its non-applicability to these facts. The only appropriate remedy for plaintiff and defendant is to remand this case for a new trial on plaintiff’s fraud claim and after the jury’s verdict is returned, plaintiff’s UDTP claim should be re-considered by the trial court. I respectfully concur in the result in part and dissent in part.
I. Application of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
In Dogwood I, our Supreme Court re-stated that, the “ ‘rules of procedure are necessary ... in order to enable the courts properly to discharge their dut[y]’ of resolving disputes. It necessarily follows that failure of the parties to comply with the rules, and failure of the appellate courts to demand compliance therewith, may impede the *221administration of justice.” 362 N.C. at 193, 657 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 790, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930)) (alteration original). Non-uniformity and inequality in the application of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the imposition of sanctions thereunder may raise Federal and State constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection issues and strikes at the heart of fair, impartial, and equal administration of justice to all parties. See State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 317, 644 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2007) (“Fundamental fairness and the predictable operation of the courts for which our Rules of Appellate Procedure were designed depend upon the consistent exercise of this authority. . . . [I]f the Rules are not applied consistently and uniformly, federal habeas tribunals could potentially conclude that the Rules are not an adequate and independent state ground barring review. Therefore, it follows that our appellate courts must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”). “It is, therefore, necessary to have rules of procedure and to adhere to them, and if we relax them in favor of one, we might as well abolish them.” Bradshaw v. Stansberry, 164 N.C. 356, 357, 79 S.E. 302, 302 (1913).
With these principles in mind, our Supreme Court set forth a framework in which North Carolina appellate courts analyze violations of the appellate rules. Dogwood I, 362 N.C. at 193, 657 S.E.2d at 362. The Court stated, “that the occurrence of default under the appellate rules arises primarily from the existence of one or more of the following circumstances: (1) waiver occurring in the trial court; (2) defects in appellate jurisdiction; and (3) violation of nonjurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 194, 657 S.E.2d at 363. Here, defendant’s noncompliance falls within the third category.
[W]hen a party fails to comply with one or more nonjurisdictional appellate rules, the court should first determine whether the noncompliance is substantial or gross under Rules 25 and 34. If it so concludes, it should then determine which, if any, sanction under Rule 34(b) should be imposed. Finally, if the court concludes that dismissal is the appropriate sanction, it may then consider whether the circumstances of the case justify invoking Rule 2 to reach the merits of the appeal.'
Id. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367.
A. Appellate Rules 25 and 34
“Based on the language of [Appellate] Rules 25 and 34, the appellate court may not consider sanctions of any sort when a party’s non*222compliance with nonjurisdictional requirements of the rules does not rise to the level of a ‘substantial failure’ or ‘gross violation.’ ” Id. at 199, 657 S.E.2d at 366.
In determining whether a party’s noncompliance with the appellate rules rises to the level of a substantial failure or gross violation, the court may consider, among other factors, whether and to what extent the noncompliance impairs the court’s task of review and whether and to what extent review on the merits would frustrate the adversarial process. The court may also consider the number of. rules violated, although in certain instances noncompliance with a discrete requirement of the rules may constitute a default precluding substantive review.
Id. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366-67 (internal citations omitted).
Here, plaintiff failed to: (1) state any legal basis upon which error is assigned in her assignments of error numbered 1 through 5; (2) cite any record page reference to the order she appealed from; and (3) argue or present any reasons or authority in support of her assignments of error numbered 6 and 7.
Plaintiff’s assignments of error numbered 6 and 7 are specifically abandoned in plaintiff’s brief. Plaintiff states, “Based upon the stated requested relief, the appellant chooses to abandon and forego these last assignments of error.” These assignments of error are abandoned and dismissed. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005) (“Assignments of error not set out in the appellant’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.”).
Initially, this Court must determine whether plaintiff substantially failed to comply with or grossly violated Appellate Rule 10(c)(1). N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1) (2005) provides, in relevant part:
Each assignment of error . . . shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned. An assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references.
(Emphasis supplied).
There is a presumption in favor of the regularity and validity of judgments in the lower court, and the burden is upon appellant *223to show prejudicial error. Without preserved, assigned, and argued assignments of error that identify the pages where the alleged error occurred, the appellate court can only rummage through the record to ascertain error.
Dogwood II, 192 N.C. App. at 118, 665 S.E.2d at 497 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff submitted the following assignments of error to this Court:
1. Did the Trial Court, . . . err in . . . granting, . . . the defendant’s prior Motion for Directed Verdict on the plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive trade practice claim . . . ?
2. . . . [D]id the Trial Court err:
(a) by . . . granting defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as to the fraud claim and award of compensatory damages; and
(b) by considering and allowing the defendant’s Motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages for conversion;
3. Did the trial court err by refusing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in its Judgment and order addressing the rulings on the defendant’s Motion for Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, and plaintiff’s request to find the conversion by the defendants of plaintiff’s house to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice after plaintiff had specifically moved, pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2) and N.C. General Statute § ID-50, for such findings?
4. Did the Trial Court err by refusing to find the conversion of plaintiff’s house by the defendant, in commerce, to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice, as a matter of law, and refusing to award treble damages and consider plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees?
5. Did the Trial Court err by refusing to award, in its judgment, interest from the date of the conversion of the plaintiff’s house?
Plaintiff’s assignments of error numbered 1 through 5 fail to state any legal basis upon which error is assigned. N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1); see also Walker v. Walker, 174 N.C. App. 778, 781, 624 S.E.2d 639, 641 (2005) (“ [Assignments of error that are . . . broad, vague, and unspecific .... do not comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate *224Procedure.” (Citation and quotation omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 491, 632 S.E.2d 774 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 92, 657 S.E.2d 31 (2007). Plaintiffs assignments of error “[are] designed to allow counsel to argue anything and everything they desire in their brief on appeal” because “like a hoopskirt — [it] covers everything and touches nothing.” Wetchin v. Ocean Side Corp., 167 N.C. App. 756, 759, 606 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2005) (quoting State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 131, 171 S.E.2d 416, 422 (1970)).
In applying Dogwood I and Hart to other remanded cases, this Court has repeatedly held that an appellant’s failure to state any legal basis upon which error is assigned constitutes a “substantial failure” or “gross violation” of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Dogwood II, 192 N.C. App. at 120, 665 S.E.2d at 499; Odom, 192 N.C. App. at 198, — S.E.2d at —. Under these precedents, this Court must decide what sanction should be imposed under Appellate Rule 34.
Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
A court of the appellate division may impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal of the appeal; (2) monetary damages including, but not limited to, a. single or double costs, b. damages occasioned by delay, c. reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred because of the frivolous appeal or proceeding; (3) any other sanction deemed just and proper.
N.C.R. App. P. 34 (b) (2005). Our Supreme Court has stated, “[i]n most situations when a party substantially or grossly violates nonjurisdictional requirements of the rules, the appellate court should impose a sanction other than dismissal and review the merits of the appeal.” Dogwood I, 362 N.C. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366. However, our Supreme Court held that dismissal of an appeal remains appropriate for the most egregious instances of nonjurisdictional default. See id. (“Noncompliance with the rules falls along a continuum, and the sanction imposed should reflect the gravity of the violation. We clarify, however, that only in the most egregious instances of nonjurisdictional default will dismissal of the appeal be appropriate.” (Citation omitted)).
North Carolina appellate courts have historically and consistently dismissed “broadside” and “ineffective” assignments of error *225because the appellant failed to bring forward or present any arguable issue for the appellate court to consider and failed to overcome the presumption of correctness in the trial court’s judgment. See Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422; see also London v. London, 271 N.C. 568, 570, 157 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1967) (“There is a presumption in favor of the regularity and validity of judgments in the lower court, and the burden is upon appellant to show prejudicial error.” (Citation omitted)). “Our Supreme Court’s opinion in [Dogwood I] did not validate hoopskirt assignments of error nor alter the Supreme Court’s precedent in Kirby or this Court’s numerous precedents dismissing broadside and ineffective[] assignments of error.” Dogwood II, 192 N.C. App. at 124, 665 S.E.2d at 500-01 (citations and quotations omitted). In Hart and Dogwood I, our Supreme Court neither cited nor discussed Kirby and the long line of cases following it. See Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422; State v. Patterson, 185 N.C. App. 67, 72-73, 648 S.E.2d 250, 254 (2007), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 242, 660 S.E.2d 538 (2008); Calhoun v. WHA Med. Clinic, PLLC, 178 N.C. App. 585, 602, 632 S.E.2d 563, 574 (2006), disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 5 (2007); State v. Mullinax, 180 N.C. App. 439, 443, 637 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2006); Wetchin, 167 N.C. App. at 759, 606 S.E.2d at 409.
Although appellate jurisdiction is invoked through the filing and serving of a proper notice of appeal, if an appellant fails to bring forward or present any arguable issue for the appellate court to consider, the presumption of correctness in the trial court’s judgment remains and the appeal should be dismissed. See Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (“It is not the role of the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant.”), reh’g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005). The majority’s opinion’s attempt to liken plaintiff’s assignments of error on these issues to the single issue in an appeal from entry of summary judgment is neither persuasive nor validated by any precedent.
In accordance with our Supreme Court’s mandate and following the analysis of Dogwood I, Hart, and the aforementioned authority, plaintiff’s “broadside” and “ineffective” assignments of error subjects her appeal to dismissal. To be consistent and follow our precedents for imposing sanctions for similar “substantial” and “gross” rule violations, plaintiff’s attorney should pay double the printing costs of this appeal. See Dogwood II, 192 N.C. App. at 121, 665 S.E.2d at 500 (“Defendant’s ‘broadside and ineffective[]’ assignments of error numbered 1 and 2 should be dismissed. In the exercise of our discretion, *226defendant’s attorney is ordered to pay double the printing costs of this appeal.”); Odom, 192 N.C. App. at 197, -S.E.2d at-(imposing double printing costs against the defendant’s attorney for violations of Rule 10(c)(1)).
B. Appellate Rule 2
Once it is determined that a party’s “substantial” or “gross” noncompliance with nonjurisdictional requirements warrants dismissal of the appeal, this Court must decide whether to invoke Appellate Rule 2 to attempt to review the merits of plaintiff’s appeal. Dogwood I, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367. Appellate Rule 2 states:
To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and may order proceedings in accordance with its directions.
N.C.R. App. P 2 (2005). The decision whether to invoke Appellate Rule 2 is purely discretionary and is to be limited to “rare occasions” in which a fundamental purpose of the appellate rules is at stake. Dogwood I, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d at 367. Although Appellate Rule 2 has been applied more frequently in criminal cases where severe punishments were imposed, it has also been invoked in a limited number of civil cases. Hart, 361 N.C. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (citing Potter v. Homestead Pres. Ass’n, 330 N.C. 569, 576, 412 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1992); Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Sherrod, 293 N.C. 498, 500, 238 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1977)).
Similar to the issue at bar, in Elec. Serv., Inc., our Supreme Court invoked Appellate Rule 2 to review the merits of the appeal after the defendant failed to except to the trial court’s “crucial” finding of fact upon which he based his entire appeal. 293 N.C. at 500, 238 S.E.2d at 609. The Court stated “[w]hile we note the defendant’s ‘broadside’ exception fails to comply strictly with the requirement of Rule 10(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, appropriate disposition of this appeal requires that we nevertheless proceed to the merits of the case.” Id. (citing N.C.R. App. P. 2; City of King’s Mountain v. Cline, 281 N.C. 269, 188 S.E.2d 284 (1972)). Our Supreme Court’s decision to invoke Appellate Rule 2 was based primarily upon the necessity to reverse this Court’s erroneous decision. Id.
*227Here, after a thorough review of the record, transcript, and briefs, the “appropriate disposition of this appeal requires that we . . . proceed to the merits of the case.” Id. Appellate Rule 2 should be invoked to suspend the Appellate rules in order “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to” plaintiff. N.C.R. App. P. 2.
III. Issues
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by: (1) granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict regarding plaintiff’s UDTP claim; (2) granting defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim and dismissing plaintiff’s punitive damages claims; (3) refusing to enter specific findings of fact and' conclusions of law in its judgment addressing its rulings as specifically requested by counsel pursuant to Rule 52; (4) refusing to find that the conversion of plaintiffs house, by defendant constituted an UDTP; and (5) by refusing to award interest from the date of the conversion of plaintiff’s house. As noted above, plaintiff specifically abandoned her assignments of error numbered 6 and 7 in her appellate brief.
IV. Directed Verdict
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict regarding her UDTP claim.
At the close of all the evidence, during the charge conference, the trial court revisited defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of UDTP and stated “[t]he court is of the opinion that after consideration of all the evidence in this case, that the conduct alleged by the plaintiff against the defendant [sic] does not constitute a practice that so offends the public policy by being either unethical, unscrupulous or injurious that it poses a threat to the consuming public.” The trial court initially granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict regarding plaintiff’s UDTP claim. However, after further exchange with plaintiff’s counsel, the trial court agreed to revisit this issue after the jury’s verdicts were returned:
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: ... So if we come back and the jury comes back and finds either/or, let’s say fraud or conversion, will the court then consider the legal remedies allowable under the UDTP finding to address whether that is an unfair trade practice?
[Trial court]: The court will consider those at that time.
*228This ruling was entirely proper because unless and until the jury returned a verdict holding defendant liable and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages, there were no “damages” for the trial court to consider trebling under the UDTP statute. Any alleged error in the trial court’s initial decision to grant defendant’s motion for directed verdict regarding plaintiff’s UDTP claim was harmless and cured when the trial court announced that it would reserve its ruling on this claim until after the jury’s verdicts were returned. This assignment of error is without merit.
V. Actionable Fraud
A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiffs fraud claim. I agree.
1. Standard of Review
[A] motion [for judgment notwithstanding the verdict] is essentially a renewal of an earlier motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, if the motion for directed verdict could have been properly granted, then the subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should also be granted. In considering any motion for directed verdict, the trial court must view all the evidence that supports the non-movant’s claim as being true and that evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving to the non-movant the benefit of every reasonable inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence with contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies being resolved in the non-movant’s favor. This Court has also held that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is cautiously and sparingly granted.
Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 368-69, 329 S.E.2d 333, 337-38 (1985) (internal citations omitted). “On appeal our standard of review for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that for a directed verdict; that is, whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury.” Whitaker v. Akers, 137 N.C. App. 274, 277, 527 S.E.2d 721, 724 (internal citations and quotations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 352 N.C. 157, 544 S.E.2d 245 (2000). A judgment notwithstanding the verdict may also be entered when the trial court determines a fatal flaw exists in the proceedings or a jury’s verdict to prevent a judgment from being entered thereon. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 50 (2005).
*2292. Analysis
Here, the trial court considered the sufficiency of the evidence to submit plaintiffs fraud claim to the jury on two separate occasions. The trial court first denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of fraud at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and expressly stated, “[tjhere is . . . some evidence from which at this point the court concludes that the jury may be able to infer that the concealment of this material fact might be fraudulent!.]” At the close of all the evidence, the trial court again denied defendant’s renewed motion for directed verdict on all of plaintiff’s claims.
Our Supreme Court has stated:
When plaintiffs have made out a case sufficient to go to the jury ... it is error for the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. Since plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant’s earlier motion' for a directed verdict, the trial court’s entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was improper ....
Bryant, 313 N.C. at 378, 329 S.E.2d at 342 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). The issues before us center upon whether plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant’s earlier motions for a directed verdict on the question of actionable fraud.
While fraud has no all-embracing definition and is better left undefined lest crafty men find a way of committing fraud which avoids the definition, the following essential elements of actionable fraud are well established: (1) False representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party.
Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 568-69, 374 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1988) (citation omitted) (original emphasis omitted), reh’g denied, 324 N.C. 117, 377 S.E.2d 235 (1989).
North Carolina courts are extremely hesitant to allow plaintiffs to attempt to manufacture a tort action and allege UDTP out of facts that are properly alleged as a breach of contract claim. See Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 346 (4th Cir. 1998) (“In this, plaintiffs’ case is remarkably like Strum v. Exxon Company, where we found a similar ‘attempt by the plaintiff to manufacture a tort dispute out of what is, at bottom, a simple breach of *230contract claim’ to be ‘inconsistent both with North Carolina law and sound commercial practice.’ ” (Quoting Strum v. Exxon Company, 15 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1994)). This hesitancy remains even if defendant’s actions in breaching the contract were intentional. See Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Summit Cos., 160 N.C. App. 647, 657, 587 S.E.2d 87, 95 (2003) (“[I]t is well recognized... that actions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract, and that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1.” (Citation and quotation omitted)).
Here, undisputed evidence tends to show that defendant had knowledge of the specific contractual requirement that the salvaged houses had to be relocated to property situated outside the 100 year flood plain. During the trial, defendant conceded multiple times that he had failed to disclose this requirement to plaintiff. Defendant further testified that “there [was] nowhere in the documents” or “public access” where plaintiff could have discovered this requirement. Defendant assisted plaintiff in making arrangements for the relocation of her house and recommended she contact defendant Turner to provide this service for her.
Additional evidence presented at trial tended to show that after defendant was notified by the County that it had breached the terms of the demolition contract, defendant sent a responsive letter dated 10 September 2002, which falsely stated “it had written contracts with each of the three owners of the houses that required the houses to be relocated outside the 100-Year Flood Plain.” At that time, defendant did not have written contracts with any of the three owners, including plaintiff. On 13 September 2002, over a month after plaintiff had purchased and relocated her house to Swan Point Road, defendant requested she sign a document stating, “I understand the house has to be relocated outside the 100 year flood plain.” Plaintiff testified she complied with this request based upon defendant’s assertion that they needed her to sign the document “for [their] records.” As a result of defendant’s non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the demolition contract, plaintiff’s house was further relocated to Bayboro, North Carolina, without her knowledge or permission, where it was subsequently demolished. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and giving her the benefit of every reasonable inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to submit her fraud claim to the jury. Bryant, 313 N.C. at 369, 329 S.E.2d at 337-38.
*231“Since [plaintiffs] evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant’s earlier motion for a directed verdict, the trial court’s entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was improper[.]” Id. at 378, 329 S.E.2d at 342.1 concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim should be reversed.
B. UDTP
Because the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it never revisited the issue of plaintiff’s UDTP claim on the basis of defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a prima facie violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975); see also Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1991) (“The case law applying Chapter 75 holds that a plaintiff who proves fraud thereby establishes that unfair or deceptive acts have occurred.”); Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 470, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1986) (“It is axiomatic that proof of fraud itself necessarily constitutes a violation of the prohibition against unfair or deceptive trade practices.” (Citation omitted)). “Once the plaintiff has proven fraud, thereby establishing prima facie a violation of Chapter 75, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he is exempt from the provisions of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1.” Bhatti, 328 N.C. at 243, 400 S.E.2d at 442 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Here, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for fraud and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $31,815.00, a prima facie violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 was established. Id. Bhatti requires that the burden of proof shift to defendant “to prove that he is exempt from the provisions of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1.” Id. Because the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff’s fraud claim, it did not consider plaintiff’s UDTP claim pertaining to defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Since defendant was the prevailing party at trial on this issue, defendant was never afforded the opportunity to prove it was exempt from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. The majority’s opinion erroneously holds that it may impose treble damages by appellate fiat, denies defendant the opportunity to prove it was exempt from the UDTP statute, and usurps the trial court’s duty to rule on plaintiff’s UDTP claim on remand.
*232C. Punitive Damages
The majority’s opinion’s holding on this issue is also erroneous because plaintiff asserted a claim for punitive damages based upon defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Defendant’s motion for a bifurcated trial was granted.
“Our appellate courts have clearly held that actions may assert both [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 75-1.1 violations and fraud based on the same conduct or transaction and that plaintiffs in such, actions may receive punitive damages or be awarded treble damages, but may not have both.” Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421, 426, 344 S.E.2d 297, 301 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986); see also Compton v. Kirby, 157 N.C. App. 1, 21, 577 S.E.2d 905, 918 (2003) (“Plaintiffs can assert both UDTP violations under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and fraud based on the same conduct or transaction. Successful plaintiffs may receive punitive damages or be awarded treble damages, but may not have both.” (Citation omitted)). In Mapp, this Court addressed the question of when a plaintiff in such cases must elect the basis of recovery and stated: “We hold that it would be manifestly unfair to require plaintiffs in such cases to elect before the jury has answered the issues and the trial court has determined whether to treble the compensatory damages found by the jury and that such election should be allowed in the judgment.” 81 N.C. App. at 427, 344 S.E.2d at 301 (emphasis original).
Here, the trial court erroneously: (1) granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim; (2) dismissed the jury before it was allowed to consider plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages; and (3) dismissed plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for fraud and awarded compensatory damages, the trial court should have proceeded to Phase II, where plaintiff and defendant would have been afforded the opportunity to submit evidence to the jury relating to punitive damages.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30 (2005) provides:
Upon the motion of a defendant, the issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages, if any, shall be tried separately from the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages, if any. Evidence relating solely to punitive damages shall not be admis*233sible until the trier of fact has determined that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and has determined the amount of compensatory damages. The same trier of fact that tried the issues relating to compensatory damages shall try the issues relating to punitive damages.
(Emphasis supplied). The trial court’s erroneous actions caused plaintiff to be denied the opportunity for the jury to consider punitive damages on her fraud claim and for plaintiff to elect the basis of her recovery after “the jury ha[d] answered the issues and the trial court ha[d] determined whether to treble the compensatory damages found by the jury[.]” Mapp, 81 N.C. App. at 427, 344 S.E.2d at 301 (emphasis original).
Based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30 and prior governing precedent, the only remedy for the trial court’s erroneous granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to remand plaintiff’s fraud claim for a new trial. This Court has stated:
where an appellate court concludes that a case that was bifurcated at trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30 must be remanded for a new trial on the issues relating to punitive damages, we believe the statute requires that the case must also be remanded for a new trial on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages, so that the same jury may try all of these issues.
Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 147 N.C. App. 166, 177, 555 S.E.2d 369, 377 (2001) (emphasis supplied), disc. rev. denied in part, 355 N.C. 213, 559 S.E.2d 803, per curium rev’d on other grounds, 355 N.C. 487, 562 S.E.2d 420, reh’g denied, 355 N.C. 759, 565 S.E.2d 668 (2002). Further, prior to the codification of N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30, our Supreme Court stated:
A bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury and where resolution of the separated issue will potentially dispose of the entire case. The better practice is to retain the same jury for all issues, even though it may hear the issues at different times.
In re Will of Hester, 320 N.C. 738, 743, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied), reh'g denied, 321 N.C. 300, 362 S.E.2d 780 (1987).
*234The trial court’s erroneous granting of defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissal of the jury before it heard evidence relating to punitive damages requires us to remand this case to the trial court for a new trial “on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages” regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim. Lindsey, 147 N.C. App. at 177, 555 S.E.2d at 377; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30. If the jury returns a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awards compensatory damages for fraud, the trial court shall then proceed to Phase II and the parties shall be allowed to submit evidence to the jury regarding punitive damages. After the jury renders its decision on punitive damages, the trial court shall consider whether defendant’s actions constituted UDTP as a matter of law. If defendant fails to prove that it is exempt from the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, plaintiff must then elect the basis of her recovery between punitive and treble damages. Bhatti, 328 N.C. at 243, 400 S.E.2d at 442. The trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim is properly reversed and, under controlling case law and statutes, this case must be remanded for a new trial. Lindsey, 147 N.C. App. at 177, 555 S.E.2d at 377; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30.
D. Erroneous Jury Instructions
Because our statutes and case law require this Court to award plaintiff a new trial on her fraud claim, I note in passing that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the measure of actual damages, if any, to be awarded for fraud. Here, the trial court stated:
The second issue reads: What amount is the plaintiff entitled to recover for damages for the fraud of the defendant.
If you have answered the first issue yes in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages, even without proof of actual damages. Nominal damages consist of some trivial amount, such as one dollar, in recognition of the technical damages incurred by the plaintiff. The plaintiff may be entitled to recover actual damages.
On this issue the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. This means that the plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence the amount of actual damages caused by the fraud of the defendant. The plaintiff’s actual damages are equal to the fair market *235value of the property at the time it was — at the time that the plaintiff was defrauded. . . .
(Emphasis supplied). It appears the trial court was reading the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 810.60 regarding “property damage” in relation to plaintiff’s fraud claim. However, plaintiff never alleged that her property had been damaged by defendant’s fraudulent conduct.
At trial, plaintiff testified that had she been informed of the contractual provision requiring the relocation of the house to property situated outside the 100 year flood plain, she would not have purchased the house from defendant. Plaintiff explained that the lot on Swan Point Road, where she originally moved the house, was “family” property and she did not possess the money required to buy a separate lot.
This Court has stated:
It is elementary that a plaintiff in a fraud suit has a right to recover an amount in damages which, will put him in the same position as if the fraud had not been practiced on him. The measure of damages for fraud in the inducement of a contract is the difference between the value of what was received and the value of what was promised, and is potentially trebled by N.C.G.S. § 75-16. It is the jury’s responsibility to determine the exact amount of damages from the evidence presented at trial.
Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc., 165 N.C. App. 68, 79, 598 S.E.2d 396, 404 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 67, 604 S.E.2d 310 (2004).
The majority’s opinion correctly states, “[defendant’s] fraudulent actions were separate and apart from its acts of conversion and required separate damages instructions.” Here, the undisputed evidence shows plaintiff purchased the house from defendant for the price of $500.00 and paid defendant Turner the sum of $4,300.00 to relocate the house to Swan Point Road. A jury verdict in the amount of $4,800.00 would place plaintiff “in the same position as if the fraud had not been practiced on [her].” Id. Although the record does not disclose the precise reason the trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is possible the trial court used defendant’s motion to correct its instructional error on fraud in the inducement.
*236VI. Conversion
A. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff further argues the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages regarding her conversion claim.
Our Supreme Court has stated, “where sufficient facts are alleged to make out an identifiable tort, . . . the tortious conduct must be accompanied by or partake of some element of aggravation before punitive damages will be allowed.” Newton v. Insurance Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976) (citation omitted).
The aggravated conduct which supports an award for punitive damages when an identifiable tort is alleged may be established by allegations of behavior extrinsic to the tort itself... [o]r it may be established by allegations sufficient to allege a tort where that tort, by its very nature, encompasses any of the elements of aggravation.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis original). In Morrow v. Kings Department Stores, this Court held that “[conversion is not a tort which by its very nature contains elements of aggravation.” 57 N.C. App. 13, 24, 290 S.E.2d 732, 739 (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 352, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations of aggravating circumstances regarding defendant’s act of conversion. Id. This assignment of error is without merit. The trial court’s ruling on this issue is properly affirmed.
B. IJDTP
Plaintiff also argues the trial court erred by refusing to find the conversion of plaintiff’s house to be an UDTP as a matter of law. I disagree.
“Under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 75-1.1, an act or practice is unfair if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. An act or practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” Ace Chemical Corp. v. DSI Transports, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 237, 247, 446 S.E.2d 100, 106 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, plaintiff contends the act of defendant moving her house from Swan Point Road to a lot located in Bayboro, North Carolina and its subsequent destruction are sufficient to establish a claim for UDTP. However, with regards to her conversion claim, plaintiff failed to allege any aggravating factors or offer *237any evidence tending to establish defendant engaged in an act or practice that meets the definition of unfair or deceptive as defined by our appellate courts. Id. Plaintiff failed to show the trial court erred in concluding that defendant’s act of conversion did not constitute an UDTP. This assignment of error is without merit. The trial court’s ruling on this issue is properly affirmed.
C. Interest
The majority’s opinion inexplicably and erroneously holds that plaintiff’s assignments of error violate nonjurisdictional requirements of the Appellate Rules, but finds these violations are not a “substantial failure” or “gross violation” of the appellate rules to warrant sanctions. Nonetheless, it essentially dismisses plaintiff’s assignment of error relating to the accrual of interest. In its mandate to this Court, our Supreme Court remanded this case to us “for reconsideration in light of Dogwood Development & Management Co. v. White Oak Transport Co., 362 N.C. [191], [657] S.E.2d [361] (2008) (303A07), and State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007).” Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contr’rs, LLC, 362 N.C. 226, 227, 657 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2008). In light of that mandate and consistent with Dogwood I, I address this assignment of error.
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by refusing to award interest from thé date of the conversion of plaintiff’s house. I disagree.
Plaintiff’s argument in support of this contention misconstrues the holding in Lake Mary Ltd. Partnership v. Johnston, 145 N.C. App. 525, 551 S.E.2d 546, disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 363, 557 S.E.2d 546 (2001). In Lake Mary, the trial court entered a directed verdict against the defendant for conversion, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive practices arising from the retention of tenant rent checks. Id. at 530, 551 S.E.2d at 551. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by “awarding interest from the date each check was ‘converted,’ as opposed to the date the complaint was filed.” Id. at 532, 551 S.E.2d at 552.
This Court emphasized that the trial court had entered directed verdict against the defendant for breach of contract and conversion and stated “the breach occurred on the dates that [the defendant] deposited or converted each check.” Id. at 532-33, 551 S.E.2d at 552. This Court held that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(a), the trial court properly awarded interest “from the date of breach.” Id. at 532, 551 S.E.2d at 552; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(a) (2005) (“In an *238action for breach of contract.. . the amount awarded on the contract bears interest from the date of breach.”).
Here, plaintiff alleged claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and UDTP. Plaintiff failed to allege any claim for breach of contract. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) (2005) provides that “[i]n an action other than contract, any portion of a money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is commenced until the judgment is satisfied.” (Emphasis supplied). This assignment of error is without merit. The trial court’s ruling on the date of accrual of interest on plaintiff’s conversion claim is properly affirmed.
VIL Conclusion
Plaintiff’s failure to state any legal basis for her assignments of error numbered 1 through 5 constitutes a “substantial failure” or “gross violation” of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Dogwood II, 192 N.C. App. at 121, 665 S.E.2d at 499; Odom, 192 N.C. App. at 198,-S.E.2d at-. Plaintiff’s “broadside” and “ineffective” assignments of error numbered 1 through 5 subjects her appeal to dismissal. Kirby, 276 N.C. at 131, 171 S.E.2d at 422. Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s mandate remanding this case and in the exercise of this Court’s discretion, Appellate Rule 2 should be invoked to review the merits of plaintiff’s appeal.
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and giving her the benefit of every reasonable inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence, sufficient evidence was presented to submit plaintiff’s fraud claim to the jury. Bryant, 313 N.C. at 369, 329 S.E.2d at 337-38. We all agree the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim.
The trial court also erroneously dismissed the jury prior to its consideration of plaintiff’s punitive damages claim based on defendant’s fraudulent actions. See Newton, 291 N.C. at 112, 229 S.E.2d at 301 (“[F]raud is ... one of the elements of aggravation which will permit punitive damages to be awarded.” (Citation omitted)).
The only remedy available to plaintiff under N.C. Gen. Stat. § ID-30 and prior precedents is to remand this case to the trial court for a new trial “on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages” regarding plaintiff’s fraud claim. Lindsey, 147 N.C. App. at 177, 555 S.E.2d at 377. If the jury *239returns a verdict for plaintiff and awards punitive damages, the trial court must conduct a hearing to allow defendant to show it is exempt from the UDTP statute. If the trial court rules as a matter of law that defendant’s conduct constituted UDTP, plaintiff must then elect the basis of her recovery. Plaintiff must choose between the punitive damages verdict or the trebling of the jury’s award of compensatory damages.
The trial court’s entry of judgment on plaintiff’s conversion claim should remain undisturbed and its ruling on the accrual of interest is properly affirmed. I vote to affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial on plaintiff’s fraud and UDTP claims. I respectfully dissent.