specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s determination that the affidavits of Detectives Hall and Subia, as analyzed under the totality of the circumstances approach set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), established probable cause for the issuance of search warrants by Judge Torke. I write separately, however, to emphasize that the mode of analysis adopted in Illinois v. Gates recognizes the continuing significance of the probable cause considerations established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 783 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
For over a decade, this court has required that an affidavit for a search warrant based on statements of an informant meet the two-pronged test for sufficiency established by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. E.g., People v. Conwell, 649 P.2d 1099 (Colo.1982); People v. MacDonald, 173 Colo. 470, 480 P.2d 555 (1971). The Aguilar-Spinelli test requires that such an affidavit must satisfy the following criteria:
First, it must contain facts from which the judge who is requested to issue the warrant can determine independently whether the informant has an adequate basis for his allegations that evidence of crime will be found at the place sought to be searched. Second, it must set forth sufficient information to enable the judge to determine whether the informant is credible or some other basis exists to believe that the information is reliable.
People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Colo.1982).
As the majority points out, this two-pronged test was “abandoned” by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates and was replaced by a totality of the circumstances approach that requires a magistrate “to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
The majority adopts the test set forth in Gates for the purpose of determining probable cause under article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution, majority opinion at 907, thus deciding an issue that we had specifically reserved in our past decisions. *909See People v. Stark, 691 P.2d 334, 338 n. 3 (Colo.1984) (case resolved on basis of Aguilar-Spinelli, making it unnecessary to address Gates); People v. Villiard, 679 P.2d 593, 598 n. 8 (Colo.1984) (application of Aguilar-Spinelli rendered unnecessary any consideration of Gates test on state constitutional grounds); People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 538 n. 5 (Colo.1983) (relied on Aguilar-Spinelli because defendant did not have opportunity to argue Gates on appeal). Although I do not disagree with the majority’s decision to embrace Gates as part of Colorado’s constitutional doctrine, I emphasize that the considerations addressed in Aguilar-Spinelli retain viability and importance for fourth amendment probable cause analysis under Gates, and accordingly, for the purpose of determining probable cause under article II, section 7, of our state constitution.
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court was concerned that “the ‘two-pronged test’ has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants’ tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.” 462 U.S. at 234-35, 103 S.Ct. at 2330 (footnote omitted). It thus decided against requiring that the two elements of the test — the informant’s veracity or reliability, and his basis of knowledge — be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in each case. Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2338. The Court noted, however, that the two elements are relevant considerations, id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2338, that “may usefully illuminate,” id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2338, a probable cause inquiry under a totality of the circumstances analysis. With the understanding that the considerations of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are being “abandoned” only as strict requirements and not as important factors that should receive attention in any examination of the sufficiency of an affidavit to establish probable cause based on an informant’s statements, I concur in the opinion of the majority.