concurring specially.
I reluctantly concur because it is essentially a matter of form over substance. The gist of the offense of which defendant is charged is lying under oath. He swore to tell the truth before the grand jury in the case against Rolland Callahan, the precise nature of which he knew and no one denies. Yet we find that the nature of the case, not expressly articulated in the oath, was a material variance from what is prescribed in OCGA § 15-12-68. While that is true, the extrinsic evidence unquestionably shows that when defendant appeared and took the oath and testified, both he and the grand jury knew the nature of the case under consideration. Yet, assuming the state can prove the perjury in fact, there can be no perjury in law because the nature of the case was not verbally stated in the oath.
It appears that defendant was in fact, all circumstances considered, “sworn in a particular case, where the party [was] charged with a specified offense,” see Beckman v. State, 229 Ga. 327, 329 (1) (190 SE2d 906) (1972). Yet we must adhere to the material form and substance of the prescribed oath, else the problem which could easily be avoided will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The oath should be administered as explicitly set out. Then no occasion will arise for the offer of extrinsic evidence, which often includes conflicting memories, to fill the gaps.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Benham join in this special concurrence.
*207Donald F. Samuel, for appellee.