The appellee, Robert Johnson, commenced this action against the *40appellant, Ronnie Sanders, on August 19, 1985, seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. A default judgment was entered against Sanders, and this interlocutory appeal followed from the denial of his “motion to quash and traverse purported service and motion to set aside default judgment.”
On August 21, 1985, a lieutenant with the Fayette County Sheriffs Office attempted to serve Sanders at his residence. Sanders was not at home, but his father happened to be at the residence and agreed to give the summons to Sanders that evening. It is uncontroverted now that Sanders’ father was not a resident, although the lieutenant did not realize such at the time of the purported service. Sanders acknowledges actual receipt of the summons from his father; moreover, it appears that Sanders promptly forwarded the summons to his insurer, who on September 4, 1985, requested a thirty-day extension within which to answer the complaint. Johnson’s attorney agreed to the request, but, no answer still having been filed more than a month past the extended deadline, Johnson was granted a default judgment on the issue of liability. On appeal, Sanders contends that the default judgment was void because personal service was never perfected. Held:
1. In Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 321, 325 (342 SE2d 690) (1986), this court held that “[w]here actual notice undisputedly results from service on a person at defendant’s residence, to say that it is sufficient for the purposes of subsection (7) [OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7)] is in keeping with the intent of the legislature and the law ... If the plaintiff can prove, or the record unquestionably shows, as here, that although the person who accepted the papers was not ‘then residing therein’ but actually gave the papers to defendant, due process would be served more nearly perfectly.” Brim v. Pruitt obviously controls the instant case, and the trial court properly declined to quash the service or set aside the default judgment.
2. The appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal or alternatively to hold the appellant in contempt for failure to file timely a brief and enumeration of errors is denied.
Judgment affirmed.
Banke, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Pope, and Beasley, JJ., concur. Sognier and Benham, JJ., dissent.