(concurring):
I agree that the closing argument of the prosecutor does not constitute harmful error under State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). I also agree that the supplemental oral instruction given the jury did not violate Thomas’s right to a fair trial under either the state or federal constitutions. However, I would note that the decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), cited by the majority, certainly does not answer the question of whether the giving of an Allen charge is proper under the Utah Constitution or should be permitted as a matter of judicial administration.
I also join the Court in remanding the matter for a hearing on whether the two-pronged test of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), is met. As the majority notes, the State argues that because both of the jurors in question had originally voted to acquit, Thomas could not possibly have been prejudiced by their misstatements during voir dire and his inability to strike them from the venire. This is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as is clear from the majority’s statement of the McDonough rule, the actions of those jurors subsequent to voir dire is irrelevant to a determination of whether Thomas is entitled to a new trial; the sole question is whether a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge. Second, even if their post-voir dire behavior was relevant to the new trial question, Thomas’s contentions, if true, would support a finding of prejudice. He claims that those jurors would have held out for acquittal had not the other jurors been able to coerce them into voting for a conviction because they knew of the false voir dire statements.
Finally, I agree that the trial court committed harmless error in admitting the out-of-court statements of the victim under rule 803(2). Utah R.Evid. 803(2). However, I cannot agree with the implication in the majority opinion’s discussion of the admission of the out-of-court statements under rule 801(d)(1)(B) that attack on the witness’s testimony amounted to a claim that that testimony was the product of “recent fabrications or improper influences as motives” so as to justify admitting her prior hearsay statements. Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The most that can legitimately be said is that the witness’s trial testimo*452ny was inconsistent in some minor particulars with what had been said out-of-court. Mere inconsistency certainly is not grounds for letting in prior hearsay statements. Therefore, in my view there is no basis on the facts of this case for suggesting that the testimony offered would be properly admissible on any of the grounds set forth in subparts (A), (B), or (C) of 801(d)(1). See State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1986) (upholding the admission of out-of-court statements under rule 801(d)(1)(B) where there had been a direct attempt to impeach testimony as being recently fabricated).