I concur in the judgment and in general with the rationale of the majority.
It is true that cases hold intercase proportionality review is not required, i.e., an analysis to determine whether imposition of the death penalty in this *347case was disproportionate to the penalties imposed on other persons who have committed similar offenses. (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-41, 104 S.Ct. 871].)
It is equally clear that our state constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17) requires a determination whether the punishment in this case is proportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability. However, to do so may require a comparison of defendant’s conduct with that of others involved in the same venture, i.e., intracase proportionality. We conducted that type of analysis in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 488 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]: “In short, defendant received the heaviest penalty provided by law while those jointly responsible with him received the lightest . ...” As a result the judgment in Dillon was modified. (See also In re Wells (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 592, 599 [121 Cal.Rptr. 23].)
I also recently urged intracase proportionality review in People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 276-277 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906]. There three persons, in my view equally responsible for the death of the victim, received widely disparate sentences.
It is my belief that a trial judge, in fulfilling his duties under Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e), should undertake to determine intracase proportionality as one of the necessary considerations. I do not suggest there would be a different result in this case. Indeed it is unlikely, although the codefendant, also convicted of first degree murder, was sentenced not to death but to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life. (People v. Gonzales (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 591 [230 Cal.Rptr. 732].) However, we should urge trial judges to recognize the need for intracase proportionality and to make clear on the record that they have given it appropriate consideration.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 21, 1989, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.