(dissenting) — I dissent because I believe that the majority misinterprets RCW 84.68.020. That statute requires a taxpayer who wishes to challenge an assessment to "pay such tax or any part thereof deemed unlawful, under . . . protest." (Italics mine.) In cases such as this one, where the taxpayer agrees that the tax is valid but challenges the amount, the statute does not clearly require that the entire tax be protested. The provision cited above could readily be interpreted to mean that the taxpayer must protest only that part of the tax to which he or she objects. This interpretation is logical in light of the holding in Morf v. Johnston, 173 Wash. 215, 22 P.2d 663 (1933), cited by the majority. That court held that the taxes on a parcel of property for any one year is a unit and is not discharged until the last dollar owed is paid, whether payable in installments or not. Morf, 173 Wash, at 216-17. Under the rule enunciated in that case and the specific language of the statute, it is certainly arguable that the taxpayer has no right to object until the taxpayer is required to pay more than he thinks he or she should. Certainly there is no obvious reason for designating part of a payment as excess before the legal obligation has been satisfied.3
*317Neither is such a requirement necessary to serve the purpose of the statute. The purpose of protest under any system of taxation is to give notice that the right to collect the tax is disputed. This is required so that the State may not unwittingly receive payment of a tax to which it has no legal right, and thereby subject itself, against its will, to the costs of an action to recover it back. Tozer v. Skagit Cy., 34 Wash. 147, 151, 75 P. 638 (1904); see also Ozette R.R. v. Grays Harbor Cy., 16 Wn.2d 459, 133 P.2d 983 (1943), overruled on other grounds in Xerox Corp. v. King Cy., 94 Wn.2d 284, 289-90, 617 P.2d 412 (1980), in which only one protest, apparently made after the first half-payment was due, complied with statutory requirements. The court held that the protest was sufficient. Here, the County had notice of the objection to the tax before it had collected any funds to which its right was challenged. The purpose of the requirement was satisfied, and there was no good reason for denying Longview Fibre a refund to which it was equitably entitled.
Finally, whether or not the majority agrees with my interpretation of RCW 84.68.020, it is certainly apparent that more than one interpretation of the statute is reasonable. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a taxing statute, it must be construed against the taxing power. Duwamish Warehouse Co. v. Hoppe, 102 Wn.2d 249, 254, 684 P.2d 703 (1984); Shurgard Mini-Storage v. Department of Rev., 40 Wn. App. 721, 727, 700 P.2d 1176 (1985). This statute should have been interpreted to apply Long-view Fibre's protest to the entire amount of the improper assessment. Therefore, I dissent.
Review granted at 113 Wn.2d 1028 (1989).
Of course, if the taxpayer challenges an amount equal to more than half of the tax assessed, he must make the first payment under protest as well.