specially concurring:
I agree that reversal is necessary because the trial court failed to advise the respondent, in the words of section 1 — 5(3) of the Act, that he was obligated to “cooperate with [DCFS], comply with the terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions that require the child to be in care, or risk termination of *** parental rights.” 705 ILCS 405/ 1 — 5(3) (West 1998). I write to stress that the service plan designed to reunite Andrea with her father has made no progress toward curing the conditions that separated Andrea from her father; instead, it has harmed her. In fact, before the visitations that traumatized Andrea were terminated by the court because of their negative effects, the service plan was grossly inconsistent with the purposes of the governing law.
On July 2, 1996, respondent was adjudged to have sexually abused Andrea’s half-sister, Shannon H., by fondling her buttocks, and to have thereby neglected Andrea because she was living with Shannon H. at the time. Andrea was removed from respondent’s custody following the report of abuse. Pursuant to a service plan instituted by DCFS in August 1995, respondent was allowed weekly supervised visits during the pendency of the abuse/neglect petition. On July 30, 1996, following the adjudication of the petition, Andrea was declared a ward of the court and guardianship was placed with her mother, Connie K. Also, respondent was allowed visitation with Andrea “supervised by DCFS per their discretion.” Supervised visitation between respondent and Andrea indeed continued under the service plan.
In a December 1996 report to DCFS, Andrea’s therapist, Chris Magnelia, of Family Advocate, Inc., of Rockford, wrote:
“[I]t appears Andrea *** is exhibiting post traumatic, sexual abuse related behaviors after visitation with her biological father, [respondent], These behaviors involve trauma specific reinactment [sic], in play, recurrent distressing dreams surrounding past abuse, difficulting [sic] staying asleep, and enuretic episodes. These charateristics [sic] symptoms are no doubt being exasperated [sic] by exposure to the perpetrator of abuse.”
Magnelia recommended that respondent’s visits with Andrea be reduced from weekly to biweekly and noted that “further decrease in frequency may become necessary if Andrea’s visitations continue to illicit [sic] further development of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder type symptomotology.”
On February 11, 1997, Magnelia reported to DCFS that Andrea was no longer “displaying nightmares or bed wetting” after visitations with respondent but was continuing “to manifest considerable opposition/defiant type behaviors at home after her visits.” Magnelia noted that Andrea told him during a previous counseling session that “she feels very uncomfortable when her father would hold her hand, and when he would kiss her goodbye (on the lips) during visitations with him. Andrea prefers that her father not hold her hand and that he only kisses her on the cheek when departing from visits.” Magnelia recommended that Andrea’s wishes concerning physical contact with her father be honored during the visits.
In a February 24, 1997, report to DCFS, Magnelia wrote:
“Andrea continues to express considerable distress and confusion in terms of having visitation with her father, [respondent]. [Respondent’s] affections in terms of holding Andrea’s hand and kissing her goodbye (which he was told not to do) are interrupted [sic] by Andrea as being a prelude to sexual abuse. Andrea frighteningly stated that when her father holds her hand T don’t know if he’s going to do anything more.’ Andrea reported ‘My dad says he loves me ... so I love him’ (stated with indifference). This association of being told that one is loved by someone who has also been abusive, can be very problematic if Andrea confuses love and affection with sexual abuse, which would in turn make her more likely to be exploited in the future, by a perpetrator who exclaims [sic] love and affection, but whose behaviors are exploitative.
At this time it is recommended that visitations with [respondent] are not in the best interests of Andrea’s psychological or emotional well-being, and therefore visitations be terminated. Andrea’s mistrust and feelings of vulnerability to subsequent abuse/ exploitation appears to manifest itself [sic] only with her father. Andrea needs to feel safe and it is extremely important that Andrea not be exposed to an environment which continues to traumatize her.”
At the hearing on the request for the termination of respondent’s visitation, counsel for respondent argued that Andrea was initiating the “large majority” of physical contact during the visitations and that respondent never kissed Andrea on the lips during the visits. Observing that “a common thread throughout the reports regarding visitation is that Andrea manifests some kind of disturbed behavior at the conclusion, whether or not it be from conduct that she’s initiating or not,” the court entered an order terminating respondent’s visitation with Andrea.
On respondent’s motion, the court modified the order in October 1998 to permit supervised visits “at the discretion of the caseworker for therapeutic purposes.” The court conditioned the visitation on respondent’s completion of sex offender counseling. According to respondent’s caseworker, Christine Johnson, a requirement of sex offender counseling was that respondent admit to having abused either Andrea or Shannon H. Respondent has never made such an admission and has never completed sex offender counseling. His visits with Andrea have not been reestablished.
At the hearing on the petition for the termination of parental rights, Johnson testified that, while she was the caseworker for respondent between June 1997 and August 2000, Andrea reported that she was “angry” with and “scared of” respondent. Andrea told Johnson that she (Andrea) was afraid to see respondent and did not want to meet him at court. Julie Rector, who became respondent’s caseworker in August 2000, testified that Andrea stated in March 2001 that “she did not want to see her father because she was scared of him.”
It is important to note what purposes are to be served by the governing law. “It is well settled that the purpose of the [Juvenile Court Act] is to serve the best interest of the minor.” In re Bettie Jo R., 277 Ill. App. 3d 401, 405 (1995). In its own words, the Act’s purpose is:
“to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his or her parents only when his or her safety or welfare or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal.” 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(1) (West 1998).
The Act is to be “administered in a spirit of humane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.” 705 ILCS 405/1— 2(2) (West 1998). All procedures under the Act are to be guided by the precept that “[t]he parents’ right to the custody of their child shall not prevail when the court determines that it is contrary to the health, safety, and best interests of the child.” 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(3)(c) (West 1998).
The purpose of a service plan imposed in the wake of a finding of abuse or neglect is “to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent.” 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 1998). A parent’s failure to make reasonable efforts toward correcting those conditions pursuant to the terms of a service plan is a basis for the termination of parental rights. See 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(m) (West 1998). The law recognizes, however, that not all attempts to reunite the minor with the parent who has been found to have neglected the minor are appropriate. Section 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998)) provides in relevant part:
“Family preservation services shall be offered, where safe and appropriate, to prevent the placement of children in substitute care when the children can be cared for at home or in the custody of the person responsible for the children’s welfare without endangering the children’s health or safety, to reunite them with their families if so placed when reunification is an appropriate goal, or to maintain an adoptive placement.” 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998).
The provisions quoted above are representative of the fact that, in all places in the Juvenile Court Act and the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act where the importance of reunifying the parent with the minor is emphasized, there is also the qualification that reunification, and attempts at reunification in the form of service plans, should not occur at the expense of the minor’s welfare. The visitation that DCFS attempted as part of the service plan did not promote the healing of the rift between Andrea and her father. In fact, for Andrea the visits led not to an increased sense of closeness with her father but rather to bed-wetting, sleeplessness, nightmares, and emotional disturbance. Andrea is openly fearful of her father; she is suspicious even of his attempts to hold her hand. Magnelia, Andrea’s therapist, offered an uncontroverted opinion that her father’s professions of love accompanied by perceived attempts at abuse may cause Andrea severe emotional harm. Given the history of this case, I doubt whether reunification is an appropriate goal; I am even more doubtful of the propriety of a plan to allow visitation between Andrea and an individual like respondent upon his confession that he abused either Andrea or Shannon H. Rehabilitation of sex offenders is a worthy goal, but in light of Andrea’s profound fear and suspicion of her father and his apparent indifference throughout this case toward bettering himself as directed by DCFS and the court (e.g., failing to appear in court for months at a time and failing to complete counseling for alcohol and drug abuse and domestic violence), I would think that such a confession would be decisive grounds for disallowing visitation. I would urge DCFS, in formulating a service plan on remand, to take full account of the harm inflicted by the previous service plan. The Juvenile Court Act is not to . be construed in favor of parents at the expense of children. See In re K.B.J., 305 Ill. App. 3d 917, 922 (1999).