dissenting.
I would dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons. When appellant Ferris was charged in August 1981 with Terroristic Acts — Shooting at a Conveyance, Terroristic Threats, and Obstructing an Officer, he had pending previous indictments for Driving under the Influence and Obstructing an Officer (Indictment no. S81R-103) and Cruelty to Animals (Indictment no. S81-4-310). In December of that year — five months after the incident and within the same court term in which his arrest and indictment occurred — Ferris filed pro se with the Clerk of the Pickens County Superior Court the following document: “To Whom it May Concern[,] This Letter, Requesting Speedie Trial of any or all Charges Pickens County and or Jaspe [sic] City would have against me[.] Sincerely C. C. Ferris II Claude.”
In April 1982 appellant was charged with speeding (Indictment no. S82-R-162), was arraigned, and pled “not guilty.” The following October he filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court a letter reading as follows: “TO: Pickens Co. Court and or Whom It May Concern Let be known that on this day 10-14-81 I C. Clifton Ferris II demand my right to speedie trial in case number S-82 R 162 [the April speeding charge] C. Clinton Ferris II.” In February 1983 he filed a letter addressed to the district attorney requesting dismissal of “any Charges made against me before 12-18-81”; that is, the August 1981 Terroristic Acts charges and those already pending in August 1981. On March 2, 1983, the date set for trial on the speeding charge (S82-R-162), appellant was brought in by the sheriff and demanded a trial on all pending charges. He was too intoxicated to stand trial at that time, however. In October 1983 — 22 months after, the initial demand for speedy trial on charges filed on or before August 1981 and 12 months after the initial demand for speedy trial on the April 1982 charges — appellant filed a “Motion for Acquittal upon Failure to Have a Speedy Trial.” The court denied the motion, and on January 24, 1984 (29 months after the incident), he was acquitted on the first two counts of the August 1981 charges (Indictment no. 81 R-50) but was convicted on Count 3 (obstructing an officer).
The majority opinion accurately cites the pertinent provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) and (b). We agree with the majority that the purpose of this statute is to aid and implement the common-law right to speedy trial existing in Georgia since prior to 1861, and the related provisions of the State’s constitution. Underhill v. State, 129 Ga. App. 65 (198 SE2d 703) (1973); Reid v. State, 116 Ga. App. 640 (158 SE2d 461) (1967); Dickerson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 548 (134 SE2d 51) (1963). Unlike the majority, however, we regard the statutory imperative as mandatory, rather than discretionary with the trial court. Hunley v. State, 105 Ga. 636 (31 SE 543) (1898). We also note that *735this court has held that the demand for speedy trial need not be in any particular form or delivered to any specified officer of the court. Pless v. State, 157 Ga. App. 681 (278 SE2d 475) (1981); accord, State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 290 (290 SE2d 149) (1982). Compare Turner v. State, 136 Ga. App. 42 (220 SE2d 57) (1975); Dickerson v. State, supra.
The purpose of requiring a demand is to ensure that the State is put on notice as to the demandant’s intention to invoke speedy trial guaranties. Stripland v. State, 115 Ga. 578 (41 SE 987) (1902). The cases cited by the State in support of the contention that Ferris’ letter does not constitute a sufficient demand are distinguishable on their facts in that they concern either situations in which neither the words “speedy trial” nor a substantial equivalent is used, or situations in which the demand for a speedy trial is “buried” in a document so ambiguously or even deceptively captioned as to provide no notice that it contains a speedy trial demand. For example, in Forbus v. State, 162 Ga. App. 307 (290 SE2d 559) (1982), aff’d 250 Ga. 24 (295 SE2d 530) (1982), a letter to the district attorney included, inter alia, a sentence asking that functionary to “please accept this letter as a formal demand for a trial by jury”; there was no caption, and no other part of the letter constituted a statement that could even remotely represent a demand for speedy trial. The court correctly held that the quoted sentence was insufficient.
In State v. Adamczyk, supra, the document on which the appellant subsequently based his claim for discharge/acquittal was captioned “Demand for Copy of Accusation (Indictment), etc.” Amidst demands for copies of the indictment, witness list, and other documents, there appeared the sentence, “Trial by jury and all other procedural rights provided by the . . . Constitution and statute . . . are also especially demanded.” Id. at 289. This court held that the cited language was insufficient as a demand for speedy trial and held further, at 289, that “henceforth a demand for trial will not be considered sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of [OCGA § 17-7-170] unless it is presented for what it is — a demand to be tried within the next succeeding term of court.”
In Getz v. State, 251 Ga. 462 (306 SE2d 918) (1983), the Supreme Court held the following language insufficient: “I demand all of my rights, and I do not waive any of them! I therefore demand my right to enjoy a trial by jury of 12 . . .” In Smith v. State, 166 Ga. App. 352 (304 SE2d 476) (1983), the defendants were indicted in November; in December they filed a demand for a copy of indictments and the list of witnesses and for a jury trial; and in July they were tried. They filed a motion for discharge and acquittal, alleging that they came under the aegis of OCGA § 17-7-170. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that no demand for speedy trial had been filed, *736and this court affirmed.
In the instant case, in contrast, the relevant document bore no caption at all, misleading or otherwise, but contained in the third line of the six-line hand-printed text the words “speedie [sic] trial.” The State objects, and the majority apparently agrees, that the letter specifically names neither the case number, nor the relevant statute, nor the term of court involved. We, however, regard the language “speedie trial,” coupled with that citing “any or all Charges,” as “present[ing the demand] for what it is,” Adamczyk, supra at 289; that is, it is sufficiently comprehensive and unequivocal to put any literate person — a fortiori an officer of the court on notice of appellant’s intention to avail himself of the speedy trial provisions of the law. We would hold, therefore, that the December 1981 letter was sufficient demand to invoke the provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170. We would further hold that, because appellant’s demand was filed at the end of the September 1981 term, during which he was arrested and indicted, and his trial was not set until the January 1984 term, the statutory requirements were not met, and the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for acquittal and failing to dismiss the charges against him. Bush v. State, 152 Ga. App. 598 (263 SE2d 499) (1979); Bishop v. State, 11 Ga. App. 296 (75 SE 165) (1912); Thornton v. State, 7 Ga. App. 752 (67 SE 1055) (1910).
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.