concurring.
[¶ 65] I concur in the result but I conclude that the Maine Constitution provides a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws than the United States Constitution.18 I therefore believe that *27the Court’s decision should be based on the Maine Constitution, independent of the United States Constitution. I also conclude that some of the additional registration burdens promote retribution and deterrence, are excessive, and impose a stigma, and should be held unconstitutional under Maine’s ex post facto clause on these additional grounds.
I. THE MAINE CONSTITUTION
[¶ 66] The Maine Constitution provides an independent basis for decision. We interpret the Maine Constitution independently of the Federal and have the authority to interpret language in the Maine Constitution as providing more protection to our residents than similar or identical language in the Federal Constitution. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982) (“[F]ederal decisions do not serve to establish the complete statement of controlling law but rather to delineate a constitutional minimum.... ”). The United States Supreme Court has long held that, despite its interpretation of federal constitutional provisions, “the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). Thus, the Federal Constitution prescribes the minimum mandatory constitutional standards that states must afford their citizens. State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626 (Me.1972).
[¶67] Consistent with this discussion in Lego, we held in Collins that the Maine Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens than the Federal Constitution in adopting a higher standard of proof necessary to establish the voluntariness of a confession because the value expressed in the provision “has been endowed with the highest priority by being embodied in a constitutional guarantee.” Id.; State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 976, 979. Similarly, in Caouette, we interpreted more broadly than the United States Supreme Court the constitutional requirement that statements made by a defendant be voluntary. 446 A.2d at 1122-23. More recently, in Rees, we discussed that “a more protective standard [for suppressing a defendant’s statements] is warranted under Maine law.” 2000 ME 55, ¶ 9, 748 A.2d at 979.
[¶ 68] Other states have held that sex offender registration laws violate the ex post facto clauses of their state constitutions even in circumstances in which they would not violate the Federal Constitution. For example, in a state law challenge following the United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Alaska Supreme Court applied the federal “intent-effects” test,19 but found that the Alaska sex offender registration law violated the state constitution, which is more protective than the Federal despite the use of similar language. Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d 999, 1003, 1007, 1019 (Alaska 2008). The Indiana Supreme Court as well held that a sex offender registration act was unconstitutional under the state constitution as applied to the defendant, even when using the federal test. See Wallace v. Indiana, 90S N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind.2009).
[¶ 69] Here, we have reason to apply a higher standard. The location of the ex post facto clauses within the broader con*28stitutional schemes of the Maine and United States Constitutions indicates their unique underlying purposes. Maine’s ex post facto clause is found not in article IV, which sets out the powers of the Legislature, but is instead found in article I, which declares the personal rights of Maine’s citizens. See Me. Const, art. I, §11. By contrast, the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause is found not in the Bill of Rights, which enumerates citizens’ federal personal rights, but rather in article I, section 9, which describes the powers and limitations of the legislative branch of the federal government. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
[¶ 70] The location of a provision within a constitution bears as much significance as the provision’s text itself. Chief Justice Marshall recognized this point when construing the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U.S. 316, 419-20, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). Rebuffing Maryland’s argument that the clause limited Congress’s power to enact legislation, the Chief Justice deftly pointed to the clause’s placement “among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers.” Id. at 419. Had the framers intended “by this clause, to restrain the free use of means which might otherwise have been implied, that intention would have been inserted in another place.” Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
[¶ 71] The respective placements of the ex post facto clauses in the federal and state constitutional schemes indicate that the Maine Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, declares that the right to be free of ex post facto laws is a personal right, and not simply a limitation of legislative power, as it is in the United States Constitution. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-13 at 41-42 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that “when the text [of the Constitution] is silent or ambiguous ... [courts often must] rely ‘on notions of a constitutional plan — the implicit ordering of relationships within the [governmental] system,’ ” and explaining that “ ‘[t]he tacit postulates yielded by that ordering are as much engrained in the fabric of the document as its express provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and often meaning1 ” (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))). Because of this difference, we should analyze the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999, 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11201-11256 (2008), under the Maine Constitution, acknowledging its greater protection to this personal right.
[¶ 72] One of the greater protections afforded by our Constitution should be a standard of proof that is not as onerous as the “clearest proof’ standard, which is both unnecessary and excessive when applying the ex post facto clause of the Maine Constitution. The Supreme Court’s standard requiring the “clearest proof’ to find a statute that is intended to be civil to instead be an ex post facto law is not controlling. See Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1122; Collins, 297 A.2d at 626-27. Instead, pursuant to well-established jurisprudence in this State, any constitutional challenge to a statute is subject to the presumption that the statute is constitutional. State v. Falcone, 2006 ME 90, ¶ 5, 902 A.2d 141, 142. We need not employ a more onerous standard under the Maine Constitution. I would follow the Alaska Supreme Court in adhering to the “presumption of constitutionality” approach, and not impose “a heightened presumption requiring ‘clearest proof ... [which] could threaten rights protected by [our State] Constitution and might be inconsistent with the responsibilities of this court.” Doe, 189 P.3d at 1008 n. 62.
*29II. THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ FACTORS20
A. SORNA of 1999 Imposes a More Burdensome Punishment Regardless of Whether it is Included in the Sentencing Statute
[¶ 78] I agree with the majority that if a law establishes a more burdensome punishment and applies it retroactively, it makes no difference whether that burden is labeled “civil” or “criminal” or whether the burden is characterized as “remedial” or “punitive.” See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 87, 46, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (holding that labeling a law as procedural does not immunize it from scrutiny for an ex post facto violation). For this reason, I disagree with the Court’s suggestion, set forth in its discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, that a distinction should be drawn between a burden imposed as part of a sentence and one imposed as a regulatory requirement parallel to sentencing.
[¶ 74] As the Court notes, the statutory history reflects that, beginning in 1996, the SORNA of 1995 registration requirements were imposed as part of a sentence. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4 (effective July 4, 1996) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-0 (Supp.1996)). The statute at that time stated that “[a]s part of a sentence, the court shall order” convicted offenders to register. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996). In 2003, the statute was amended to state that “[a]t the time the court imposes a sentence, the court shall order” convicted offenders to register. P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-13 (effective July 30, 2004) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-0 (Supp.2004)). That SORNA requirements were historically part of the sentencing process, beginning in 1996, indicates that SORNA of 1999 is punitive, as the majority holds, but it is also important to note that the 2003 amendment did not, in itself, make the registration requirements less punitive or otherwise remove the constitutional infirmity.
B. SORNA of 1999 Promotes Retribution and Deterrence
[¶75] Unlike the majority, I would conclude that SORNA of 1999 does promote retribution and deterrence. As the Indiana Supreme Court recently said in its discussion of that state’s sex offender registration act:
It is true that to some extent the deterrent effect of the registration and notification provisions of the Act is merely incidental to its regulatory function. And we have no reason to believe the Legislature passed the Act for purposes of retribution — vengeance for its own sake. Nonetheless it strains credulity to suppose that the Act’s deterrent effect is not substantial, or that the Act does not promote community condemnation of the offender, both of which are included in the traditional aims of punishment.
Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 382 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Even if one accepts the premise that publicly labeling individuals as violent sexual predators is not in any way intended as retribution for their crimes, SORNA of 1999 has had this effect. It promotes community condemnation in its most extreme form: vigilantism. Two Maine men were murdered after their names were found on the Maine Sex Offender Registry. See Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 56 n. 21, 932 A.2d 552, 568 (Alexander, and Silver, JJ., con*30curring). This factor, therefore, suggests that the SORNA of 1999 registration requirements have a punitive effect.
C. SORNA of 1999 is Excessive in Relation to its Non-Punitive Purpose
[¶ 76] Despite the assuredly well-intentioned actions of the Legislature, the expansion of SORNA in 2001 to include all persons convicted of sex offenses on or after June 80, 1992, see P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-7 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified at 84-A M.R.S.A. § 11202 (Pamph. 2001)), is not a reasonable means to protect the public from sex offenders. SOR-NA of 1999, which is “a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person himself,” see Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 882 N.E.2d 298, 308 (2008) (quotation marks omitted) (discussing Massachusetts statute), currently contains no provision allowing for a waiver of its requirements; a waiver provision was enacted, see P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 13 (effective July 4, 1996) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121 (Supp.1996)), but later repealed, see P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-5 (effective Sept 21, 2001) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121 (Pamph. 2001)). SORNA of 1999 is mandatory and attaches to all convictions specified by statute. 34-A M.R.S. § 11203(5)-(8)(2008).
[¶ 77] Although requiring persons sentenced for sex offenses from June 30, 1992 through September 17, 1999, see 34-A M.R.S. § 11222(2-A) (2008),21 to submit to inclusion on the registry does provide the public with information about where these individuals live and work, see 34-A M.R.S. § 11221(1)(A), (B) (2008), the catch-all scope of the statute’s application dilutes its utility. Given the wide range of acts committed by those individuals, the registry does not allow the public to distinguish between individuals like Letalien, who have been evaluated by a clinical and forensic psychologist and determined to be at the lowest risk of reoffending, and those individuals who committed multiple crimes; victimized infants and toddlers; and tortured, maimed, or killed their victims. Because the application of SORNA of 1999 is not tied to the relative public safety risk presented by the particular registrants and is excessive with respect to the purpose for which it was enacted, its effects are more punitive than regulatory.
III. ADDITIONAL FACTOR OF STIGMA
[¶ 78] In addition to the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, the Court should also consider the additional factor of stigma, consistent with the Court’s prior decisions. In State v. Freeman, 487 A.2d 1175 (Me.1985), this Court held that a civil drunk driving law was determined to have sufficient criminal characteristics to require constitutional safeguards; that civil law was deemed void, however, because a complementary criminal drunk driving law was already in effect. Id. at 1176-80. The Court recognized that the resulting stigma was “highly suggestive of the true criminal nature of the procedure.” Id. at 1178. In contrast, in State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703 (Me.1983), it was the absence of stigma attached to traffic offenses that led, in part, to the Court’s determination that there was no right to a jury trial in a case involving those charges. Id. at 708. Regarding Le-talien, the stigma is due in part to the offense itself, but the magnitude of the effects of the stigma are indisputably *31heightened with Internet publication. The stigma renders SORNA of 1999 punitive.
[¶ 79] In conclusion, because SORNA of 1999 is punitive and operates retroactively, I would hold that its application violates the ex post facto clause of the Maine Constitution independent of the protections afforded by the United States Constitution.
. Although Maine apparently has yet to implement the current version of the Federal SORNA, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 16901-16929 (Lexis-Nexis 2008 & Supp.2009), that Act provides:
When evaluating whether a jurisdiction has substantially implemented this title, the Attorney General shall consider whether the jurisdiction is unable to substantially implement this title because of a demonstrated inability to implement certain provisions that would place the jurisdiction in violation of its constitution, as determined by a ruling of the jurisdiction’s highest court.
*2742 U.S.C.S. § 16925(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
. Assuming, without finding, that the state's legislature intended the Alaska sex offender registration act to be non-punitive, the court resolved the issues applying the "effects” portion of the test. Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d 999, 1007-08 (Alaska 2008).
. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554. 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).
. Another provision applies to persons sentenced from 1982 to 1992. See 34-A M.R.S. § 11222(2-0 (2008).