— The State accused Mark Bugai of first degree theft and forgery. In a trial to the court without a jury, he was found guilty of both crimes and appeals, asserting that his waiver of a jury was invalid and that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
*157The waiver of a jury, required to be in writing by CrR 6.1(a), was filed at the end of closing arguments on the second day of trial when the court noted that there was none in the record. The following occurred:
Mr. Neal [Defense Counsel]: I will take care of that, Your Honor.
Ms. Antonik [Deputy Prosecuting Attorney]: But perhaps the Defendant can indicate at this time his desire to so waive on the record.
Mr. Neal: Mark Bugai, do you waive a jury, request for a jury, is that correct?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Neal: We have discussed the right, your right to have a jury?
The Defendant: That's correct.
Mr. Neal: And you feel that, upon my recommendation, that a waiver of a jury and have all issues tried before a judge is proper and your decision, is that right?
The Defendant: That's correct.
The Court: For the record then, I would like a form completed for the file.
Mr. Neal: Yes.
Bugai argues that the waiver he then signed with the court's written consent was too late. Because of the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, the record must show that the waiver of a jury by the accused was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. State v. Forza, 70 Wn.2d 69, 422 P.2d 475 (1966). CrR 6.1 incorporates this principle, but there is no requirement that the written waiver be filed at any particular time. Bugai and his counsel did discuss the right of trial by jury at some point and, from the outset, proceeded with the trial to the court sitting without a jury. In State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 591 P.2d 452 (1979), no jury waiver was filed, but the court said at page 646:
On those occasions when the rule [CrR 6.1(a)] is inadvertently overlooked, however, it is counsel's obligation to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court if that particular error is to be preserved for use on appeal.
In this case, the court caught the inadvertence, and Bugai's *158statement in open court that it was his desire to waive a jury trial and his written waiver were made a part of the record.
A much more difficult question arises from Bugai's assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not contact prospective witnesses essential to his defense, and, of equal concern, coerced him into signing the waiver. Bugai does not rely upon the record to support these accusations, but upon affidavits appended to his opening brief. He asks that we reverse his conviction upon the basis of these documents which contain information never shown to the trial court.
In accomplishing its work, this court must confine itself to the record for knowledge of the case.
We first note the oft-repeated rule that cases on appeal are decided only from the record, and " [i]f the evidence is not in the record it will not be considered." State v. Wilson, 75 Wn.2d 329, 332, 450 P.2d 971 (1969).
Grobe v. Valley Garbage Serv., Inc., 87 Wn.2d 217, 228-29, 551 P.2d 748 (1976). Accord, State v. Loux, 24 Wn. App. 545, 548, 604 P.2d 177 (1979).
Alternatively, Bugai proposes that the case be remanded for a factual determination of defense counsel's incompetence. Under current practices, a person charged with crime is protected from incompetent counsel by an integrated bar, experienced trial judges, a complete review of the entire record by an appellate court, and in an extraordinary case a full factual hearing in a personal restraint petition proceeding. RAP 16.3. The procedure provided by that rule is admirably suited to litigate claims of lawyer incompetence based upon alleged facts outside of the record. State v. King, 24 Wn. App. 495, 601 P.2d 982 (1979). The question is much too important for the defendant, and the lawyer as well, to be considered as an adjunct to the main trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
Durham, J., concurs.