(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The United States Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). And we have held that a defendant’s right to counsel includes “a constitutional right to conduct his defense in person without assistance of counsel.” State v. Huber, 275 Minn. 475, 482, 148 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1967). A criminal defendant also has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of a trial. U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). While we said in State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 196 (Minn.1992), that a “defendant’s right to be present at all stages of the trial is not so absolute as to require jeopardizing the safety of those present in the courtroom,” a trial court may use only those procedures reasonably necessary to maintain order and security. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 2(c) (describing procedures for the use of physical restraint). Less restrictive available alternatives must also be considered, especially when a defendant’s rights are at stake. See State v. Mahlcuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 684-85 (Minn.2007) (public *485trials); State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Minn.1999) (physical restraints).1
Here, the trial court conditioned Holt’s right to self-representation on his exclusion from proceedings in chambers. Coupled with the trial court’s decision to hold proceedings, including a Schwartz hearing, in chambers and its subsequent exclusion of Holt from those proceedings, the trial court effectively violated Holt’s constitutional right to represent himself and his right to be present at all critical stages of trial.
Holt requested during trial that he be allowed to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. The trial court conducted a colloquy with Holt, including a comprehensive examination as to Holt’s understanding of the nature of the charges against him, the possible punishments, and the dangers of self-representation. See State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn.1997). In addition, the following discussion took place:
The Court: Do you understand further that you will not be allowed to move about the courtroom? ... that you will not be allowed to approach the witness stand ... ?
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In addition, you will not be permitted to approach the bench for a bench conference. Only standby counsel, should you authorize it, will. You will not be permitted to come back into chambers or to a conference room when all the other attorneys would normally confer with the Court.
Do you understand that?
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Everything will be put on the record, whether it’s done in the court, in chambers, or in a conference room. It will be on the record.
[Holt]: Will I have any kind of representation there at all?
The Court: Standby counsel will be there if you authorize it. In addition, I will tell you that I am restricting your movement for the safety of witnesses, the jury, the Court, counsel, all counsel, and all of the court personnel. And the reason I’m doing that is because of the nature of the case, number one; because of the probable cause to believe that threats have been made to one or more witnesses, two; three, because probable cause has been found and a complaint has been issued against you for tampering with a witness or conspiracy to tamper with witnesses in the first degree.
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The Court: Do you wish to represent yourself with them as standby counsel participating at the bench and giving you assistance, standing by but not acting as co-counsel, or do you wish to have them take no part?
[Holt]: No, I wish them to represent me as in approaching the bench, in the judge chambers on issues, and at my table.
The court’s opinion today ignores the trial court’s error and then attempts to divert attention away from that error by miseharacterizing what took place through its emphasis on Holt’s agreement to the trial court’s “ground rules.” While it appears that the trial court was justified in *486restricting Holt’s movements in the courtroom based on safety and security concerns, the problem is that the trial court failed to utilize the least-restrictive alternatives available to ensure safety and security. Had the trial court simply held the Schwartz hearing and the in-chambers conferences with counsel in the courtroom without the jury present, the court’s safety and security concerns would have been accommodated without any violation of Holt’s right to self-representation or his right to be present at every critical stage of trial. But the trial court’s “ground rules” offered Holt a pair of Hobson’s choices. The trial court forced Holt to choose between forgoing completely his constitutional right of self-representation and accepting the limitations on his right to be present at critical stages of trial in order to receive a substantively limited right to self-representation. In the end, even that choice was an illusion because the trial court violated Holt’s right to self-representation by forcing him to choose between having no representation during in-chambers conferences and having representation by standby counsel. The Supreme Court has found it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (reversing a judgment when a defendant was forced to choose between asserting a Fourth Amendment claim and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). While constraints may be placed on voluntary decisions of waiver, “[a] criminal defendant may be asked to choose between waiver and another course of action [only] as long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive.” U.S. v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir.1990) (citing U.S. v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 739 (7th Cir.1988)) (determining whether a waiver of counsel was voluntary). It is even less tolerable when the right granted by the court is limited to the point of constitutional infirmity. Here, I believe that the trial court’s “ground rules” were constitutionally offensive, and Holt’s acceptance of the limitations cannot be considered a valid waiver.
The trial court does not explain and, on the record presented, I do not understand why the trial court’s safety concerns required the Schwartz hearing and some conferences with counsel to be held in chambers with Holt absent. The record suggests that such a limitation was not required because, on some occasions, the trial court excused the jury from the courtroom in order to confer in the courtroom with the State, Holt, and standby counsel all present.
I.
The constitutional right to self-representation “is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Thus, the right to self-representation is not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. The trial court may have given Holt his right to self-representation in name, but, by arbitrarily and unnecessarily excluding Holt from the Schwartz hearing and in-chambers conferences, the court forced Holt to accept representation by standby counsel alone at those proceedings. As a result, Holt was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and reversal is required. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn.1990).
We have acknowledged that “the role of standby counsel is fundamentally different from the role of counsel generally. When a lawyer is acting as standby counsel, the defendant’s other rights occasionally intervene to prevent the standby counsel from acting as would be expected if he or she *487were counsel for the defendant.” State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 207 (Minn.1996) (emphasis in original). When standby-counsel participates outside the jury’s presence, “the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (describing this standard as the “core of the Faretta right”). A trial court judge “must be considered capable of differentiating the claims presented by a pro se defendant from those presented by standby counsel.” Id. at 179, 104 S.Ct. 944. Further, the pro se defendant must be “allowed to address the court freely on his own behalf and ... disagreements between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved in the defendant’s favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of counsel.” Id. If standby counsel is effectively allowed “to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, ... or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded.” Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944.
Obviously, on this record, Holt’s right to self-representation was violated because he was not present at the Schwartz hearing and the in-chambers conferences held between the trial court, standby counsel, and counsel for the State. The Tenth Circuit concluded that a pro se defendant’s Faret-ta rights were violated when a trial court barred him from 30 bench conferences while allowing standby counsel to appear on his behalf. U.S. v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir.1995) (finding that standby counsel spoke instead of the defendant on matters of importance and interfered with significant tactical decisions). The Second Circuit found that, although a defendant was excluded from sidebar conferences, there was no Faretta violation, partly because the defendant was present for all legal arguments made by standby counsel outside the presence of the jury. U.S. v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 905 (2d Cir.1990). And the Ninth Circuit found that when a chambers conference “involved two issues with undoubted tactical importance ... [and] involved discussions that ... could not have been accurately predicted or rehearsed in advance, [the defendant's exclusion resulted in a complete silencing of [the defendant’s voice on the matters.” Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 742 (9th Cir.2008) (involving the admissibility of a 911 tape and the response to a jury’s request for the tape).
By holding the Schwartz hearing and the conferences in chambers instead of in the open courtroom where Holt could have been present, the trial court denied Holt an opportunity to address the court freely on his own behalf. The trial court could not have differentiated between Holt’s claims and those of standby counsel. Standby counsel for Holt was rarely informed about the nature of these conferences until after they began, so Holt had no chance to give standby counsel any instructions for the hearing. By excluding Holt, the trial court forced standby counsel to interfere with Holt’s representation on significant tactical decisions and speak instead of Holt on matters .of importance. Essentially, whenever the trial court excluded Holt from the proceedings, Holt was forced to give up his Faretta right and allow standby counsel to act exactly as she would have acted if she were actual counsel for Holt. Thus, on this record, the trial court’s decisions violated Holt’s Sixth Amendment right because they denied Holt the right to preserve actual control over the case.
II.
Due process requires that a criminal defendant be present at all critical stages of a trial. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. *488730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). In Minnesota, a criminal defendant has the right to be present “at every stage of the trial.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(1); Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.2005). Here, the trial court denied Holt the right to be present by barring Holt from being in chambers and then holding conferences and the Schwartz hearing in those chambers. There can be no question about whether those in-chambers gatherings were stages of Holt’s trial. They were. Moreover, the Schwartz hearing was, without question, a critical stage of the trial. Again, forcing Holt to accept a limitation on his right to be present in exchange for his right to self-representation is constitutionally offensive.
The court states that Holt suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s decision to hold the Schwartz hearing in chambers. But Kelsey v. State, 298 Minn. 531, 532, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1974), the case cited by the court for its harmless error analysis, predates the promulgation of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and does not mention the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applicable to the denial of the constitutional right to be present. See State v. Bouwman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn.1984). In State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.1977), we found that a defendant’s absence from a pretrial suppression hearing was harmful error because “it [was] impossible on this record to determine what contribution or assistance to counsel defendant could have rendered had he been present to hear the oral testimony of [the testifying officer].” Not only are the facts in this case similar to Grey, Holt was a pro se defendant, and the denial of his right to be present facilitated the violation of his right to self-representation. On this record, Holt’s exclusion from the Schwartz hearing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I would reverse Holt’s convictions and remand for a new trial.
ANDERSON, Paul H., Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Page.. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state that “[t]he trial judge should endeavor to maintain secure court facilities. In order to protect the dignity and decorum of the courtroom, this should be accomplished in the least obtrusive and disruptive manner, with an effort made to minimize any adverse impact." American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: Special Functions of the Trial Judge, Standard 6-3.2 (3d ed.2000) (emphasis added).