Schooler v. State

Rakestraw, C. J.

The appellant was charged by affidavit with the offense of shoplifting. After waiving trial by jury, she was found guilty of shoplifting by the court. The court imposed a fine of $10.00 and the costs of the action and sentenced her to the Women’s Prison for a period of not less than one nor more than five years.

On appeal, she relies only upon the overruling of her motion for new trial. The motion for new trial is that the “verdict of the Court is contrary to the evidence and the law.” We assume that the appellant intended to call in question the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, and this is the theory upon which the case was argued.

From an examination of the record, the evidence most favorable to the finding of the trial court would indicate that in the forenoon of August 29, 1963, the appellant and one Jilean Stallings came to the Tower Parking lot in Fort Wayne, Indiana in a car belonging to Jilean Stallings. Around 11 to 11:30 a.m., the appellant and Jilean Stallings entered the Meyers and McCarthy Men’s Store in Fort Wayne, which is located across Harrison Street east of the Tower parking lot. While in the store, the appellant asked to see certain men’s knit shirts. She was shown some shirts, and told the salesman that she was going to pay some bills, and that she would come back and buy one of the shirts if she had enough money left. While they were in the store, both the appellant *626and Jilean Stallings were carrying large straw bags, described as being 12" x 14" or larger. The appellant and Jilean Stallings were then seen leaving the store, and going back to the Tower parking lot.

At the Tower Parking lot, they were observed by the attendant to go back to the car belonging to Jilean Stallings. They then left the car in the parking lot and proceeded east. Within a minute or two after the appellant and Mrs. Stallings had left the store, it was discovered that two men’s knit shirts and a man’s suit were missing. A short time later, two policemen were summoned and proceeded to the Tower Parking lot where they observed the automobile belonging to Jilean Stallings. Through the open window, the officers saw in a brown paper sack what looked like a man’s suit and some sweaters or shirts. The officers waited at the parking lot for the occupants of the car to return.

After the officers had waited two or three hours, the appellant and Mrs. Stallings were seen coming west toward the parking lot more than a block away. They were identified to the officers by the parking lot attendant as being the occupants of the car. The appellant and Mrs. Stallings then saw the policemen at the parking lot and kept looking at them in an apprehensive manner. They walked toward the parking lot continuing to look at the police officers, turned north and walked on past the parking lot the length of the block, turned east, and started to walk away from the parking lot along the street one block to the north. At that time, the officers proceeded around the block and accosted them.

At the time they were stopped they told the officers that they had come to town in a taxi. They were brought back to the automobile, and after the merchandise had been identified, they were arrested. The straw bags which they were carrying contained nothing at that time except a head scarf in one bag, and there were no billfolds, receipts or bills despite the fact that the appellant claimed that she had made some pay*627ments and some purchases. The merchandise still contained the identifying tags from the store, which the testimony indicated were always removed from purchased goods, and no sales slips or receipts were in the car or in the possession of the appellant and Mrs. Stallings. From the testimony of the appellant, it appears that the appellant had twice before been convicted of shoplifting on occasions when she was accompanied by Mrs. Stallings.

It is true that there is no direct evidence in the sense that no witnesses were able to testify that they saw the appellant taking anything. However, it has long been settled that a conviction can rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support an inference of guilt. Greenwalt v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 608, 209 N. E. 2d 254; Wagner v. State (1963), 243 Ind. 570, 188 N. E. 2d 914; McCoy et al. v. State (1958), 237 Ind. 654, 148 N. E. 2d 190.

And while it is true that the appellant denied certain of the facts given above in her testimony, the court was not bound to accept her story where there was evidence of probative value tending to contradict it. Harrison v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 336, 197 N. E. 2d 770; Schweigel v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 6, 195 N. E. 2d 848.

Considering all the evidence contained in the record, we are of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the court below.

Judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

Arterburn & Myers, JJ., concur. Jackson, J., dissents, with opinion. Achor, J., not participating.