dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the sole question for decision in this case is whether or not the deed dated Decern*943ber 15, 1937, was ever delivered by Mary E. Crump to her husband J. T. Crump. I do not question the legal principles stated, but I question their applicability to the facts and the realities of the situation.
In the view I take of the case, the evidence and all proper and reasonable inferences therefrom point unerringly, and without a single contradiction, to the fact that there was a complete delivery of the deed. The infirmities of the conclusion of the majority lie in their failure to attach proper importance to the recitals of the deed, the circumstances of its possession, and their effort to give undue weight to the testimony of the relatives of the wife about the circumstances surrounding their finding of the deed.
A consideration of all of the evidence and circumstances' will, I think, disclose the weakness of the majority opinion'.
Mrs. Crump was a well educated colored woman and taught in one of the elementary schools in Richmond. She sometimes prepared papers, such as wills, for her friends. It is alleged that she drafted the deed in question here. Her husband was ignorant of business and legal matters, and was unable to tell a deed from a will. Living together in complete harmony, they looked upon themselves as one in unity of purpose and possession.
The undisputed testimony of Crump is that his wife came to him one day and handed him the deed, which he glanced at and handed back to her, suggesting that she place it with their other important papers. His wife then told him that if anything happened to her, he “would have no trouble, but would be entitled to the property by virtue of this paper.”
The deed contained short recitals which speak louder than volumes. They inform us of the motives and intent of the grantee in the most positive, direct and express words. They are preserved by the written words of the grantee in language that permits of no doubt and cause the majority to concede that their conclusion makes this case one of hardship. They indelibly impress the case with the material-' *944fact that she intended her act to be the fulfillment of what she properly regarded her obligation to her husband.
These recitals, in the language of Mrs. Crump, are sufficiently important to be set out in detail. They are:
“Whereas the Rev. J. T. Crump, party of the second part did build and buy all that certain lot of land with improvements thereon, known as 620 N. 31st Street, Richmond, Va., and
“Whereas the said Rev. J. T. Crump, did, of his own accord, cause the said lot and buildings thereon to be -recorded in the name of Mary E. Crump, party of the first part as owner, and
“Whereas it now appears to Mary E. Crump, party of the first part, to be more convenient to deed the said lot and buildings thereon to the said Rev. J. T. Crump.
“NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the sum of One Dollar, and other considerations, the dollar being cash in hand
“The said party, Mary E.. Crump, of the first part doth grant with general Warranty of Title unto Rev. J. T. Crump, party of the second part all the following property; # # * .”
Eleven years after the deed was written, upon the death of Mrs. Crump, it was found by one of her relatives in a drawer of her bureau with an insurance policy and some receipts, the place where she and her husband kept their important papers. It had apparently remained there from the date of its execution and delivery to her husband. Had it been removed therefrom by her husband it is quite clear no question of its delivery would ever have been raised.
Crump, shocked and grieved by the death of his faithful companion of many years, gave no immediate thought to his business affairs upon her death. He made no examination of her papers or search to determine whether she had left a will.' Eight days after her death, with his mental faculties vague and confused by sorrow and grief, he was confronted by the relatives and heirs-at-law of his wife with their *945■discovery of the deed. He did not then read the paper presented to him, for he thought it referred to another piece of property. Nothing said by the witnesses for the defendants contradicted his testimony that the deed had been delivered to him, or negatived the attendant circumstances of the claimed delivery. He did not deem it necessary, nor was it necessary, for him to make an explanation to the relatives of his wife. Under the attendant circumstances it could hardly be expected that he would have identified the paper delivered to him eleven years before. Without thought of controversy, he complied with their suggestion that they be permitted to make a copy of the instrument.
In Leftwich v. Early, 115 Va. 323, 328, 79 S. E. 384, quoting from Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 P. 287, 40 Am. St. Rep. 415, 19 L. R. A. 242, we said:
“ ‘The question of the delivery of a deed is one of intention, and the delivery is complete when there is an intention manifested on the part of the grantor to make the instrument his deed.’ ”
In Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 S. E. 712, Prentis, J., in a comprehensive review of numerous cases dealing with various phases of the subject, said there is a delivery of a deed where the intention of the grantor to deliver is effectuated by word or acts, and this is a question of fact to be gathered from all of the circumstances of the case. This was stated to be particularly true if the conveyance is one of voluntary settlement. Nor, as between the grantor and the grantee, would the deed be invalid for want of delivery merely because it remained in the grantor’s possession.
As to the sufficiency of the delivery of a deed, it is said in 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, section 121: “All that is requisite is that, by his acts and words, the party manifests an intention to deliver his deed. The intention is to be gathered from all the acts and declarations of the grantor. As has been many times said, a deed may be delivered by words without acts, or by acts without words, or by both words and acts.”
See also 26 C. J. S., Deeds, section 42, et seq.
*946In Garrett v. Andis, 159 Va. 150, 157, 165 S. E. 657, Holt, J., said:
“Intent governs delivery. Of course one would not after-wards be heard to say that he did not intend a delivery unequivocally made, but intent is of the utmost importance in doubtful cases, and it is then that relevant evidence of facts and circumstances leading up to the delivery becomes of importance.”
It cannot here be said that possession was retained by the grantor. The Crumps were simple people. They kept their valued papers in the wife’s bureau. Because of her greater experience in business matters, it was natural for her to preserve the records and papers of her family. That it was placed in her bureau by common consent for safekeeping is without contradiction. The fact that other papers of importance were there found affords affirmative support.
In Garrett v. Andis, supra, at page 158, we quoted with approval:
“ ‘In cases of voluntary settlements, courts have gone great lengths in sustaining the validity of deeds, without affirmative proof of any delivery, and the earlier cases hold that a voluntary settlement, fairly made, is binding in equity, unless there is clear and decisive proof that the grantor never parted or intended to part with possession of the deed, and that if he retains it, there must be other facts to show that it was not intended to be absolute.’ Wallace v. Berdell, 97 N. Y. 13, 22.”
We come next to the law of corroboration. Code of 1950, Title 8, sec. 286.
In Martin v. Martin, 166 Va. 109, 116, 184 S. E. 220, we held that corroboration “need not rest in the testimony of witnesses but may be furnished by surrounding circumstances adequately established,” citing a number of Virginia cases and also Rogers v. Rogers, 89 N. J. Eq. 1, 104 A. 32.
The surrounding circumstances herein recited seem to me to adequately establish delivery. To begin with we have a voluntary settlement between a man and his faithful and *947devoted wife, in accord with the dictates of good conscience. In addition to the positive testimony of delivery of the deed, the circumstances out of which the transaction grew afford further support.
Mrs. Crump did what was expected of a dutiful wife. Her execution and delivery of the deed was in the form and manner deemed more convenient for her husband, in view of the purposes admitted. The preservation of the deed in the place where the important papers of the couple were kept was consistent with its safekeeping in the manner described by Crump. The fact that Mrs. Crump preserved the deed for eleven years and did not destroy it strongly indicates that she intended it to be effective. Her reason for not acknowledging it indicates, in conformity with the desire it not be known that Crump owned the property, that she did not wish the officer taking the acknowledgment to learn of the conveyance. Her intention was so clear in the recitals of the deed, and her acts were so consistent with the dominant purpose of the husband to conceal knowledge of his ownership of any property, that to ignore her intention and acts and defeat her purpose would be to discard equity and justice by an overly strained adherence to a conventional formula, regardless of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The effect of an affirmance of the decree appealed from not only deprives the appellant of his life savings invested in the property; but deprives his own heirs of any inheritance they might expect. It would have been strange conduct, indeed, on the part of the wife to have gone to the trouble of writing the deed, inserting its peculiar recitals, executing it, and preserving it for eleven years, without intending that such steps be considered legally effective when her husband sought to claim its benefits.
I repeat that had the heirs-at-law of Mrs. Crump not found the deed, no question of its delivery to the husband would have arisen. No reasonable inference can be drawn from the testimony of the witnesses for the defendants *948which conflicts with the facts and circumstances supporting the claim of Crump. His conduct is readily explainable in view of the situation in which he found himself. Only suspicion supports the theory of the defendants, a suspicion likely to be engendered by the hope of gain. Opposed to this are facts and circumstances, all upholding the position of the plaintiff who asks only that he be allowed that which, all must agree, is his just due.
Equity is the synonym of natural right and justice. Its principles are grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law. It is in this spirit that I believe the evidence in this case should be considered. In such a consideration, I find no evidence or reasonable inferences which support the conclusion of the trial court. On the other hand, the facts, the circumstances, and fair play support a contrary determination. I think we should reverse the decree of the trial judge and here enter a decree granting J. T. Crump the relief applied for.
Staples, J., concurs in this dissent.