(dissenting) — I am unable to agree with the majority opinion because I find no ambiguity in the written contract between the parties.
This is an action brought to enforce a subcontract in which no fraud was pleaded by the subcontractor (respondent) nor did he ask for a rescission or reformation thereof. He admits delivering to appellant the following written instrument:
“Able Plumbing
8201 So. Tacoma Way — Lakewood 3440 Tacoma, Washington
“Plumbing and heating will be done according to spc. for the sum of $1419.31.”
and that it referred to the construction of an addition to the Spanaway school.
He contends that the word “plumbing” meant the furnishing of all material and labor necessary according to plumbing specifications, but that the word “heating” meant the furnishing of labor only according to the heating specifications. I cannot find any legal basis for such a construction of this instrument.
The abbreviation “spc.” incorporated by reference the specifications for the Spanaway school job (prepared by certain Seattle engineers) in so far as they related to the plumbing and heating requirements. 17 C. J. S. 773, Contracts, § 327 b(2).
These specifications (which were admitted in evidence) state that they are on file with the clerk of the school board *333at the Spanaway school. Under the heading “General Conditions” is found this provision:
“Scope of Work:
“The work contemplated under this contract includes all labor, material, equipment and other items and services necessary for, and reasonably incidental to, the completion of the project described in the specifications and the accompanying drawings.
“The project consists of the following principal items:
(a) A 47' x 56' addition to the present frame building, including 2 classrooms, corridor and 2 entrances.
(b) Additional plumbing fixtures and minor alterations to the two existing toilet rooms.
(c) Moving 2 existing 20' x 40' frame buildings.”
Under the heading “Plumbing for New Addition” is a detailed description of the new materials to be installed in the school addition together with a list of new plumbing fixtures required and a description of the alteration of existing fixtures.
Under the heading “Heating” is a paragraph reading:
“Scope of Work:
“This work shall include (a) an addition to the hot water heating system, including radiators, piping and circulating pump for the addition to the building; (b) a run of direct burial insulated hot water supply and return to the new location of the shop and (c) reconnecting the shop and library buildings at their new location.”
Following this is a page devoted to a detailed description of the radiators, pipe, fittings, valves, pipe insulation and other heating materials to be installed in the new addition to the school.
Respondent testified that he did not see these specifications until after the delivery of the instrument above set forth. He said that, before bidding on this subcontract, he went to the school and talked to a carpenter (who was working on this job) who showed him a set of plans. However, these specifications were then available to him in the office of the clerk of the school board which was located in the school building. In any event respondent, having incorporated these specifications in his bid, is bound by the *334provisions thereof relating to plumbing and heating whether or not he had previously read them.
In 17 C. J. S. 949, Contracts, § 459, the author states the obligation of a builder under such a contract to be:
“Building and construction contracts. In accordance with general rules governing other types of contracts, considered in previous paragraphs of this section, by the strict common-law rule, a builder who has improvidently assumed an absolute liability when he might have undertaken a qualified one only, is not excused from performing his engagement, unless he is prevented from doing so by reason of performance becoming impossible by a change in the law, see infra § 467, by the destruction of the specific thing which is essential to the performance of the contract, see infra § 466, or by the nonexistence of conditions essential to performance. No hardship, no unforeseen hindrance, no difficulty will excuse him from doing what he has expressly agreed to do. Thus, a contractor is not excused from per7 forming according to the terms of the contract, because of defective or mistaken plans, of failure to agree on plans and specifications at the outset, or mere difficulty in performing, or of unusual or unexpected expense; or because of his inability to perform, not due to any wrongful act or .omission of the owner; or because the contract would not be profitable to the owner, or would be useless under the existing conditions; nor is he excused because of latent defects in the soil conditions, unless the testing of the soil is exclusively within control of the owner or architect. So, also, the mere fact that after the builder has failed to perform his contract the owner notifies him that he will himself complete it does not show that the contractor was justified in his failure to perform.”
Respondent’s bid in this case was unqualified. To construe the bid, as the majority construes it, as being for labor and material with regard to the plumbing but for labor only with regard to the heating, seems to me to ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the instrument. If respondent intended to so limit his bid regarding the heating, he should have qualified it specifically in that respect.
It is argued by respondent that the figure ($1,419.31) was so absurdly low that appellant knew or should have known that he had miscalculated his bid. While appellant pro*335duced evidence to the contrary, the trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds as to the heating work and allowed appellant to recover $38 for respondent’s breach of the plumbing portion of the contract. It seems to me that there is no logical basis for treating the two elements differently when the bid contained identical language as to both plumbing and heating.
While parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties prior to the making of the contract for the purpose of placing the court in the same position as the parties, such evidence is not admissible to show an intent contrary to that expressed in the written agreement. On this point, we said in Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn. (2d) 399, 133 P. (2d) 938:
“It is a well-established rule of construction that, when parties adopt a written agreement as the expression of their intentions, that instrument becomes the contract, and all negotiations and understandings previous thereto become merged into the agreement. Unless the contract as executed is ambiguous, or unless there exists some ground for rescission or reformation, the actual unexpressed intentions of the parties may not be considered to alter the terms of the written document. The fact that a party may have believed the effect of the agreement to be different than it actually is, will not in and of itself, justify this court in setting aside or rewriting the contract for them.
“One further rule of construction should be mentioned. The court may always consider the surrounding circumstances leading up to the execution of an agreement, not to evidence an intent contrary to that expressed in the agreement, but to place the court in the same position as the parties. 3 Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.) 1804, § 629; Leavenworth State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356, 204 Pac. 5.”
The majority opinion, contrary to the above quoted rule, considers the parol evidence admitted by the trial court regarding the preliminary negotiations between the parties and, adopting its findings of fact, holds that-the terms of the unambiguous written instrument (which was the final integration of the negotiations between the parties) shall *336be varied and given a different meaning than, the words used therein plainly mean.
Respondent may have made a bid which was much too low, but he has shown no legal or equitable ground for relieving him from the obligations which he, a plumber of twenty-two years experience, assumed by delivery of the written instrument to appellant.
I think that the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant judgment for the amount prayed for in its complaint.