(dissenting).
Although plaintiff is a resident of Sumter County and the individual defendants are residents of Florence County, this suit was brought in Darlington County. Since the corporate defendant operates a railroad, has an agent and conducts corporate business in Darlington County, plaintiff had a *23right to bring the action in that county under the construction given by this Court to Section 422 of the 1942 Code. Tucker v. Ingram et al., 187 S. C. 525, 198 S. E. 25. His motive or purpose in doing so is not a relevant inquiry here. Of course, under the terms of Section 426 of the Code, the defendants had a right to change the venue by showing that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. A motion to change the place of trial upon this ground is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the circuit judge, which will not be disturbed by this Court except in case of manifest error. Sample v. Bedenbaugh et al., 158 S. C. 496, 155 S. E. 828; Wade v. Southern Railroad Co. et al., 186 S. C. 265, 195 S. E. 560; Frost v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 199 S. C. 349, 19 S. E. (2d) 471; Gregory v. Powell et al., receivers, etc., 206 S. C. 261, 33 S. E. (2d) 629. After full consideration, the Circuit Judge in the instant case determined that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of Justice would not be subserved by changing the place of trial to Florence County. The sole inquiry on this appeal is whether under the facts presented, the Court below in reaching this conclusion committed manifest legal error.
While it seems to be conceded that none of the witnesses reside in Darlington County, defendants have not definitely shown that they have any witnesses in Florence County. It is true that the two individual defendants reside in Florence County but the inconvenience of the parties in attending the trial is not a factor to be considered in a motion of this character. As such, they are not witnesses within the contemplation of Section 426 of the Code. Wrin v. Ohlandt, 213 Cal. 158, 1 P. (2d) 991; Baird v. Smith, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 221, 68 P. (2d) 979; McConnon & Co. v. Sletten et al, 55 N. D. 388, 213 N. W. 483; 67 C. J., page 160, It is not shown by the affidavits that the corporate defendant will use the individual defendants as witnesses in its behalf. There is an assertion in the affidavit of one of the attorneys *24for the defendants “that there may be several lay witnesses from Florence”, but this statement is entirely too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be considered. The only other witnesses whose convenience is sought to be accommodated are “several medical witnesses on the part of the defendants from Rocky Mount, North Carolina, Wilmington, North Carolina, and Richmond, Virginia.” It is claimed that the convenience of these witnesses would be promoted by a trial at Florence because that city is on the main line of the Atlantic Coast Line Railway over which they would travel in attending the trial. It is said that if the trial is held in Dar-lington County, it would be necessary for these witnesses to come to Florence by train and then travel by automobile from that city to Darlington. The distance between these cities, however, is only ten miles and they are connected by a dual lane highway. Assuming that the convenience of nonresident witnesses may be considered, which is questionable, 67 C. J., page 161, the asserted inconvenience seems negligible. The circuit judges of this State frequently commute a greater distance in holding court. There are many jurors who live more than ten miles from the county court house. Under existing means of travel, no party or witness, whether residing in Darlington or Florence, would be seriously inconvenienced if the trial were held in either county.
Under the above circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Court below committed a manifest abuse of legal discretion in refusing the motion and, therefore, respectfully dissent.