dissenting.
I respectfully dissent with respect to Part II A. 1.
The contract between Peerless and the School is at odds with the contract between Gatto and the School. Gatto was not a party to the Peerless-School contract. She is, therefore, entitled to rely upon her own contract with regard to the ultimate authority for termination of that contract. It specifically stated that termination is a determination to be made upon reasonable cause in the sole discretion of the School. It does not contemplate that such authority may be delegated to a des-ignee such as the Headmaster.
Under Part II A. 3. of the majority opinion, this fact would appear to be acknowledged. In treating the issue of whether the reasonableness of a contract termination is a question appropriate for summary judgment, the majority states:
“... St. Richard’s reserved to itself exclusive authority to terminate Gatto’s employment. The contract provides that the school makes such reasonable cause determinations ‘in its sole discretion’ .... In other words, because the assessment of reasonable cause was within the exclusive province of the school ...” Op. at 922.
I fail to understand how the School may delegate its exclusive authority to another employee of the School.
For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Peerless possessed delegated authority to fire Gatto.5
*927Although I concur in the affirmance of the summary judgment with respect to Gatto’s claim for defamation, I would reverse the summary judgment with respect to the breach of contract and tortious interference with contract claims and would remand for further proceedings as to those two counts of the complaint.
ORDER
This Court having heretofore handed down its decision in this case on August 19, 2002, marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication;
The Appellees, by counsel, having thereafter filed their Motion to Publish Decision, alleging therein that the decision both clarifies existing law and is a matter of substantial public importance in that it clarifies the application of the defamation standard in the context of school communications with parents and in particular establishes a new rule of law, namely, the adoption of the common interest privilege to protect communications between schools, parents and taxpayers.
The Court having examined said Motion and being duly advised, now finds that said Motion should be granted and this Court’s opinion in this appeal should now be ordered published.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:
1. The Appellees’ Motion to Publish Decision heretofore handed down in this cause on August 19, 2002, marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication, is now ordered published.
. In this regard I must acknowledge that Gat-to's contract was executed by Peerless on behalf of St. Richard's School Foundation. It was not signed by the President of the Board of the Foundation or some other authorized member of the Board. Appellee’s Appendix at 068. That fact does not, however, in my estimation, alter the manner in which and by whom the contract could be terminated. Although Peerless may have been the agent of the School with reference to the hiring of Gatto he did not thereby and in derogation of the contract itself become the agent of the *927School with reference to termination of the contract.