CONCURRING IN RESULT
Staton, P.J.I agree with the result reached by the majority that “awarding substantially all the marital assets to the wife while reserving the inheritance to the husband was against the clear logic and effect of the circumstances within the mandate that the division should be fair and equitable to each.” However, the majority opinion’s treatment of several matters compels me to concur in result only for two reasons.
First, IC 1971, 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1976) sets out five separate factors which a trial court shall consider in determining what is a just and reasonable disposition of property. Two of those separate factors are:
“(b) the extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse prior to the marriage or through inheritance or gift;
(c) the economic circumstances of the spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell therein for such periods as the court may deem just to the spouse having custody of any children; . . .”
The majority opinion erroneously jumbles these separate considerations together by stating that the statute “would permit the court to hear evidence regarding the inheritance and consider it in connection with its assessment of the economic circumstances of the parties at the time the disposition of the *610marital assets is to become effective.” I do not believe it was the intention of the legislature that the trial court should lift out of context the “economic circumstances ... at the time of disposition” language and combine it with the reference to inheritance or gift. The two separate considerations were included in the property disposition statute for separate functions.
Before the present dissolution act came into existence, it was customary to completely exclude from consideration the separate property of each spouse. Scott v. Scott (1859), 13 Ind. 225; Wilkins v. Miller (1857), 9 Ind. 100. Therefore, the reasonable interpretation of the present statute would mandate that subsection (b) be construed as an exclusionary proviso, thé exclusion being directly related to source of property. Subsection (c) deals specifically with the disposition of the family residence and mandates a consideration of the economic circumstances at the time the disposition is to become effective. A trial court might, in a given case, determine how an inheritance has affected the economic circumstances, at the time of final disposition, of the spouse who is to be awarded the marital residence; but, as I shall discuss below, even then the inheritance must be absolutely ascertainable. And, because of case law preceding the enactment of IC 1971, 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1976), I am convinced that the legislature wanted the trial court to justly and reasonably distinguish between true marital assets (fruits of the union) and separate properties of the parties. This conviction is reinforced by the past tense “was acquired,” which implies a sorting out, at the time of the divorce, of “his,” “hers,” and “our” property. By no means should the reference to gift or inheritance be interpreted as a mandate that gifts and inheritance are necessarily subject to property distribution.
Therefore, I agree with the majority that it was against the logic and effect of the circumstances for the trial court to divide the assets by distributing to the husband the “his” property and distributing the “our” property almost exclusively to the wife. The “his” property should not have been considered in portioning marital assets.1 IC 1971, 31-l-11.5-ll(b) (Burns Code Ed., Supp. *6111976), would not have been necessary at all except for the source-exclusionary purpose.
The second reason for my concurrence in result relates to the characterization by the majority of the inheritance as “acquired” as of the date of dissolution. Title to personalty does remain in the personal representative throughout the administration of the estate under current law. State v. Kaufman (1941), 218 Ind. 74, 30 N.E.2d 987; Helvey v. O’Neill (1972), 153 Ind. App. 635, 288 N.E.2d 553. Therefore, the husband had only some future interest in the estate, which interest was subject to divestiture by the personal representative for payment of claims against the estate. If we are to say that the husband had sufficiently “acquired” his interest in his mother’s estate prior to final separation for that interest to have been considered, then it is basic that we know the value of his interest. We cannot ascertain a value, nor could the trial court.
The majority states that the husband “valued” his interest in the estate (other than the certificates of deposit) “at between $27,000 and $28,000, and this value was not disputed.” The record not only discloses a dispute about the value of the husband’s eventual share, but it also reveals that the $27,000-$28,000 figures were given by the wife.2 The husband testified only that there had been no distribution of the estate. His sister, the other heir to the mother’s estate, testified that nothing in the estate had been finalized, but that the total estate might be about $79,000. The $79,000 presumably represented a gross estate figure, before claims, administratrix-administrator fees, state and federal income taxes, state inheritance tax, federal estate tax, appraiser’s fees, court costs, funeral expenses, and attorney fees are deducted. There may be some net estate for the husband and his sister to inherit, but it would be unmitigated folly, from *612the record before this Court, to place a dollar amount on the husband’s part of that estate.
Like the Indiana Supreme Court in Loeb v. Loeb (1973), 261 Ind. 193, 301 N.E.2d 349, I do not believe that the husband was “presently possessed of any pecuniary value which could have been before the trial court for disposition.” Id. at 353. The husband’s rights to inheritance were fixed at his mother’s death, but intervening variables could diminish the value of the estate before he acquired it. There was no evidence that the statutory time for filing claims had lapsed;3 there was no evidence even of the amount of the preliminary bond (IC 1971, 29-1-11-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-501 [Burns Code Ed.]).
The court did abuse its discretion in dividing the marital assets, and the property settlement must be reversed; therefore, I concur in the result.
NOTE — Reported at 369 N.E.2d 653.
. There are possible case-by-case exceptions to this rule. If the “non-*611inheriting” spouse cared for the decedent or the marital assets were used to preserve the expected inheritance, then it would be neither just nor reasonable to exclude the inheritance from the marital estate. Likewise, if the inheritance or gift has been so utilized and commingled by the parties over a number of years as to evade sorting, it has become a marital asset irregardless of source.
. Depositions were ordered published, but were not in the record.
. The mother died in January, and the dissolution hearing was in October, but no evidence was introduced as to the date the estate was opened or to the date the first notice to creditors was published. See IC 1971, 29-1-14-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-801 (Burns Code Ed.).