I concur in the judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment of the superior court as to guilt, death eligibility, and noncapital sentence. After review, I have found no reason to do otherwise.1
I dissent, however, from the judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment of the superior court as to the sentence of death. As I shall explain, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct bearing on this question.
I
In summation at the penalty phase, the prosecutor urged the jury to impose the penalty of death on defendant. Like William Jennings Bryan in the Scopes trial, he brought a Bible into the courtroom before his argument and kept it visible on counsel table throughout. He opened with these comments:
“Thou shalt not kill.
“We all know what that means. We all know where it came from. The words have their plain evident English language meaning.
“I don’t need to explain to you why such a rule ever came into existence or why we even have to have rules like this today.
*273“We have to because people do things like he’s done and then the question is: What do we do to them for it?
“But before I get to that, before I talk about this case, I think it’s important for you all to appreciate how we got to where we are today; starting with religious principles; starting with religious references, Biblical references.
“None of you had any religious reservations about serving on the jury like this. But I still feel it is important that you understand that what I’m going to ask you to do is totally in keeping with religious principles. It is totally in keeping with the Spirit of Christ or God or whatever beliefs you have.
“Every society has developed a rule like that and it’s just been necessary whether they were tribes; whether they were major countries or small clans.
“There are references—it is something we could all accept—the Old Testament is full of references to the death penalty, full of references to the types of things that one should, could do and subject himself or herself to the death penalty.
“When Moses led the Jews out of the desert God gave him those commandments and those commandments were a combination of religious principles—because the Jews were out to start on their own and they had no more government; so they were a codification or recognition of both religious and civil principles.
“And that’s why you see this mixture of religious commandments and civil. Or in this case criminal commandments: Thou shalt not kill.
“Clearly that was among them.
“There are references, as I mentioned to that concept, the concept of thou shalt not kill and what happens if you do throughout the Old Testament:
“ ‘Anyone who strikes a man—[’]
“This is from the Book of Exodus.
“ ‘Anyone who strikes a man and so causes death must die.’
“Beastiality [szc], fornicating with an animal was punishable by death.
“The Book of Leviticus had a similar message or concept.
“The Book of Numbers: ‘He who had struck a person with an iron object so as to cause death is a murderer and he must be put to death.’
*274“The same message was delivered with respect to striking somebody with a stone instrument, with a wooden instrument.
“Now those are all God’s law.
“Those were not man’s law.
“And the message was very clear in those days.
“There are people who feel that there are contrary messages coming from the Old or the New Testament.
“And rather [than] wait for [defense counsel] to point those out to you, I want to tell you what they are and why they are not contrary to where we are here today or where the Jews were when they got the message from Moses.
“An eye for an eye. You are all familiar with that.
“And many people think that the rejoinder to that was the idea that that was not to imply that you couldn’t impose life punishment on somebody was ‘Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord.’
“It’s true that ‘Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord’ seems to countermand, seems to offset the idea that an eye for an eye was the appropriate punishment. But that wasn’t the point.
“Because when you read on subsequent to ‘Vengeance is mine’ it was clear that the message was: But you must submit to civil authorities.
“You must render unto Ceaser [jz'c] the things that are Ceaser’s [jfc].
“The reason that when Jesus came on the scene and talked about love and compassion for human beings was that by that time the Romans had established the rule. The Romans had established the law and so it was fitting for him to deliver messages filled with compassion. It was fitting for him to talk about forgiveness. But it was also clear that it was proper to render to Ceaser [jzc] the things that are Ceaser’s [sic]. And those were the laws, in existence, at the time.
“God recognized there’d be people like Mr. Wash. That’s why those commandments were delivered. That’s why that message is throughout the Old Testament.
“Who must be punished for what they have done and if they have done things like he’s done they must forfeit their lives for what he’s done.”
*275The prosecutor then turned to the facts of the case. He did not renounce his religious theme. In the course of his argument, he returned to the Bible, once expressly and several times by implication. Moreover, he kept the Bible itself on counsel table for all to see.
II
In my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 200-201, 204 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862], certiorari granted September 28, 1993, sub nomine Sandoval v. California (1993)_ U.S--[125 L.Ed.2d 789, 114 S.Ct. 40], I set out the law that is applicable to the facts of this case. I paraphrase as follows:
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to invoke purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death.
Argument of this sort by a representative of the state offends California statutes and judicial decisions, which establish our positive, secular law as the rule governing the choice between life and death. It also violates the United States and California Constitutions—including their respective clauses concerning establishment of religion, cruel and unusual punishments, and due process of law.
It is well settled that religion may not play a role in the sentencing process.
The jury has a duty to apply the law of the jurisdiction as given by the court in determining whether the defendant should live or die. It may not rely on its own interpretation of that law. Less still may it rely on religious precepts.
The invocation of the command of extrajudicial “law,” no matter how well intentioned, is not permitted.
Indeed, the use of an extrajudicial “code” cannot be reconciled with the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that any decision to impose death must be the result of discretion that is carefully and narrowly channeled and circumscribed by the law of the jurisdiction—the secular law of the jurisdiction.
The Bible, of course, is an extrajudicial “code.” Its commands and prohibitions cannot be viewed as mere reliquiae of a culture separated from ours by thousands of miles and thousands of years. This is because, to many jurors, the Bible is an authoritative religious document.
*276As stated, prosecutorial misconduct involving the invocation of purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death implicates both California law and the United States Constitution. It is the general rule for error under California law that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome when, as here, the defect bears on penalty in a capital trial. Similarly, it is the general rule for error under the United States Constitution that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn is presumed unless the government shows that the defect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The sort of prosecutorial misconduct identified above appears to be subject to the general rule. Thus, insofar as state law is concerned, the “reasonable possibility” standard is applied. Insofar as the federal charter is involved, the “reasonable doubt" test is employed.
Ill
The question that arises as we turn to apply the law stated above to the facts of this case is whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by making the comments quoted in the text.
Before we may reach the merits, however, we must cross the threshold.
It is evident that defendant did not raise at trial, and has not preserved for appeal, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. He failed to satisfy the general rule (e.g., People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 976 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214]) requiring assignment of misconduct and request for admoni-, tion as to the comments he now challenges, and can invoke no exception. Therefore, he has “waived” the question.
But “[t]hat means only that [defendant] is not entitled to require that we review the point as a matter of right. It does not mean that we are somehow barred from undertaking such review ex mero motu. Plainly, albeit impliedly, the California Constitution obligates us to reverse a judgment that results from a miscarriage of justice. Any rule of less than constitutional stature that may be construed to prevent us from discharging our duty [citations] is invalid to that extent.” (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1017, fn. 1 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984], italics in original (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The majority are not to the contrary: they reach the merits themselves.
My conclusion is not remarkable. In fact, it is strictly in line with the widely applicable and well-established doctrine of “plain error.” Almost all jurisdictions, state and federal, “recognize the authority of an appellate court to reverse on the basis of a plain error even though that error was not *277properly raised and preserved at the trial level.” (3 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) Scope of Appellate Review, § 26.5(d), p. 255.) Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a typical statement of the doctrine: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
The purpose of the “plain error” doctrine is broad. To be sure, “[t]here is language in a number of cases saying that the power to notice plain error is to be exercised only when this is necessary to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. This seems too restrictive, [[¶]] Clearly a part of the purpose of the plain error rule is to protect the defendant. If a serious injustice was done him it should be remedied. . . . But this does not exhaust the purpose of the rule. Instead the court is to act if there were errors that ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ It is important that justice be done but it is also important that justice seem to be done. ‘Even those guilty of the most heinous offenses are entitled to a fair trial.’ It is not a miscarriage of justice to convict a guilty man, but if he is convicted in a way inconsistent with the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, then the courts should invoke the plain error rule in order to protect their own public reputation.” (3A Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure (2d ed. 1982) § 856, pp. 338-341, fns. omitted [dealing with Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C.].)
It hardly needs to be stated that the “power to notice a plain error ... is one that the courts exercise”—and should exercise—“cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances.” (3A Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, § 856, p. 338, fn. omitted [dealing with Fed. Rules Grim. Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C.].) For example, “federal courts have consistently interpreted the plain-error doctrine as requiring an appellate court to find that the claimed error not only seriously affected ‘substantial rights,’ but that it had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” (United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 17, fn. 14 [84 L.Ed.2d 1, 13-14, 105 S.Ct. 1038] [same].) If we should follow such an interpretation here, we would find what it requires. The analysis below will prove the point.
On the very face of the record, it is manifest that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. The majority agree.
In comments that were plain, vigorous, and extensive, the prosecutor invoked purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death on defendant. The thrust of his remarks was that “God recognized there’d be people like Mr. Wash”—and that God decreed such people must be put to death. Both the tone and content of his words were unmistakable. *278Time and again, he referred to “God” and “Jesus” and “Christ”; mentioned the “Bible” and its “Books” and the “Old” and “New” “Testaments”; spoke of “Biblical” and “religious” “references” and “principles”; directed attention to “Moses” and “the Jews”; cited “God’s law” and “commandments”; referred to the Bible’s injunction of “an eye for an eye” and its' “message” that the murderer must suffer death; and quoted and requoted and quoted again, “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt not kill.”
It is also manifest that the prosecutor’s misconduct requires reversal. The majority disagree. Their conclusion, however, must yield to the facts.
The only issue before the jury was whether to impose on defendant the penalty of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The evidence was substantial both in aggravation and in mitigation. Indeed, similar evidence had previously resulted in a mistrial, as the original jury was unable to reach a verdict after five days of deliberation, standing ultimately with three jurors holding out for life.
Obviously, the prosecutor’s comments invoking purported religious law in favor of death bore directly on the question of penalty. Just as obviously, his remarks must have carried special force, “incorporating as [they] did ‘what many consider an authoritative source—if not Authority Itself.’ ” (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 205 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
It is true that the prosecutor’s comments were delivered at the opening of his summation and were followed by a review of the facts of the case. But the effect of his remarks perdured. As noted, he returned to the Bible in the course of his argument, and kept the Bible itself on counsel table for all to see.
It is also true that the prosecutor’s comments were challenged by defense counsel in his own summation.2 But despite counsel’s efforts they were not neutralized.
*279Therefore, the misconduct raises a reasonable possibility of an adverse effect on the outcome, and cannot be declared harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In view of the foregoing, we may—and indeed must—reach the merits of the “waived” question whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct and, in so doing, resolve the issue in the affirmative. Our failure to act would subvert both justice and the appearance of justice. This is certainly an egregious case that calls for our intervention. As explained, the prosecutor’s comments “seriously affected ‘substantial rights[]’” enjoyed by defendant, including his federal and state constitutional guaranties concerning establishment of religion, cruel and unusual punishments, and due process of law, and must be held to have had an “unfair prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” (United States v. Young, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 17, fn. 14 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 13-14].)
IV
For the reasons stated above, I would set aside the sentence of death.
This is not to say that I approve of all that the record discloses. Quite the contrary. I am especially critical of Detective Little’s interrogation of defendant, which was violative of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], and its progeny. Defendant’s statement, “I don’t know if I wanna talk anymore since it’s someone killed, you know,” seems an invocation of his right to remain silent. Certainly, Detective Little so understood the words. His response, “Don’t you like, uh, I thought you said that you liked Shelley?” and “Well, don’t you wanna help, uh, with that?,” did not constitute a proper attempt to obtain clarification of defendant’s statement but an improper— and successful—attempt to secure its withdrawal.
“You know, [the prosecutor] . . . told you the death penalty is proper under the laws of God. He reached back to the scriptures and he made a Biblical analysis.
“The truth is: The death penalty today is condemned by most religious beliefs.
“Pope John Paul the II has condemned the death penalty; even as applied against the person who tried to take his life.
“Pope Paul the VI before him also spoke against the death penalty.
“The death penalty has been called immoral by the leaders in many churches.
“The National Counsel [sz'c] of Churches has taken a stand. Leaders in churches here in California and in synogogues [sz'c] throughout California have taken a stand against it.
“California Catholic Conference has taken a stand against it.
“So what do we make of this stand of the religious leaders?
“Well, clearly, it shows us that [the prosecutor] is wrong when he implies that God freely *279sanctions the execution of Mr. Wash. Others much closer to God than [the prosecutor] will surely disagree with that.”