concurring: I concur in the result based on the conclusion that Wain’s demand letter was not sufficient to invoke the penalty provision of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-512a. Whether a demand letter complies with the statutory prerequisites to invoke the penalty is a question of law. This court can substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Reeves v. Equipment Service Industries, Inc., 245 Kan. 165, 173, 777 P.2d 765 (1989).
K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-512a provides in part:
“(a) In the event any compensation, including medical compensation, which has been awarded under the workers compensation act, is not paid when due to the person, firm or corporation entitled thereto, the employee shall be entitled to a civil penalty, to be set by the director and assessed against the employer or insurance carrier liable for such compensation in an amount of not more than $100 per week for each week any disability compensation is past due and in an amount for each past due medical bill equal to the larger of either the sum of $25 or the sum equal to 10% of *733the amount which is past due on the medical bill, if: (1) Service of written demand for payment, setting forth with particularity the items of disability and medical compensation claimed to be unpaid and past due, has been made personally or by registered'mail on the employer or insurance carrier liable for such compensation and its attorney of record; and (2) payment of such demand is thereafter refused or is not made within 20 days from the date of service of such demand.”
Wain’s demand letter does not state a specific amount of temporary total compensation that is due and unpaid. It does, however, refer to the ALJ order filed February 2, 1989, requiring Clarkson or its insurer to pay temporary total payments during the vocational rehabilitation ¿valuation process.
The Supreme Court made the following comments regarding the sufficiency of a 44-512a demand letter.
“Under K.S.A. 44-512a as it existed prior to the amendment, the claimant was not obligated to itemize the amounts which he claimed were due and payable; the burden was on the employer and compensation carrier to compute the amounts due and make payment within the twenty-day period. Simple letters, requesting payment of all due compensation, were held to comply with the statute. [Citations omitted.]
“As we said in Ryder v. Reagor, 213 Kan. 576, 579, 516 P.2d 990: ‘. . . The employer has the burden of avoiding the effects following the 44-512a demand, and neither the employee nor his counsel is under any obligation to advise the employer of the exact amount due. (Citing cases.)’
“This is no longer true. The claimant now has the burden under K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 44-512a to specify the items and amounts which he contends are due.” Kelly v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 347, 353-54, 566 P.2d 10 (1977).
The problem in this case is that the demand letter is ambiguous concerning what compensation is past due. The letter seems to demand that Clarkson initiate contact with the new vendor and then begin paying temporary total disability benefits once the evaluation process starts.
The trial court indicated its belief that the ALJ order filed February 2, 1989, required payment of temporary total disability payments from the date of the order. Thus, it held the March 17, 1989, demand letter was sufficient to invoke the penalty provision. The ALJ order does state specifically that temporary total disability was payable from the date of the order. The problem with the trial court’s reasoning is that Wain did not request payment from the date of the order. The demand letter alleges *734that Clarkson and its insurer (1) failed to change vendors, (2) failed to obtain a vocational rehabilitation evaluation, and (3) failed to pay temporary total disability benefits during the evaluation.
Two of these allegations were false. The ALJ order filed February 2, 1989, specifically appointed Kansas Rehabilitation and Clinical Consultants (KRCC) as the néw vendor in the case. An employee of that company acknowledged that it had received notice of its appointment from the ALJ in February 1989. Further, the initial contact between KRCC and Wain occurred on March 3, 1989, two weeks prior to the date Clarkson received its demand letter. At the time Clarkson received the demand letter on March 17, 1989, the evaluation process had been underway for two weeks.
• Clarkson could not determine how much compensation was alleged to be past due from the letter. The letter refers to the ALJ order which was filed February 2, 1989, but seems to demand something other than what was ordered. A request to comply with the February 2, 1989, order absent itemization of the amount due was insufficient to invoke the penalty provision of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-512a.