concurring.
I agree that the affidavit for search warrant in this case was at least minimally sufficient to meet constitutional requirements and, to that extent, concur in the opinion of Judge Miller.
However, even if the affidavit were insufficient, no cause for reversal would exist. The Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In Leon, the court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate need not be excluded. 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3428, 82 L.Ed.2d at 701. However, the Leon exception does not apply if, inter alia, the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonably well trained officer could believe in its existence. Our supreme court has recognized the Leon rule in Blalock v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 439, where it found the probable cause affidavit to be sufficient, but stated that even if it were deficient the good faith exception articulated in Leon would have justified the search and seizure. In Motter of M.R.D. (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 306, we specifically applied the good faith exception of Leon and upheld the admissibility of evidence obtained by a search warrant determined to be invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavit.
The affidavit in this case was not so lacking that no reasonably well trained officer could have believed probable cause existed. Thus, this case fits squarely within the Leon exception. The evidence obtained under the search warrant was admissible. Therefore, I concur.