dissent.
Dissenting Opinion by GREENE, J., which BELL, C.J., and CATHELL, J„ Join.
Respectfully, I dissent:
The majority seems to acknowledge that, for more than fifty-seven years, the law in Maryland has been that if the a defendant dies during the pendency of an appeal of right, as opposed to a discretionary appeal, the appeal is dismissed as moot, the conviction is vacated and the underlying indictment, *38as well, is dismissed as moot. Trindle v. State, 326 Md. 25, 602 A.2d 1232 (1992); Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158, 486 A.2d 184, 187 (1985) (noting that it is unfair to let a conviction stand “[w]here the deceased criminal defendant has not had the one appeal to which he is statutorily entitled ... ”); Russell v. State, 310 Md. 96, 527 A.2d 34 (1987); Frank v. State, 189 Md. 591, 56 A.2d 810 (1948). Further, the majority points out that, because the defendant’s appeal is dismissed as moot, it may not be fair and in the interest of justice to let his conviction stand.
The rule followed by the majority of state and federal jurisdictions is that when a criminal defendant files an appeal of right and dies pending the appeal of his or her conviction, the appeal is dismissed and the prosecution abates ab initio. See Tim A. Thomas, Abatement of State Criminal Case by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of Conviction—Modem Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 189 (1990) (for a collection of the states following this majority rule). See also United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir.1977) (explaining that the interests of justice require that the conviction not stand without determination of the merits of an appeal).
In my view, because petitioners, Surland and Bell, filed appeals of right that were undecided at the time of their deaths, their convictions were not entitled to any degree of finality as a matter of law. Pursuant to Maryland statutory law, both defendants were entitled, as a matter of right, to appeal their convictions. See Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In the interests of justice their convictions should not stand without a resolution of the merits of their appeals and any resolution is impossible by virtue of their deaths. See People v. Matteson, 75 N.Y.2d 745, 551 N.Y.S.2d 890, 551 N.E.2d 91, 92 (1989) (holding that a defendant’s suicide while his appeal of right was pending abates the appeal and all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception because “[t]he death places a defendant beyond the court’s power to enforce or reverse the judgment of conviction, thereby preventing effective appellate review of the validity of the conviction”) (citations omit*39ted). A majority of the federal courts of appeal have concluded that an appeal of right is an integral part of the system for adjudicating guilt or innocence, and if a defendant dies before appellate review is completed, the defendant has not obtained final adjudication of the appeal. See United States v. Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 665 (D.C.Cir.1994) (recognizing the holdings of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits affirming that abatement ab initio is the law). The universal rationale for holding that death abates all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception seems to be that “the interests of justice ordinarily require that ... [a defendant] not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an “integral part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.” U.S. v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir.1977) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)).
Recently, the Supreme Court of Alabama applied the abatement rule to a case involving the death of a criminal defendant occurring during the course of an appeal of right. The court held that the defendant’s conviction abated upon his death. Ex parte Estate of Cook, 848 So.2d 916 (Ala.2002).1 The Supreme Court of Alabama acknowledged that states have provided various policy reasons in support of the abatement rule:
Our review of the jurisprudence of other states shows that a majority follow this same rule, and some have provided *40compelling policy reasons in support thereof. See People v. Robinson, 187 Ill.2d 461, 241 Ill.Dec. 538, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (1999) (“the purpose of criminal prosecutions is to punish the defendant; continuing criminal proceedings when the defendant is dead is a useless act”); State v. Holland, 288 Mont. 164, 955 P.2d 1360, 1362 (1998) (adopting rationale for abating criminal proceeding upon defendant’s death set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court “that the interests of the state in protecting society have been satisfied, the imposition of punishment is impossible, and further collection of fines or forfeiture would result in punishing innocent third parties”); State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379, 382 (S.D.1997) (“Mere dismissal of the appeal, without abatement of the proceedings ab initio, would permit a judgment to stand that is not final.”); Gollott v. State, 646 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Miss.1994) (“What is obvious is that society needs no protection from the deceased.... Moreover, other potential criminals will be no less deterred from committing crimes. In the abatement ab initio scheme, the judgment is vacated and the indictment is dismissed, but only because the convicted defendant died. Surely this would not give peace of mind to the criminally inclined.”); State v. McClow, 395 So.2d 757, 758 (La.1981) (abatement has as its purpose “serving the interest of the surviving family in preserving, unstained, the memory of the deceased defendant or his reputation”); State v. Griffin, 121 Ariz. 538, 592 P.2d 372 (1979) (rational adopted in State v. Holland, supra); State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891, 895 (Me.1973) (“By such principle of abatement, ab initio, there is avoided, likewise, danger of any potential collateral carry-over to affect personal or property rights of survivors of the deceased defendant or other persons.”).
Ex parte Cook, 848 So.2d at 918-19 (parallel citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Presumably, because an appeal is an integral part of our criminal justice syt^m, the majority appears motivated to overrule Tñndle, and its progeny, and hold that a defendant’s appeal continues even after death. This approach has been criticized by at least one jurist as a court, apparently, seeking *41to extend its grasp over criminal defendants beyond the grave, i.e., “from here to eternity.” State v. McDonald, 144 Wis.2d 531, 424 N.W.2d 411, 416 (1988) (Day, J. dissenting) (recognizing that death ended the appellate court’s jurisdiction over the criminal defendant and that allowing the appeal to continue after his death will not vindicate the defendant). In that case, a majority of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the appropriate remedy when a defendant dies “while pursing postconviction relief’ is not to abate the criminal proceedings ab initio but to allow the appeal to continue regardless of the cause of the defendant’s death because the defendant is entitled to a final resolution of his appeal. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d at 414-415.
In support of its holding in the present case, the majority advances the following reasons to justify changing the law: it is in the interests of justice and protects the interests of the public to continue the appeal after the defendant’s death; the decedent or those who survive him should have the opportunity for “vindication” by allowing the appeal to go forward; the conviction appealed from is presumptively valid; abatement ab initio should not be the default; and the Court should not dismiss the possibility, out of hand, that the defendant’s conviction on appeal might be reversed, vacated, or modified. Yet, in the same context, the majority acknowledges that the defendant “can suffer no further punishment and reap no reward, whether judgment is vacated or not,” it is willing to permit the “defendant, through a substituted party appointed for his or her benefit, to maintain the defendant’s challenge to ... [the judgment].” Maj. op. at 36, 895 A.2d at 1045.
It is not clear to me the specific societal interests that the majority deems are in need of protection. If the real interests that the majority seeks to protect are the interests of victims and -witnesses, then, in my view, the Legislature is better able to craft a rule than this Court to address the “rights” of all victims and witnesses. If, however, the majority is alluding to the public’s trust and confidence in the criminal justice system, it seems to me that the public would tend to have less confidence in a system that creates a fiction allowing the *42defendant to continue to pursue an appeal from the grave while not allowing victims of crimes to pursue any postmortem remedies in the criminal case.
The reality is, and should be, that death terminates the appeal. Even if the conviction is upheld or reversed after the defendant’s death, it is of no benefit or detriment to the defendant who is dead or to those who cherish his or her memory. For example, assume it is determined on appeal that “an error occurred in the trial warranting a new trial. Does that ‘vindicate’ the defendant]? Hardly. There [will] not ... be a determination that the defendant] was ‘not guilty.’ The issue will never be retried [,]” and the deceased could never be vindicated or found not guilty. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d. at 416 (Day, J. dissenting). It is better for all concerned to recognize that the matter is moot because the defendant, upon death, can suffer no further punishment and reap no reward, whether judgment is vacated or not. In my view, there is no legitimate purpose to be served in permitting the appeal to continue after the defendant’s death.
In other words, when the defendant dies pending his appeal the appeal should be dismissed as moot because the defendant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the court. When a defendant dies, the State’s interest in the “protection of society ha[s] been satisfied, the imposition of punishment is impossible, and [the] collection of fines or forfeiture [will] result in [the] punish[ment of] innocent third parties.” Griffin, 592 P.2d at 373. Further, “[w]hen a financial penalty is imposed upon a defendant, it is unfair to punish defendant’s family by making the family pay the defendant’s fine by virtue of an assessment against the estate.” McDonald, 424 N.W.2d at 413 (discussing concurring opinion by J. Sundby in State v. Krysheski, 119 Wis.2d 84, 349 N.W.2d 729, 731 (1984)); People v. Mazzone, 74 Ill.2d 44, 23 Ill.Dec. 76, 383 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1978) (holding that a fine imposed as punishment on the defendant, and there is a pending appeal, upon his death there is no justice in punishing his survivors for his offense). An appeal automatically becomes moot upon the defendant’s death because the defendant is not available to pursue the *43appeal and often there is no effective relief that the appellate court can provide. See Mazzone, 23 Ill.Dec. 76, 383 N.E.2d at 950. The court in Robinson, upholding Mazzone, reaffirmed that “the purpose of criminal prosecutions is to punish the defendant; that to continue criminal proceedings when the defendant is dead is a useless act,” Robinson, 241 Ill.Dec. 533, 719 N.E.2d at 663 (citing Mazzone, supra) and that “[ojnce the defendant has ceased to be, an appeal cannot effectively confer vindication or impose punishment.” Mazzone, 23 Ill. Dec. 76, 383 N.E.2d at 949. Further, the court in Robinson held that the interests of victims and witnesses are immaterial to abatement ab initio unless the Legislature deems otherwise. See Robinson, 241 Ill.Dec. 533, 719 N.E.2d at 663-64.
The circumstances surrounding the Bell and Surland appeals do not warrant a modification of Maryland law. It serves no meaningful purpose to decide an appeal after the defendant’s death in a criminal case. Substituting a party to act on behalf of the defendant will unnecessarily complicate the resolution of the case. The primary objectives of a criminal prosecution resulting in a conviction and punishment are: (1) to protect society and imprison the guilty and dangerous defendant; (2) to deter the criminal defendant and potential criminals from performing similar conduct; (3) to rehabilitate the criminal defendant; and (4) to obtain retribution from the criminal defendant as a means of satisfying society’s sense of revenge. Application of the rule of abatement ab initio is consistent with these objectives; however to allow a substituted party, appointed after the defendant’s death, to maintain the defendant’s challenge to the judgment is remarkably inconsistent with the primary objectives of the criminal justice system and should not be allowed. Therefore, I dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Bell and remand the case with instructions to abate the conviction ab initio. In addition, I would grant the motion in the Surland case and remand the matter with directions to abate the conviction ab initio.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge CATHELL have authorized me to say that they join in this dissent.
. In Cook, the defendant died while in the course of his appeal de novo to the circuit court. Subsequently, in Wheat v. State, 907 So.2d 461 (Ala.2005) the Alabama Supreme Court distinguished the facts in Cook and held that where the defendant died, while an appeal was pending in the appellate court, death abates the appeal. On remand, the court in Wheat directed the trial court to note in the record the fact of the defendant’s conviction, and that the conviction was appealed, but it was neither affirmed nor reversed. In Wheat, the court applied Ala. Rule 43(a), which was not applicable in Cook, to resolve the issue of abatement on a case by case basis. Rule 43(a) provides that “when the death of a party has been suggested, the proceeding shall not abate, but shall continue or be disposed of as the appellate court may direct.” Wheat, 907 So.2d at 464 (Harwood, J. concurring).