concurring and dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, Justice, joins.
I agree that the decision of the district court should be reversed in this case. I would premise that result upon the failure of Sinclair Trucking to demonstrate “good cause for failure to present it [the additional evidence] in the proceeding before the agency existed * * as required by Wyo. R.App.P. 12.08. As the majority opinion points out, the Harris claim was premised upon unusual exertion attributable to changing a truck tire in the mud. There is no justification for the claim by Sinclair that it was surprised by any evidence relating to mud or rain. Good cause for failure to submit the meteorological data simply is not present in this record. We addressed the Wyo.R.App.P. 12.08 requirement for good cause in Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n, 809 P.2d 775, 781-82 (Wyo.1991). In the context of the timing of the hearing in this matter, which manifests a continuance by the hearing examiner when Sinclair learned the claim was premised upon unusual physical exertion, there is no good cause shown for failure to present the evidence at the initial hearing.
I cannot agree, however, with the invocation of our definition of a material fact in the context of summary judgment proceedings to explain what “evidence is material” in the context of Wyo.R.App.P. 12.08. Reference to dictionary definitions demonstrates that these are discrete concepts:
Material evidence. That quality of evidence which tends to influence the trier of *1168fact because of its logical connection with the issue. Evidence which has an effective influence or bearing on question in issue. Barr v. Dolphin Holding Corp., Sup., 141 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908. [ (1955) ] “Materiality” of evidence refers to pertinency of the offered evidence to the issue in dispute. Vine Street Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 220 N.W.2d 860, 863 [ (1974) ]. Evidence which is material to question in controversy, and which must necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy, and which by itself or in connection with other evidence is determinative of the case. Camurati v. Sutton, 48 Tenn.App. 54, 342 S.W.2d 732, 739 [ (1960) ].
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See also Evidence; Relevancy; Relevant evidence.
Material fact. * * *
Pleading and practice. One which is essential to the case, defense, application, etc., and without which it could not be supported. One which tends to establish any of issues raised. The “material facts” of an issue of fact are such as are necessary to determine the issue. Material fact is one upon which outcome of litigation depends. Amant v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 10 Wash.App. 785, 520 P.2d [181] 481, [184] 484 [ (1974) ]. See also Material allegation.
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Summary judgment. In determining what constitutes a genuine issue as to any material fact for purposes of summary judgment, an issue is “material” if the facts alleged are such as to constitute a legal defense or are of such nature as to affect the result of the action. Austin v. Wilder, 26 N.C.App. 229, 215 S.E.2d 794, 796 [ (1975) ]. See Fed.R.Civil P. 56(c).
A fact is “material” and precludes grant of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have effect of establishing or refuting one of essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties, and would necessarily affect application of appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligations of the parties. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 872 [ (1975) ].
Black’s Law DictionaRY 976-77 (6th ed.1990).
My primary concern relates to the interaction between the concept of a summary judgment, which we have recognized is available in workers’ compensation proceedings (Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc. and State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 899 P.2d 56 (Wyo.1995)), and the requisite demonstration, by evidence admissible at trial, of a genuine issue of material fact. I believe we will engender confusion by invoking the same definition for the evidence necessary to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as we use for determining what fact is material.
To illustrate, the issue of material fact in this case is the presence of mud when Harris changed the tire. Meteorological data could support or refute the presence of the mud. Had Sinclair Trucking presented an affidavit to the effect that there was no mud in the area on the critical date, surely Harris could have presented the meteorological data to create an issue of fact as to the presence of the mud. In such an instance, our summary judgment cases teach that a summary judgment should not be granted. If we invoke the definition of a material fact to determine whether the meteorological data is material, however, we would have to conclude, as does the majority, that the evidence is not material. This simply leads to a circuitous approach destined to be confusing in many situations.
I would invoke the definition of material evidence which really translates into relevant evidence under our Wyoming Rules of Evidence. The definition found there is:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Wyo.R.Evid. 401.
This is a workable rule to invoke in the resolution of the remand issue under Wyo. R.App.P. 12.08. It is one that is familiar and, combined with the requirement of good cause, provides a sufficiently narrow basis for *1169remand. It also maintains the discretion of the trial court, which the invocation of the summary judgment test for material facts probably does not.
I would reverse this case for failure on the part of Sinclair Trucking to demonstrate good cause for the failure to present the evidence at the initial hearing. I would, however, hold that the phrase “evidence is material” found in Wyo.R.App.P. 12.08 should properly be understood to mean relevant evidence within the definition found in Wyo. R.Evid. 401.