(dissenting, with whom Lynch, J., joins). I dissent. In the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350 (1975), we allowed an exemption to the parent-child immunity doctrine in automobile tort actions to the extent that the damages were paid from motor vehicle liability insurance. Although subsequent decisions have questioned the validity of the insurance coverage requirement of Sorensen, see Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 630 n.4 (1976); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 363 (1976) (Quirico, J., concurring); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Fahey, 385 Mass. 137, 138 (1982), never has the court expanded the parent-child immunity exception beyond motor vehicle torts.
Our reticent approach to dismantling the immunity between child and parent is best explained in the concluding passages of *767the Sorensen opinion. “We limit our holding to the circumstances of the case before us: an automobile tort action brought by an unemancipated minor child against a parent. Allowance of such an action neither undermines ‘parental authority and discipline’. . . nor threatens substitution of judicial discretion for parental discretion in the care and rearing of minor children. Neither parental authority and discipline nor parental discretion in child care is called into question by an automobile accident case. . . . We are mindful that there may be parental exercises of discretion and authority which should be immune from scrutiny in a court of law. However, we are not here confronted with such cases and we need not speculate as to the scope of our holding. That scope will be determined by following the logic and policy of the present decision.” Sorensen, supra at 365-366 (footnote and citations omitted).
To allow the child in the instant case to maintain an action against her mother for failing properly to supervise her activities at the pizza shop is to ignore each of the reservations expressed by the Sorensen court. Unlike a motor vehicle tort action, allowance of the present action tends to undermine parental authority and discipline by substituting for parents’ discretion in the care and rearing of minor children that of the court. Nor should we create a new immunity exception that would allow a child to maintain an action against a parent where the alleged negligent supervision occurred at the parent’s place of business, a limited exception that even the plaintiffs describe as “not logically defensible.”1
The decision today to strike the parent-child immunity doctrine in this case alleging negligent parental supervision flies in the face of a majority of the State courts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 223 (1980) (immunity bars action for negligence against persons standing in loco parentis); Horton v. *768Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156 (1974) (simple negligence claim by infant against mother barred by parental immunity); Horton v. Unigard Ins., Co., 355 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (tort action may not be maintained between father and son because of policy to encourage family unity and maintain family discipline); Coleman v. Coleman, 157 Ga. App. 533, 533-534 (1981) (unemancipated child cannot sue parent for injury arising from negligent act); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205 (1980) (parental immunity bars action for alleged negligent supervision); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 500 (1974) (action based on failure to supervise barred by parental immunity); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (declaring intention to retain parent-child immunity in cases involving reasonable exercise of parental discretion and authority); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8 (1972) (preserving parental immunity for negligent acts involving parental discretion and authority); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 224 (1959) (unemancipated minor cannot maintain action for ordinary negligence against parent); Zikely v. Zikely, 98 A.D.2d 815, 816 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (no cause of action exists for parent’s negligent supervision of infant); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413 (1963) (immunity abrogated except where negligent act involves exercise of parental authority or discretion respecting provision of necessities and care). Contrast Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G (1979) (endorsing minority view of complete abrogation of parent-child immunity). We should decline to expand the Sorensen exception and to encroach further upon the parent-child immunity doctrine. We should follow the logic and policy of that decision, and remain mindful of the parental exercises of discretion and authority that should continue to be immune from scrutiny in our courts. The intimacy of the parent-child relationship is too precious to be exposed to civil process in these circumstances.
Furthermore, a review of the minority of jurisdictions that do provide a business exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine discloses that the underlying theory of the exception is premised on the existence of a master-servant relationship between child and parent, and not merely on the location of the alleged negligent act. See, e.g., Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 929, 933 (Tex. 1971).