concurring specially.
As stated in his brief on appeal, Smith does not challenge the voluntariness of his plea or his understanding of the plea as negotiated, except as to the effect of the imposition of the incarceration portion of the sentence on parole eligibility and on earned time allowance.
At the hearing on the plea, defendant asked the court to impose the negotiated period of confinement under the jurisdiction of the state (OCGA § 17-10-3 (a) (2)) rather than under the jurisdiction of the county (OCGA § 17-10-4 (a) (2)). The court and counsel discussed in defendant’s presence whether sentences for misdemeanors of a high and aggravated nature, as this was, would be credited only four days per month earned time allowance if confined by the county but not if confined by the State. It was assumed that in the latter event there would be one day credit for each day served. It was determined by the court, after having been explicitly stated by the State’s attorney, that the law provided no choice; misdemeanors of a high and aggravated nature had to be served under county jurisdiction (OCGA § 17-10-4 (a)). This would mean, if followed, that only the four days credit of which the court had spoken would be earned (OCGA § 17-10-4 (b)). Counsel for defendant wanted to brief that point but the court indicated there was no need for it, being satisfied that that was the law and thus indicating that it would sentence pursuant to that under*242standing.
The confinement agreed upon was then imposed by the court to be under county jurisdiction. No objection was made nor did defendant or his counsel indicate that they did not understand that this was the legal premise for the sentence or that they wished to withdraw the plea. Two weeks later defendant filed his motion to withdraw the plea.
Eligibility for parole is not at issue. Counsel did not know when defendant would be eligible, if at all, and told defendant so before the plea was entered. There was no discussion at the time of the plea about parole eligibility; no questions were asked by defendant or his counsel in this regard. The court did not address it, as it would not, because parole eligibility was exclusively within the province of the parole board and did not involve the ingredients of the sentence but rather whether, given later consideration of many extraneous factors, actual time of incarceration would be shortened.
Defendant had no basis whatsoever, considering what his attorney told him, for taking parole eligibility into account in agreeing to plead guilty. It was simply not a part of the plea negotiations, the plea proceedings, or the court’s sentence. Moreover, appellant states in his brief “that [he] is not arguing that his attorney misled him with reference to the amount of time that he might serve if he had a good prison record.” In addition, he has not shown that he is not eligible to be considered. See OCGA § 42-9-20. Parole is a collateral consequence, the result of executive clemency dispensed by a constitutional board. 1983 Constitution of Georgia, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II.1 OCGA § 42-9-1. It is not a relevant factor in a trial court’s ascertainment of whether a plea is voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly made.
As to earned time allowances, counsel had apparently earlier advised defendant to the effect that he believed he would get the one-day-earned-for-one-day-served credit and therefore his maximum time would actually be one year in confinement on a two-year confinement sentence.
Although he was wrong, as explained in court at the taking of the plea, there was no effort to withdraw. This, of course, was not a change in the negotiated plea or in any misunderstanding of its terms. Rather, it was nothing more than a pre-plea misunderstanding by counsel who apparently did not look at the statute before he informed his client of the computation of confinement time; that misunderstanding was dispelled by the state’s attorney, as acknowledged by the court expressly in defendant’s and his counsel’s presence. Thus it *243was clear at the time of sentencing that the court had no option to sentence to state custody, and that time served would be credited with four days per month instead of one day for each day served. All is succinctly set forth in OCGA § 17-10-4. Where a plea is entered knowing that confinement will have to be under county rather than state jurisdiction, and that it will be subject to the lesser earned time credit of four days per month, defendant should not be heard to complain after he thinks about it further and decides he is dissatisfied. He has not undermined the conclusion of the trial court that his plea was voluntary and knowingly and understanding^ made.2
Decided February 26, 1985 Rehearing denied March 28, 1985 Theodore S. Worozbyt, William A. Morrison, for appellant. James L. Webb, Solicitor, Lawrence L. Washburn III, Charles S. Hunter, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.The legislature has a limited power with respect to certain repeat offenders who are serving life sentences after their death sentences are commuted.
While I do not intimate that a different result would be reached under state constitutional law, I point out that the issue before us is only whether defendant’s federal constitutional right was violated. All of the authority he relies on is federal, including the state cases, which construe the federal constitutional mandate. His arguments involving federal noncon-stitutional law are, as the majority has said, not controlling.