dissenting.
I dissent. The majority correctly states the standard of review which we employ presently: “[Bjefore a court may exercise its discretion to open a default judgment, the moving party must show (1) that the petition to open was promptly filed, (2) that a meritorious defense exists, and (3) that the failure to act can be reasonably explained. See: Rounsley v. D.C. Ventre & Sons, Inc., 361 Pa.Super. 253, 256, 522 A.2d 569, 571 (1987)[.]” Majority Opinion at 10. See also Jung v. St. Paul’s Parish, — Pa. —, 560 A.2d 1356 (1989). The majority, applying that standard and, at the same time, invoking broad equitable powers, reverses the decision of the lower court.
While I do not believe that appellant has offered a reasonable explanation for his failure to plead in a timely manner, the majority cites, as a reasonable explanation, the following:
The discussion of settlement was entered upon by the parties within the twenty day deadline for responding to the complaint. Appellee during that settlement discussion extended the deadline for response to the complaint, affording to appellant the color of excuse for concluding that rigid compliance with the extended deadline was not a matter of essential urgency. (Majority Opinion at 12). However, the majority also states:
There is sound basis for the decision of the trial court to refuse to open the default judgment. The appellant must, of course, be charged with the dreadfully poor judgment displayed by its president ... The president of *14appellant attempted to display to counsel for appellee a sophisticated knowledge of legal affairs, but has revealed instead a shallow conceit which associates must find offensive. (Majority Opinion at 10-12).
Upon review, I am convinced that appellant has not offered a reasonable excuse for his failure to plead in a timely manner. This is not a case where judgment should be opened because appellant’s counsel, through oversight or incompetence, deprived the appellant of his “day in court.” See Jung, supra; Commonwealth, Dept. of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580, 442 A.2d 689 (1982), citing Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 226 Pa.Super. 270, 307 A.2d 423 (1973). Rather, the cavalier attitude of appellant’s president was the sole cause of appellant’s failure to plead in a timely manner, not the appellee’s gratuitous extension of the initial filing deadline as cited by the majority. As such, I am unable to conclude that the trial court’s refusal to open the judgment constituted an abuse of discretion.