dissenting.
I dissent. The question presented in this case is whether an auction company is liable as a seller of goods under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, adopted by this court in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) and *377expanded in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977).
In Francioni this court extended the application of Section 402A specifically to “lessors” of goods and in a general sense to anyone:
“who enters into the business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property ...” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment f. What is crucial to the rule of strict liability is not the means of marketing but rather the fact of marketing, whether by sale, lease or bailment, for use and consumption by the public.
Id., 472 Pa. at 367, 372 A.2d at 738 (emphasis added, some citations omitted).
In my view an auction company is a “supplier” of goods subject to strict liability under Section 420A. As I stated in Nath v. National Equipment Leasing Corp., 497 Pa. 126, 439 A.2d 633 (1982), (in which I urged the court to extend “supplier” liability to entities which provide products to the public under financing leases) “[i]t is beyond dispute that in Pennsylvania the imposition of strict liability has been premised on the need to relieve consumers of a burden which may be intolerable to one upon whom caprice has placed it and to shift that burden to those whose business it is to traffic in commerce ”. Id., 497 Pa. at 135, 439 A.2d at 637-638 (Larsen, J. dissenting).
The majority, in this case, does not dispute that Vilmeier Auction Company is a “supplier” of goods and that the auction was a “means of marketing” the goods in the stream of commerce. It distinguishes, however, the “auctioneer” as a supplier to which liability does not attach because: 1) it is “not equipped to pass upon the quality” of the goods it markets; 2) it does not have a “direct impact” upon the manufacture of the goods; and 3) there is no “continuous relationship” between it and the manufacturer of the goods. The flaw in this analysis is that the majority, again, as in Nath, is erroneously injecting concepts of *378negligence into a Section 402A case where such concepts have no place. Indeed, as I stated in Nath:
... we have consciously and consistently rejected an approach to strict liability which is predicated upon any element of fault, knowledge of the trading parties (or lack thereof), consumer expectations, or other elements alien to defendant identification on bases other than their participation at any stage in the manufacture or marketing (in any fashion) of products.
Id., 497 Pa. at 135-136, 439 A.2d at 638. In this case the pertinent factors for extending strict liability, as set forth in Francioni, are all present: 1) the auctioneer may be the only member of the marketing chain available for redress; 2) the extension of liability will serve as an incentive to safety; 3) the auctioneer is in a better position than the consumer to prevent the sale of defective products; and 4) the auctioneer can redistribute the cost of compensating for injuries by increasing its fees or percentage of receipts of sale. Id. 427 Pa. at 368-369, 372 A.2d at 739. See also, Nath at 136, 439 A.2d at 638 (Larsen, J. dissenting).
Accordingly, Vilmeier Auction Company meets the only proper test for determining liability under Section 402A. Thus, I would reverse the order of the Superior Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of Common Pleas granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins this dissenting opinion.