dissenting:
My reading of this record discloses only one conflict in the evidence; that is, whether defendant was present in the bowling alley to buy drugs from Loder as agent Plahm testified defendant told him after his arrest and as defense counsel argued to the trial court, or was he there to sell drugs to Loder as Loder and the agents testified. Further, it appears that the trier of fact discounted any impeachment of Loder by reason of his statement, and its immediate retraction, that he had not discussed a recommendation of sentencing leniency with the assistant State’s Attorney. Finally, there was no impeachment of the MEG agents.
While it would always be preferable to have additional evidence such as drugs and money being exchanged in the presence of police agents, that element of the offense can be inferred, and thus proved, from the circumstances surrounding the buyer’s contact with the seller. (People v. Gilmer (1969), 110 Ill. App. 2d 73, 249 N.E.2d 129.) Although the testimony of an accomplice must be viewed with suspicion, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to warrant conviction, and the fact that the accomplice himself is a criminal and expects leniency does not of itself raise a reasonable doubt. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267; People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 495 N.E.2d 1207.) Here, the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated. Material corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony is entitled to great weight. People v. Brown (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 271, 281 N.E.2d 682.
In People v. Byas (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 562, 432 N.E.2d 1226, the court observed that even if the testimony of the witness in that case was accorded the scrutiny of an accomplice’s testimony, the great extent to which a defendant’s own statements corroborated the details of the witness’ testimony provided a sufficient indication of reliability to support a jury verdict of guilt. (People v. Byas (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 562, 570-71, 432 N.E.2d 1226.) When a defendant elects to justify or explain his presence at or near the scene of a crime, while denying participation, as did defendant here to the police after his arrest, he must tell a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities. People v. Spagnolia (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 455, 458, 173 N.E.2d 431.
I conclude that the circumstantial evidence established that the transaction, being a sale by defendant of cocaine to agent Plahm through the middleman Loder, took place even though there was no evidence of money or drugs being transferred directly to or from defendant at the scene; that is, the corpus delicti and defendant’s guilt of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Aldridge (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 176, 179, 166 N.E.2d 563.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County finding defendant guilty.