dissenting.
While I join fully in Judge Carley’s dissent, I believe a few points should be emphasized. There is no division on this Court in finding the language used by defense counsel to be odious and obnoxious. However, I do not believe we are entitled to substitute our judgment for that of defense counsel on a question of trial strategy in a case where that strategy was obviously effective to a large extent, in that the defendants were acquitted of three of the four felony offenses with which they were charged.
It is one thing to accept the defendants’ contention that their counsel went “overboard in trying to make it palatable for the jury to acquit them without having it appear that the jury was approving of defendants’ character and behavior . . . ” It is quite another thing to reverse the defendants’ convictions on this ground. Although we may agree that the trial court had the right to step in and rebuke counsel in order to protect the dignity of the proceedings, I do not believe the court’s failure to do so inures to the benefit of the defendants under the circumstances of this case. I fear that the effect of the majority’s *288opinion is to permit defense counsel to build reversible error into the record through the expedient of going “overboard” in pursuing a favorable verdict.
I would affirm the convictions.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Carley join in this dissent.