The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress certain evidence obtained in a warrantless search of appellant’s car, after which appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty1 to one count each of carrying a pistol without a license,2 failing to register a firearm,3 and unlawfully possessing ammunition.4 His only contention on appeal is that his motion to suppress should have been granted on the ground that the search of his car was unreasonable and thus viola-tive of his Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.
I
The facts pertinent to our review of the issue presented in this case are few. At 2:45 a.m. on the morning of June 29, 1985, two officers of the Metropolitan Police Department observed a car with three passengers make an illegal u-turn on Pennsylvania Avenue. The officers stopped the vehicle, spoke briefly to the driver and asked him to step out of the car. After administering a breathalyzer test, they arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant, a passenger, then stated that he was the owner of the car, which a subsequent computer check of the vehicle’s license tags confirmed. The officers then ordered appellant and a third man out of the car and frisked them.
The police searched the interior of the car and found a loaded .25 caliber pistol and three shotgun shells in the locked glove compartment — access to which was obtained by use of a key connected to those *91in the car’s ignition. The police arrested appellant, who later admitted both his ownership of the gun and his knowledge that it was in the glove compartment.
The trial court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress the introduction into evidence of the gun and ammunition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that the police obtained the gun in a search incident to the lawful arrest of the car’s driver and was therefore not within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. This appeal followed.
II
A.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court adopted a bright-line test regarding the permitted scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of one of its occupants. The Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that “the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment,” and construed the term “container” to mean “any object capable of holding another object ... including] closed or open glove compartments....” Id. at 460 & n. 4, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 & n. 4.
In Smith v. United States, 435 A.2d 1066 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 1454, 71 L.Ed.2d 665 (1982), we first had occasion to apply the rule enunciated in Belton. In Smith, we reviewed the warrantless search of a locked glove compartment incident to the lawful arrest of the car’s driver. In upholding the validity of the search, we concluded that Belton prescribed a simple, two-pronged test: “(1) whether the police had probable cause to make the arrest and, if so, (2) whether the search of the automobile was a ‘contemporaneous incident of that arrest.’ ” Id. at 1068 (citing Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 460-61, 101 S.Ct. at 2864). We held that “[if] both conditions were met, it follows the search ... was reasonable.” Id.
Appellant here has conceded — as he must — that the police had probable cause to arrest the driver for driving while intoxicated. See D.C.Code § 40-716(b) (1986). Furthermore, he does not argue that the search of the glove compartment was not incident to that arrest. Our examination of the record confirms that it was contemporaneous. Consequently, in light of the express holdings in Belton and Smith, supra, that once police lawfully arrest the occupant of an automobile they may search both the car’s interior and the glove compartment incident to the arrest — whether locked or open — our inquiry ends, and we conclude that the search which yielded the pistol was reasonable and thus was not offensive to the Fourth Amendment. See Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864; Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 487 n. 2 (D.C.1985).
B.
Appellant argues, however, that the broad holdings in Belton and Smith notwithstanding, his reasonable expectation of privacy in the glove compartment of his automobile should have rendered it immune from a search thereof incident to the lawful arrest of the driver. We disagree.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court examined the bases underlying the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s per*92son in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.... There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” —construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id. at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. at 2040.
In Belton, supra, the Court recognized that while these principles are stated clearly enough, they had not been as clearly applied to specific cases. The Court noted that
the protection of the Fourth ... Amendment[ ] “can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which ... makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.” ... This is because “Fourth Amendment doctrine ... is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be ‘literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.’ ”
Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2863 (citation omitted).
Thus the Court, concluding that “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and experience to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront,” id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)), formulated the rule enunciated in Belton. The rule is to be applied uniformly, without resort to a determination “ ‘of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search....’” Id. 453 U.S. at 459, 101 S.Ct. at 2863 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)).5
In circumstances where the police stop a vehicle with multiple passengers and arrest one of them, the need for the police to discover either hidden weapons which could be turned upon them or evidence which could be destroyed is no less acute simply because a person other than the arrestee owns the “container” in which those items might be located. In fact, because of the number of people involved, the need may be greater. Third-party ownership of the auto or “containers” therein would not necessarily prevent the arrestee from gaining access to those items. It should not, therefore, bar the police from searching them in the same manner as if they were owned by the arrestee.
The Supreme Court has observed that the justification for this type of search is “not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.” Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. So too, we think that the arrest justifies the reasonable infringement on any privacy interest that another passenger in the automobile may have in that container. Clearly, the ownership of a car by a third party not present at the time of an occupant’s arrest does not preclude a search of the car’s interior and any container located therein. See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 501 A.2d 796, 797 (D.C.1985) (ownership of car by friend of defendant); Purce v. United States, 482 A.2d *93772, 778-79 (D.C.1984) (woman owned car in which male defendant arrested). We perceive no reason why that third party’s presence at the time of arrest should suddenly render those areas immune to search.
Ill
Appellant’s argument is essentially with the Supreme Court’s broad holding in Belton. That case, however, establishes the rule that where the occupant of a car is lawfully arrested, “police are authorized ... to search the person of the arrestee and ‘the area within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.’ ” Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1357 (D.C.1977) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978); see Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 460-61, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. Given the fact that the police lawfully arrested an occupant of appellant’s automobile, they were entitled to search the passenger compartment and any containers located therein incident to that arrest.6 We thus conclude that the search was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court correctly denied appellant’s suppression motion. The judgment of conviction is consequently
Affirmed.
. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 11(a)(2).
. D.C.Code § 22-3204 (1981).
. Id. § 6-2311 (1981).
. Id. § 6-2361 (1981 & 1988 Supp.).
. Given this holding, appellant’s argument that the search was improper because there is "no evidence of record that the officer ... feared possible danger to himself' or that there was "any indication that the officers believed contraband or evanescent evidence to be present” is without merit.
. Appellant contends that while the police permissibly searched the driver’s person because the latter may “have had access to weapons at the time of his arrest,” they exceeded the proper scope of searches incident to arrest by searching the car as well. This appeal is meritless in light of Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864.