dissenting.
The opinion affirming the denial of retirement benefits notes that Shiomos’ service commenced on January 3, 1973, and that he retired on March 1, 1984, at which time he withdrew his accumulated deductions and began receiving his monthly benefits. The denial is rooted in Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides, “No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed under section 18 of this article or under Article VI.” The State Employes’ Retirement Board (Board) has interpreted the term “compensation” to include “any retirement allowance” due Shiomos, not including his contributions plus statutory interest.
In Glancey v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 457, 560 A.2d 263 (1989), the opinion in support of affirmance1 noted that:
Section 18(h) provides that upon an order of removal or suspension, the judge’s ‘salary shall cease from the date of such order.’ (Emphasis added.) We believe the use of the two terms (salary and compensation) is significant. *46‘Compensation’ is defined as ‘payment____ for service rendered.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 463 (1966). ‘Salary,’ on the other hand, is defined as ‘fixed compensation paid regularly (as by the year, quarter, month or week) for services ... ’ d. at 2003. A review of these definitions shows that ‘salary’ is a part of a total compensation package, more specifically, present compensation. Public retirement benefits, again, are deferred compensation. Once a judge is removed and therefore has forfeited his office, no more services may be rendered and no more salary can be due. It necessarily follows that the section 16(b) prohibition against paying ‘compensation’ to a removed judge must refer to deferred compensation, i.e. retirement benefits. That a judge makes contributions to a retirement fund out of salary troubles us not, as those contributions plus statutory interest will be returned to the errant jurist.
Glancey, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 462, 560 A.2d at 266 (in support of affirmance) (emphasis added).
As noted by the Honorable James Gardner Colins in the opinion in support of reversal in that matter, had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wished to “remove” Glancey, it could have done so specifically. Glancey, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 459, 560 A.2d at 264 (in support of reversal). However, no such order was entered in that matter, just as no specific order has been entered in the matter sub judice.
Alternatively, while public retirement benefits are deferred compensation, it does not necessarily, nor reasonably, follow that Shiomos’ retirement benefits are “compensation” as that term is used in the Section 16(b) sanction.
A reasonable interpretation of the term “compensation” as set forth in section 16(b) must be compatible with the authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to remove, must avoid any impairment of constitutional rights, and must be consistent with statutory pension rights.
*47Shiomos admitted receiving cash gifts in December of 1983, 1984 and 1985. He was subsequently convicted in Federal Court of accepting a $300 bribe in December of 1983. His appointment was terminated on November 18, 1986. Compensation, within the meaning of Section 16(b), should be interpreted as any enhancement to pension rights, other than contributions and statutory interest, occurring subsequent to the wrongdoing, herein December of 1983. Prior to the wrongdoing, Shiomos complied with all the terms and conditions imposed upon the receipt of retirement pay. This narrow interpretation of the sanction in Section 16(b) reasonably reflects the intent of the legislature, and provides a needed deterrent, yet does not infringe upon the contractually vested pension rights of members and their spouses.
The order of the Board should be reversed and the matter remanded.
. This Court’s vote in that matter (three votes for affirmance and three votes for reversal) resulted in an affirmance of the decision of the Board denying retirement benefits to another jurist under similar circumstances.