dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals, which may be found at In re Wardship of B.C., (1982) Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 19 (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting), should not be disturbed.
*213As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the catalyst for the initial removal of B.C. from the care and custody of her natural mother, L.C., was L.C.’s mental illness— schizophrenia. Her mental condition was inextricably intertwined with the behavior detailed in the majority opinion, from her act of giving B.C. to strangers in a parking lot to her inability to hold a job and her failure to cooperate with the social service agencies involved in the attempts to help her. Evidence was introduced that via medication, L.C.’s mental health was improving during the period of temporary wardship. Prior to the hearing on the petition to terminate her parent-child relationship, however, L.C. was committed to Richmond State Mental Hospital for treatment.
It may be that “there is a reasonable probability” that L.C.’s mental illness — the condition which prompted the removal of B.C. from her custody — “will not be remedied.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5 — 4(2) (Burns 1980). Her pattern of conduct between the time B.C. was removed from her custody and the hearing to terminate her parental rights certainly is not encouraging in that respect.
As the Court of Appeals explained, however, L.C.’s behavioral history is not a conclusive basis for determining that her mental condition will not be remedied:
“Normally, the trial court could look at this history and expect the pattern to continue. People normally continue to choose to act as they have in the past. Here, the record is clear that L.C.’s inabilities and failures are intertwined with her mental illness — an abnormal condition of behavior.
“L.C. has been diagnosed as having schizophrenia. Psychotropic drugs have been developed to treat and control schizophrenia. They aid the patient in maintaining contact with reality. Other drugs are usually taken in conjunction with the anti-psychotic drugs to remove the side effects of the anti-psychotic drug. Different drugs produce different side effects; therefore, the physician substitutes medications and alters dosages until the optimum result is reached. In the Matter of the N. Children (1981), 107 Misc.2d 763, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020.
“Psychotropic drugs have the effect of restoring a person to his pre-psychotic state. If an individual had a well-integrated personality before experiencing a psychotic episode, the drugs should re-establish that integrated personality and allow functioning at pre-psychotic levels. Conversely, a person with a poorly integrated pre-psychotic personality would not have their personality re-integrated. It is therefore of vital importance to ascertain the person’s condition prior to the manifestation of the mental illness. Id., 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.”
Id., Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d at 21-22.
Given that L.C.’s behavior was the product of her schizophrenia, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that medical evidence was both appropriate and necessary is a sound one. That evidence is the only vehicle by which to truly determine whether there is a “reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in his [B.C.’s] removal will not be remedied,” as is required by Ind. Code § 31-6-5-4(2), supra.
To be sure, as the majority of this Court asserts, the trial court might still reach the conclusion that L.C.’s parental rights should be terminated after it received medical evidence regarding L.C.’s mental condition and the possible future courses it might take. It does not follow, however, that expert medical evidence of L.C.’s present and future mental health is not relevant to the question. Obviously, the contrary is true; the evidence is highly relevant. Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(2), supra. And so it follows that, as the Court of Appeals held, the cause should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings “not inconsistent” with its opinion. In re Wardship of B.C., supra, Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d at 22. If the Court of Appeals’ decision was permitted to stand, the trial court could assess any medical evidence which is presented, together with the evidence already presented, and reach a decision based on all the relevant evidence necessary to an informed resolution of the dispute.
*214That approach would be particularly prudent here, for as the Court of Appeals recognized, the rights of parents in their natural children are among the most basic and fundamental rights afforded citizens by our United States Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. XIY; Stanley v. Illinois, (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551. The United States Supreme Court emphasized the significant nature of parental rights in Stanley v. Illinois, supra:
“The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (1923), ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942), and ‘[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights,’ May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 97 L.Ed. 1221, 1226, 73 S.Ct. 840 (1953). ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L.Ed. 645, 652, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, 67 L.Ed. at 1045, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, 86 L.Ed. at 1660, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 522, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).” Id., 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d at 558-9, as quoted in In re Wardship of B.C., supra, Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d at 20-1.
Our legislature’s recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights and the significant societal role of familial ties is reflected in its enactments. See Ind.Code § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1980 Repl.); Ind.Code § 31-6-4-16(d) (Bums 1980 Repl.); see generally, Perkins v. Allen County Department of Public Welfare, (1976) 170 Ind.App. 171, 352 N.E.2d 502.
Just as our United States Supreme Court emphasized in Bellotti v. Baird, (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3043, 61 L.Ed.2d 797, 807, that the “unique role in our society of the family ... requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children,” so also should prudence and discernment mark this jurisdiction’s approach to the termination of parental rights.
That is not to say that parental rights should be regarded as absolute in nature. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the termination of those rights is an extraordinary judicial determination that irrevocably breaks and ends the parent-child relationship. Ind.Code § 31-6-5-6 (Burns 1980 Repl.). Few matters which face our courts bear such fundamental consequences.
For that reason, a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mentally ill parent should not be resolved without some examination of medical evidence concerning the probabilities of whether the mental condition “will not be remedied.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(2), supra. Schizophrenia and the future course it may take in any case is not a matter which we, as judges, are equipped to evaluate;1 parental rights are not a matter to be terminated without a complete presentation and examination of relevant evidence.
For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent. The opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals, which would have permitted a complete presentation of the evidence rele*215vant to Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(2), supra, should not have been disturbed.
I dissent.
DeBRULER, J., concurs.
. The majority discounts the significance of the “mere claim that some medical program might exist which might possibly cure L.C.” Majority Opinion, supra. That treatment programs for schizophrenia do exist and, in turn, that L.C. might be cured, are obviously very relevant matters. There is no reason that medical evidence regarding L.C.’s potential for recovery should not be presented to the factfinder for his consideration and evaluation.